Although Japan and Britain are both island countries, Japanese civilization is parasitic and lacks sufficient cultural background, so it is easy to go to extremes and lacks deliberation. Due to the influence of Bushido culture, Japan often lacks comprehensive and meticulous strategic measures when dealing with its relations with great powers, and often adopts the simple method of samurai duel. If it wins, it will despise the loser-even if the opponent is a loser who should be respected; If the powerful challenger loses, Japan will grovel. The victory over Manchu and Russian government blinded Japan. She doesn't know that the essence of feudal autocratic government is the fire of people's revolution, and inefficient and incompetent administrative efficiency is the fundamental reason for Japan's victory. Japan is blind and confident: Bushido spirit and a little luck can defeat any big country. Sadly, the first two victories of the United States and Japan were different. It has a sufficient public opinion base and an efficient government operation mechanism. Coupled with the huge material foundation and strong revenge, it is only a matter of time before Japan fails.
When it comes to Japan, we can't help but mention another island country-Britain. Britain summed up the real reasons for the failure of the Hundred Years' War between Britain and France. Island countries should know enough is enough, instead of fighting land countries on the European continent. Controlling important sea routes and competing for sea power is the foundation of the cause of island countries, rather than blindly pursuing land rights like land rights countries. It is dangerous for the island country to be trapped in the mainland. In the Crimean War, Britain defeated Russia, but did not go deep into the Russian hinterland. The Opium War, so did the Qing Dynasty. Britain knows that it is much more realistic to decide the victory of the war with Russia and China through treaties than to conquer an important country unrealistically.
It is not easy to control a war, and ordinary people are often easily confused by the appearance of victory on the battlefield. However, as a wise strategist, you should know how to make progress. Giving up when you reach the critical point of the greatest victory is a superb art of compromise. Bismarck was a "prophet" who failed to March into Vienna and annex Austria, and the so-called "prophet" was a lonely master that ordinary people could not understand. It is precisely because Napoleon did not know how to stop in time that the power of the empire was consumed in the vast Russian land.
I remember that after the September 18th Incident, there were two views on China in Japan. Young soldiers advocated attacking China. As one of the few far-sighted strategists in Japan, Ishihara said with a smile that as long as China recognizes or acquiesces in the status quo of Manchuria and recognizes Japan's privileges in North China, Japan can tolerate the existence of China. According to the "victory limit theory" of Major General Shintaro Ishihara, the chief strategist of the "September 18th Incident", he resolutely opposed Japan's "expanding its war with China". Ishihara believes that once an all-out war breaks out with China, Japan will fall into a quagmire and have no chance of winning. But this opinion was quickly denied by fanatical officers, who ignored the formation of China's unified anti-Japanese forces and thought that China's army would escape as usual. The optimistic idea of "hit it with one blow" is full of most troops in the military department. Chiang Kai-shek once famously said, "China, a big country, is not afraid of being swallowed by you, but afraid of being eaten by you." . What the Japanese didn't expect from the war was that China's nationalism was unprecedentedly high, the two countries cooperated, and local warlords put aside their differences and fought in unison. Japan could have used China's internal contradictions to differentiate and utilize it, but it was self-defeating because of its short-sighted strategy. On the contrary, we found that when Britain annexed India, it began to gradually encroach on the inland with coastal colonial strongholds, supplemented by the contradiction between different religions and local states in the Indian subcontinent. After more than 200 years of swallowing, India's colonial rule was finally established.
We found that Britain's management of India was mainly slow, not aggressive; Japan lost its invasion of China in a hurry, mainly by whaling. In judgment, there is a big difference between the two. Britain also tried to eat China, but after careful study of China's history, it was found that China has been a unified feudal centralized country for thousands of years, which is different from the Indian Mughal Empire, which is a weak country composed of scattered and disunited feudal countries. China believes in Confucianism, and there are many religious beliefs in India. China is dominated by the Han nationality, but there are more than 100 ethnic groups in India. Combining these factors, Britain thinks it is impossible to swallow China directly. There are not as many contradictions available in China as in India. It is better to use the contradiction between Manchu and Han in China to support the decadent Manchu government to rule the vast number of Han people, so as to ensure Britain's privileges in China. For their own interests, the minority Manchu ruling class always reached some kind of compromise with foreign invaders to consolidate their collapsing government. Britain believes that this strategy of controlling China with China has a high cost-effectiveness ratio, which is less risky and more profitable than its direct intervention. Japan's national strength is not as good as that of Britain, but its ambition is even worse. It should be admitted that Japan's preparations for invading China are extremely adequate. Japanese maps of China provinces are better than Chinese paintings, and some maps of China Waterway are still in use in China. However, the shrewdness of Japanese tactics can't make up for the strategic mistakes, and the annexation of China eventually led to Japan's complete failure.
History cannot be assumed, and Japan cannot have the opportunity to correct its mistakes. Sometimes we might as well be glad that it was Japan's all-round aggression that led to the unprecedented unity of the Chinese nation. China people are no longer fragmented. Due to the particularly brutal Japanese, China people who are fragmented and love to fight civil war finally got together, and scattered sand finally got together into a tower. China's century-long humiliating history gradually ended with the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, and China's soul as a great power was built on the tragic victory of the Anti-Japanese War.
The short-sightedness of Japanese strategy is worthy of rejoicing for everyone in China, although the process of the war of resistance against Japan was bitter and the price was painful. But this is the price that a big country must pay to regain its due international status. Imagine that Japan, as cunning as Britain, does not fight a decisive battle with mainland countries on land, but differentiates and uses contradictions from all aspects, pays attention to cultivating and fostering pro-British intellectuals, and starts with soft power such as values and cultural factors, just like countries on the Indian subcontinent. Tens of millions of people may not die in China, but the rise of China will be stifled even more. Today, the South Asian subcontinent is divided into several countries with different beliefs, and they are entangled in the Kashmir issue. The intellectual elites in India and Pakistan did not reflect on the evil consequences of British colonialism, but thanked Britain for bringing them so-called civilized democracy and staying in the Commonwealth to be loyal to the Queen. What's more, the so-called "democratic elite" in Hong Kong today is just a freak produced by the British soft knife killing strategy.
I can't help feeling lucky that China's island rival is Japan, not Britain. As a native of China, I hate British aggression against us, but as an opponent, I have a little awe of Britain; I have only contempt for Japan. As an island country, Japan and Britain have such different strategic and cultural views, which probably determines that Japan and Britain play different roles in the world. Japan, a parasitic civilization, is strong in transformation, but not original, which is why they are called "monkey" nation.
Throughout the centuries of British colonial history, China really has a lot to learn from. Knowing how to appreciate the strengths of others can help us better stand on the world, which is different from Japan's flattery to the strong; Americans' praise for the dedication of volunteers in the Korean War reflects the confidence and generosity of the strong.
China is in the stage of revival, and we have a profound historical accumulation of 5,000 years in soft power such as cultural outlook, values and strategic thinking. Even Britain, a strategic and cultural power, is envious, let alone a "myopic" country like Japan. For a country, the construction of soft power needs centuries of long-term accumulation, which is a long historical process, unlike decades of hardware construction. In this respect, we are lucky. As long as we build the hardware now, I believe that our achievements will not be worse than those of the British Empire.