He was appraised as an expert in German armored tactics, but was forgotten by European historians after the war. On June 22, Colonel Ahadraus was involved in the Soviet-German War, which was unpredictable for his soldiers and superiors. Born in Austria, Rouse's previous war experiences are as follows: He participated in the First World War, and in 19 18, he was a member of the Austro-Hungarian Army 1 Bicycle Infantry Battalion, and participated in the war for five months; During the intermission between the two world wars, Rouse mainly served as a staff officer and was responsible for training; After the merger of 1938, Rouse became a member of the German army, and he continued to serve as a staff officer for the next two years (the most famous one was as the chief of staff of 17 Army during the French campaign), with the only exception that he temporarily served as the head of the teaching regiment for two months; According to the practice that the officers of the German General Staff Department should serve in the Staff Office and the frontline troops in turn, Rouse was appointed as the head of the 243rd Infantry Regiment in June 1940, and was transferred to the head of the 4th Motorized Infantry Regiment after 1 month. 194 1 in may, 2008, rouse was promoted to the brigade commander of the 6th motorized infantry brigade of the 6th armored division. At that time, he had not commanded even a small battle in the position of colonel. At that time, there was no reason to predict that the 42-year-old Austrian officer with glasses would eventually be promoted to the position of group army commander. In the mind of Franz Landgraf, the commander of the 6th armored division, Rouse probably gave him the impression of "inexperience". Except for the lack of battlefield experience, Rouse's previous experience basically did not intersect with the armored forces, which is particularly worrying as the commander of the troops below the 6 th armored division. Landgraf later discovered that this humble Austrian was a meticulous staff officer, a tireless trainer and an excellent officer. His command style is not bluffing, but trying to ensure that all subordinates can fully understand their tasks. This is the most glorious personality-but this personality may not be able to guide Rouse to deal with the fast-paced and fierce mechanized war. However, shortly after taking office, Rouse showed a calm demeanor. On the battlefield, he was as calm as in the staff room. When the Sixth Armored Division approached the suburb of Leningrad in northern Russia, the officers and men of the Sixth Brigade would say "Rouse can take us through" whenever encountering difficulties. This Austrian officer has a keen judgment on the terrain, seems to have a natural understanding of the synthetic operations of various services and arms, and has a talent for skillfully using unconventional tactics, so he can be said to be the most suitable successor for Teacher Landgraf. With the coming of winter, from 1942 to 65438+ 10, the 6th armored division almost lost its combat effectiveness due to the long supply lines and heavy losses of troops and weapons. General walter model (the new commander of the Ninth Army) showed excellent judgment. He left his entire rear area and logistics line under the command of Rouse. In the bitter cold, Rouse assembled construction troops, ground personnel of the German Air Force and other stragglers to assemble a miscellaneous army to defend the key railway line from Sychovka to the front. If Rouse can't hold the traffic line behind Mo Deer, the 23rd Army of the Ninth Army will probably be annihilated by the Soviets, who are surrounded by the Soviets in the northwest of Sychovka. By mid-February, Rouse finally had enough troops and began to implement his so-called "snail offensive" strategy, forcing the Soviet troops to retreat from key villages and towns and opening up a few miles wide safety zone along the railway. Rouse's performance in the Soviet winter counterattack won him the evaluation of "resourcefulness and decisiveness", and also consolidated the good working relationship between him and Mo Deer. Two years later, as the commander of Silesia, Rouse was again under the command of Mo Deer. The 6th Armored Division was transferred to France and gained several months' leisure time, but returned to the Soviet Union at 1942 12, and took part in the arduous 6th Army campaign in Stalingrad as the pioneer of the 4th Armored Army. Although the hastily organized clearing operation finally failed, at the beginning of 1943, Rouse was promoted to the rank of commander. In the position of commander, Rouse participated in several major battles: under the command of Marshal Erich von Manstein, he participated in the counterattack; During the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the war as the most right wing of kempf's regimental campaign cluster; Join the Southern Army Group to defend Kharkov; Facing the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union, he commanded the Germans to retreat across the Dnieper River. Rouse was promoted to commander of the Fourth Armored Army by Hitler because of his outstanding military exploits. In June 65438+0943+February 65438, under the command of manstein, he participated in the counterattack in Kiev. 1in March, 945, Rouse was finally dismissed as the commander of the group army. He worked in the fourth, first and third panzer armies, fought in Poland, the Baltic countries and East Prussia, and finally commanded operations in Pomerania. Despite the signboard of armored forces, most of these regiments are untrained national grenadiers, not armored divisions. But in some cases, such as Kiev, Lviv and the Baltic region, Rouse still has the opportunity to prove that he can command large-scale armored operations as calmly as when he was a teacher. Heinz guderian, former chief of staff of the German Army, rated Routh as "one of our best armored generals" and often made Routh a fireman. Because when Routh was the commander of the group army, the German army had irreversibly entered the state of strategic defense, and he was forced to become an expert in defensive warfare. The most striking feature of Routh is that since he became an armored division commander, the Austrian has not tended to use the popular concept of "mobile" defense or "elastic" defense, but prefers the concept of "local defense tactics" that he calls himself. Generals like Hermann Balck or Hasso von Mantefer often give up some areas temporarily when dealing with the Soviet breakthrough, and then use mobile forces to fight back, thus annihilating the Soviet vanguard tanks and recovering the abandoned areas. But Routh is not like them. In the face of the Soviet attack, Rouse always sticks to the existing position and never flinches. Both Hitler and Mo Deer appreciated Rouse's fighting philosophy, because few German officers could hold their ground like this. Unfortunately, after the war, the Austrians were gradually forgotten. As David Gurney and other historians have noticed many times, the study of the Soviet-German war in the 1940s and 1980s in the West relied too much on the memoirs of German officers such as heinz guderian, Erich von Manstein and Friedrich Wilhelm von Merentine. And all these people and Rouse are just nodding acquaintances. Guderian did defend Routh when he was dismissed by Hitler, but guderian's memoirs did not record Routh's successful defensive war in East Prussia in detail, and guderian also vehemently opposed Routh's tactical ideas. Manstein respects Rouse, but that's all, because Rouse was the beneficiary when Herman Holt, commander of the Fourth Armored Army, was dismissed by Hitler. In Melinzin's masterpiece The Battle of Armor, Rouse was severely criticized (although many of them were not named) because Rouse refused to fight back in Kiev or made a similar fight back in Lviv's defensive war, and the author himself preferred the counter-attack tactics favored by Hermann Balck. When Melinzin later set out to compile a book about a famous German general, he completely ignored Rouse. However, the historical research project of the US Army attaches great importance to Rouse, and his memoirs are listed as one of many famous special research projects in the Soviet-German war research project. Rouse is also listed as the most important author in the research of military contingency, military style and small unit tactics. These research projects last for a long time and have great influence. They were included in a series of pamphlets originally published by the War Department, a series of books published in small quantities later, and a complete revised edition compiled by Peter Zoulas in recent years. These research results can be preserved in the original style, which not only completely preserves the Soviet-German war from the perspective of Germany, but also exposes modern readers to the top secret archives of the Cold War. However, it is controversial how many of them were written by Rouse himself. Some first-hand materials don't even fully describe the author of Rouse's experience in the Soviet-German War.