In the late Qing Dynasty, famine occurred frequently. In the short 70 years from 1840 to 19 1 1, it can be said that disasters occur every year, and every year is a disaster year. As far as the worst disaster year is concerned, in the 1940s, the Yellow River burst continuously, followed by droughts in Qin and Henan, followed by floods in southeast provinces for three consecutive years. In 1950s, drought locust was serious, plague was prevalent, and the Yellow River was diverted. In the 1960s, the Yongding River was repeatedly breached by floods. In the 1970s, the drought continued in the north, and the "Ding Youqi famine" was terrible. In the 1980s, there was a national flood and the Yellow River flooded year after year. At the turn of the century, the drought was severe and the bare land was thousands of miles away.

Among the above disasters, flood is probably the most common and harmful. Take the Yellow River, the second longest river in China and the biggest flood in history, as an example. According to incomplete statistics, from1840-1911,the year when the Yellow River burst is just one third, and some areas burst almost every year, and some years burst simultaneously or successively. As far as the degree of flooding is concerned, the Yangtze River, the largest river in China, has always been lighter than the Yellow River. As Wei Yuan said, "Since the past dynasties, there have been rivers without rivers" (Noe: Wei Yuanji, Volume I, Raising Rivers, Zhonghua Book Company, 1976, p. 388. )。 However, by the end of the Qing Dynasty, the Yangtze River was increasingly flooded, with more than 30 floods, including 3 catastrophic floods. According to statistics, Yongding River, located near the capital, broke 33 times in the late Qing Dynasty, once every two years on average, among which Tongzhi broke 1 1 for nine consecutive years, with an incredible frequency. Others, such as Huaihe River, Liaohe River, Pearl River and seawall, often burst floods. Let's look at the drought again. If the drought in the late Qing Dynasty is divided into several grades, namely, severe drought, severe drought, severe drought, drought with more than one province or even several provinces, drought with more than half of the hardest hit areas, and drought with a duration of two years or more, as well as descriptions of "naked land thousands of miles away" and "people eating people" are called severe drought, then 1846- 1847 Qin Dynasty For example, the frequency of floods and droughts in Shandong, Guangdong, Zhili and Anhui provinces is quite high. Due to the weak ability to resist disasters, natural disasters have also caused serious damage to society. The first is the death of the population. For example, in the "Ding Qiqi Famine" at that time, more than10 million people died of hunger and epidemics, of which the death rate in the hardest hit areas exceeded half, and some areas even reached 95%. In addition, natural disasters often destroy buildings, roads and bridges; It also directly restricts the development of agriculture, leading to the barren land and the decline of agricultural output; After the disaster, hundreds of thousands, millions or even tens of millions of hungry people fled everywhere, seriously endangering social stability.

It should be said that the occurrence of famine is first influenced by some specific conditions of the natural environment, such as cosmic celestial bodies, geology, topography, climate, rainfall and so on. However, whether it can constitute a disaster and the extent of the disaster usually depend on many other factors, mainly the economic and political conditions within the society. The high frequency and destructive nature of famine in the late Qing Dynasty was obviously related to political corruption and frequent wars at that time. People of insight in the late Qing Dynasty knew the relationship between political corruption and famine. For example, Wei Yuan blamed political corruption for the flood of the Yellow River and frequent floods. Sun Yat-sen put it more clearly: "China people have suffered four major and long-term sufferings: famine, flood, disease and insecurity of life and property", "there is only one cause of all disasters, that is, widespread and systematic corruption" and "corruption is the main cause of famine, flood and epidemic". (Note: Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen, volume 1, p. 89. These statements are not unreasonable, especially in the politics of rivers and famine, which is more direct.

From the aspect of river administration, although the Qing government still attached great importance to river defense and invested a lot of manpower and material resources every year, due to the serious corruption of river officials, a large amount of river defense funds were embezzled and squandered by river officials in various ways, and the quality of river defense projects went from bad to worse. The major rivers in the country have not been effectively managed, and floods have repeatedly occurred.

The Qing court spent more money on river defense than ever before, and it is increasing. After Daoguang, the expenditure of river engineering is always more than 6 million taels, and the annual expenditure of Three Rivers is often 7 million taels to 8 million taels. Unplanned expenditures of other projects are becoming more and more frequent, and the expenditures of major projects such as blocking the mouth and opening and closing the dam are increasing year by year. For example, 184 1 year (in the 21st year of Daoguang), Donghe Xianggong spent 6 million taels, 1844 (in the 24th year of Daoguang), Dongbajian1.1.900 million taels, and in the early years of Xianfeng, Fenggong was 4 million taels. As far as the fiscal revenue of the Qing government is concerned, it was about 40 million taels in Daoxian period, and only 70-80 million taels after Tongguang period, "one third of the cost of river regulation project" (Note: Zhou Fu: Four Kinds of River Regulation, A Brief Introduction to the Yellow River Fangjun Militia). ) It is almost "exhausting the wealth of the world to do things." (Note: Wei Yuanji's Raising Rivers, Volume I, Zhonghua Book Company, 1976, p. 388. However, the greater the expenditure, the more times the Yellow River will burst. Why? The reason is that a large amount of river defense funds are not really used for river defense, but are squandered by river officials, that is to say, the extravagance and waste of river officials is the main flow of most river defense funds. According to records, "Nanhe spends five or six million yuan a year, but one practical engineer is not as good as one. I know better for officials to squander." (Note: Notes of the Qing Dynasty, Volume 45, Xianfeng Current Affairs. ) so, what is he Guan's life and daily life like? Jin Anqing, an aide to Li Xingyuan, governor of the two rivers at the end of Daoguang, said: "The daily life and diet of Jiangren are related to foreign merchants in Guangdong and salt merchants in Huaihe River." (Note: Jin Anqing: Water Window Spring and Golden Cave. )。 It is recorded in Notes on Yong ān@① that the author once met a shop assistant and talked about the south river atmosphere. According to him, "eating, wearing and playing with horses and chariots are extremely extravagant." He Guan gave a banquet. "People are often tired and get their own food. There is never a final banquet." At a banquet, there was a dish called "Laba Fish", which everyone thought was delicious. During the dinner, one person got up in the toilet. "Suddenly, I saw dozens of dead dolphin pillows lying on the ground and asked why, so I offered a bowl of pickled dolphins, which is the back meat of these dozens of dolphins. The way is to keep the dolphins in the room and everyone will chase them with bamboo poles. The dolphin ran around crying, so it died. Take a piece of its back meat and squeeze dozens of dolphins for a banquet. The covered dolphin is dying, and its essence is all extracted from its back, cut and cooked, which is extremely crisp ... I have done my best in the ditch, "said Zaifu, who has only been here for a few months and has reached @ 2000 dolphins. Goose feet, monkey brains, fish soup and other dishes are also jaw-dropping. (Note: Xue Fucheng: Notes on Yong ān@①. ) He Yuan's office is living such a luxurious life, dancing all day, and each office "must store a pear garden". "From New Year's Eve to New Year's Eve, there is no performance every day. From morning till night, although no one goes to the theatre, the actors are very calm" (Note: Xue Fucheng: Notes on Yong ān@①). )。 The funds for river defense are also used to attract diners, give gifts to relatives and friends, and bribe officials. According to records, "every ordinary tourist who dismissed from office in the spring, the provinces take river engineering as the golden point, and some people travel south alone, from Donghe to Nanhe to Yangzhou to East Guangdong, and get 20 thousand yuan." "Great works have gathered hundreds of thousands of people at once, so that tourists, businessmen, people who advocate Excellence and people who are not lazy from all over the world have taken away their attention to this river." "In the new Hanlin, there are people who bring paper to pay homage to the handsome river. When the handsome river calls him up, he can get 10 thousand gold, and those who bring paper to the imperial palace can get a thousand dollars." "People who pass by the Pupu of the Forbidden City are very grateful." (Note: The thirty-fourth chapter of Water Window Spring, Notes on Yong ān@①, page 70; Huang Junzai: Golden Pot and Ink, Volume 5, Twelve Red, Volume 1 River Engineering. )。 This was the so-called "south river habit" at that time.

Behind the extravagance and waste of life is corruption, which means making false reports, demanding more public funds, cutting corners and deducting at different levels. False reports of ups and downs in river defense have always existed, especially in the late Qing Dynasty. It is common to exaggerate the danger and ask for more public funds. Jin Anqing, the author of Spring on the Water Window, said with great anxiety: "The river is the most abundant, and the money for water balance is the least. The southeast, north and south rivers spend 78 million yuan a year, accounting for two-tenths of the total expenditure ... Among them, there is no way to overcome redundancy. " He put forward a ten-year reform plan. He believes that even after ten years, "if it takes a million years, An Lan can still be celebrated forever". Of this1100,000, 500,000 is used for the project, and the remaining 500,000 is used for "supporting the private interests of the public". Therefore, the seriousness of flood control funds can be imagined. In the same light-year, Ouyang Yu's Notes on Experience recorded such a thing. During Su Tingkui's tenure as the river chief, the Yellow River burst in Henan, and was blocked by the governor of Henan at a price of 6,543,800 yuan. Sue is an honest official. He "personally supervised the work and personally handled all the purchases". After the project is completed, there is still 302,000 yuan left. The governor advocated dividing it, but Sue refused to give it back to the Ministry. As a result, the governor "failed to do what he wanted to do, and he was very disgusted with it ... and bombed it." Because "anyone who succeeds in harnessing the river is falsely reported, and gets seven tenths of the outside, and the size is equally divided, and the department is bribed by three points, so it is not refuted. Now Su Gong has returned the surplus silver, and besides, the Ministry also hates it. " As a result, the Ministry tried every means to pick out "several articles that were inconsistent with the case and had the same reference" in Su's memorial, but the uncooperative officials were "dismissed". Later, he was appointed as the governor of Henan Province, "it is also worth an execution, so please pay money", and the result was also "dismissed from his post". The author sighed with emotion, "exaggerating things, asking more public funds to do things, reporting imaginary numbers, and enriching themselves, this is the long-term policy." And these two people are filthy and want to show their honesty. Should openly taboo, uneasy about the position. (Noe: Ouyang Yu: Notes on Experience, p. 9 1. At that time, there was a popular saying: "The crime of wasting money is small, and the crime of saving is big." (Note: Wei Yuanji's Raising Rivers, Volume I, Zhonghua Book Company, 1976, p. 388. )

In specific projects, supervisors cut corners and have the habit of following suit. There is a saying that "civil servants eat grass and officers eat dirt". The former means that civil servants are full of corruption when purchasing materials, while the latter means that Wu Zhi pocketed money in dike construction. 1868 (Tongzhi seven years), the Yellow River burst in Rongze, Henan. The entrance was only over 30 feet. Because the foreman's "searching for materials to buy soil is generally a lie, and it is a lie from top to bottom" and "money and food don't complement each other, so that the flood is serious." A month later, the gap was not blocked, but widened by more than 200 feet. (Noe: Li Wenhai et al.: Chronology of Modern Famine in China, Hunan Education Press, 1990, p. 273, p. 364. ) 1887 (13th year of Guangxu), the Yellow River burst in Zhengzhou, flooded several provinces and left millions of victims homeless. The explosion was caused by a mouse hole (badger hole). At the beginning, her husband's head was valued at 200,000 yuan, and she pocketed most of it in Li Zhujun, where the river department managed the engineering quantity. The worker only took 40 thousand yuan, so he put the branches in the hole and covered them with soil. As a result, they sneaked into the top and were executed. In addition, Li "neglected to invade fishing on weekdays, resulting in insufficient materials on the embankment". In case of danger, "there is no straw and soil on the river trunk". (Noe: Li Wenhai et al.: Chronology of Modern Famine in China, Hunan Education Press, 1990, p. 273, p. 364. This can be said to be a typical example of political corruption leading to the breach of the Yellow River. At that time, there was a saying: "The Yellow River burst, and there was a million gold buckets". Corrupt officials even hope that the Yellow River will burst. "It is lucky for them to find another case for those who are in danger." "If you don't break your mouth for a long time, the river workers, the book office and the Ding Yi will all go through small holes and enter the water. Within a month, it will be confirmed. The other generation has an affair and has a way to embezzle." (Note: Wei Yuanji's Raising Rivers, Volume I, Zhonghua Book Company, 1976, p. 388. )

This is the case with the regulation of the Yellow River, and so are other rivers and seawalls, so it is not difficult for us to understand the social causes of frequent floods in the late Qing Dynasty. Political corruption directly or indirectly leads to famine, which is not only manifested in river politics, but also in various drawbacks in famine politics, which is also an important reason for frequent famine (mainly famine).

The "famine policy" in the late Qing dynasty mainly includes disaster reporting and verification, that is, disaster reporting and disaster investigation; Delaying the collection of money and grain, that is, exempting or delaying the collection of part or all of the land taxes and taxes payable by landlords; Relief for the victims means distributing money and food according to their poverty. In addition to the two most important disaster relief policies, there are pension, security, loan, epidemic eradication, work-for-work relief, millet adjustment, adoption of cattle, application of cotton-padded clothes and medicine. In addition, the warehousing system is also an important measure for disaster preparedness and relief, including regular warehouses, social warehouses and voluntary warehouses.

How much role did such a relatively complete set of "famine relief" play in disaster prevention and famine relief? According to the regulations, after the disaster happens, the local authorities should report it in time. However, in many cases, it is obvious that natural disasters occur in China, sometimes very serious, while local disasters are concealed. Why? Covering up the disaster situation is bound to be "urging the levy as usual" in the disaster year, and the local officials hide the disaster situation only for "urging the levy as usual". This will not only bring considerable economic benefits to local governments, but also evade responsibility and whitewash peace; Others worry that the formalities are cumbersome and the delay in the construction period will be punished. From some historical materials, we can clearly understand that famine is caused or aggravated by underreporting the disaster. For example, before the "Ding Qi Qi Huang", Shaanxi and other places had been suffering from drought for two consecutive years, but "the superior only knows how to push the exam, and the subordinate only knows that the crop is better than the grain, so we still have to harvest the crops as usual despite the drought for years", which led to the omission (note: declaration187716438))/kloc According to statistics, "there are no more than twenty-three live disasters in the relief office", and the rest are "migration routes @ ④" and "cities, counties and villages are empty". Zheng Sizan, the suggestion historian, analyzed the reasons and thought that the disaster was obvious, and local county officials "took the exam on their own, but reported it as a middle school". When the disaster was very serious, they still "raised money as before", resulting in "delayed collection", and the victims could not get timely relief and starved to death. So he said, "People in the ravine died not from natural disasters, but from personnel." . (Note: On the fourth day of June in the 24th year of Guangxu, Zheng Si praised it. )

In the disaster relief work in various places, there has always been a saying of "clearing the disaster" and "mud disaster". The so-called "disaster relief" means that local officials are law-abiding, honest, and act according to the rules, and disaster relief funds can be paid in full to help the victims. The so-called "mud disaster" means that corrupt officials often "regard disaster management as profit" (Note: The Records of the Qing Dynasty, Xuanzong Dynasty, volume 472. ), misappropriation, deduction of relief funds. 1882 (the eighth year of Guangxu), when a flood occurred in Anhui, Zhou, the alternate road in Zhili, received170,000 yuan for disaster relief and went to southern Anhui for disaster relief. When he arrived in the disaster area, he only took out 22,000 yuan as relief money, and the remaining150,000 yuan was "business interest". (Note: Record of Dezong in Qing Dynasty (volume 168). ) 1885 (15th year of Guangxu), Shi Yu 'enlong impeached Fushan county magistrate to deduct relief funds. According to him, after the county was flooded, the court "ordered the damaged houses to pay 3,000 yuan each, and the county only paid 300 yuan", which was only one tenth of the prescribed amount. )。 1898 (in the 24th year of Guangxu), more than 30 counties in Shandong were flooded, but the relief money was delayed in the local area, and it was not released in a hurry until the court sent someone to check the relief money. During the relief period, "the members sent communicate with the first person and share the fat." One or two of the ten families took the lead and forced the whole village to take care of the poor, resulting in "countless hungry people" ... everywhere. "(Noe:" Recording Deputy Files "Chen He Bing Guangxu December 22nd, 24th year. )

"The strategy to save the famine lies in preparing for the famine", and "preparing for the famine is better than a good year". (Note: Issued to fishermen in Hunan Province: Sixty Strategies for Saving the Famine. It should be said that the storage system in Qing Dynasty was relatively complete. However, in the late Qing Dynasty, bureaucratic corruption and various drawbacks of the warehousing system became more and more prominent. For example, local officials ignore the adequacy of granaries and do not buy them in time after cashier; The warehouse damaged by natural disasters, wars and disrepair cannot be repaired, and the granary is moldy; The grain stored in the warehouse has been sold, misappropriated and stolen. Because of these "accumulated disadvantages", the deficit of each warehouse is very serious. Warehousing in many places has existed in name only, "or empty grain warehousing, or warehousing." (Note: Collection of Imperial Political Canon, Volume 37, Household Administration 14, put into storage. ) In such a situation, warehousing naturally cannot play a role in preventing famine. Let's take "Ding Qiqi Famine" as an example. As far as the degree of drought is concerned, it is "slightly similar to Daoguang Bingwu (1846)", but the famine is much more serious. "There is no bark and grass roots to dig, and there is no food to buy." (Noe: Li Wenhai et al.: Chronology of Modern Famine in China, Hunan Education Press, 1990, p. 273, p. 364. The governor of Henan asked him to borrow food from other provinces. The Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development asked: According to the quota, there should be 950,000 stone grains in Henan. Why go far? Whether there are 950,000 stone grains in the warehouse is unknown, and even if there are, it is a drop in the bucket. After the disaster, the imperial court tried to take this as an opportunity to rectify the storage, and Shaanxi Governor Ceng Guoquan seemed to have made a great determination. However, according to his successor Zhang Zhidong's report, although all the granaries and valleys have been bought, "it is planned to buy 70%, which is extremely scattered and only one area is prepared, which is not conducive to the overall situation." (Note: Collection of Imperial Political Canon, Volume 37, Household Administration 14, put into storage. In addition, the basic function of continuous liquidation is to reduce and stabilize food prices in time, which can not only adjust the seasonal changes of food prices, but also curb the soaring food prices caused by famine. But in fact, many historical data show that this effect is not obvious. In the late Qing Dynasty, the price of rice rose sharply in the event of famine, which caused people to have a psychological panic. "Occasionally there is a disaster in the corner, or the sun is a sign of drought, or the rain is a sign of water, and it rises instantly." (Note: Continued Imperial Classics, Volume 43, Household Administration, Storage. )

During the famine, the extremely hungry victims often eat things that cannot be used as food, such as chaff @ ⑤, bark, weeds, Guanyin soil and even cannibalism. Such cases occurred frequently in the late Qing Dynasty, and the list is endless. In the late Qing Dynasty, wars were frequent. 1840-191170 for more than 70 years, at least half of the time was in war. It is worth noting that most of the disasters in the late Qing Dynasty occurred during or after the war. Facts show that frequent wars have caused great damage to society, which is also an important reason for the frequent famine in the late Qing Dynasty.

First, the frequent military expenditures and huge reparations after the war made the Qing government's finances in a state of crisis, and it was impossible to obtain enough funds for disaster prevention and relief, which was the reason for frequent disasters in some areas. The situation in Shunzhi area is very telling. Li Hongzhang, governor of Zhili, compromised in "Rebuilding the Terrain of Zhili River": "Since Daoxian County, there are many military supplies, so pay more attention. In other words, the cost of annual maintenance will decrease layer by layer. Therefore, things in the river are getting worse and worse "(Note: Huang Pengnian: Ji Fu Tong Zhi, Volume 84, Page 52. )。 Take the Yellow River as an example. 184 1 year (twenty-one year of Daoguang), Xiangfu burst its mouth in Henan. At that time, the Qing government was busy with the war and could not raise huge military expenditure. In the face of the critical situation of stopping water supply for eight months after the breach, it is difficult to make up 5 million taels. After many twists and turns, it was not until the second year that the gap was blocked. Unexpectedly, a few months later, the Yellow River burst again in Taoyuan. After the flood, it was suggested to build a dam and dig a river below the breach to control the downstream flood. However, the Qing government, which had just experienced the Opium War, was overwhelmed by military expenditure and reparations, so where would it care about the river regulation project? 1855 (the seventh year of Xianfeng), the Yellow River once again burst in Tongwa Room. At that time, half of the southeast was occupied by the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, and most of China was at war. How can the precarious Qing government have the energy to plug this gap when it is unable to make ends meet? The Qing government said in the imperial edict: "At present, the military affairs are not balanced, and it is difficult to build for a while if the salary is not renewed." (Note: Records of the Qing Dynasty, volume 173. Unable to stop the building, the Yellow River was allowed to cross, resulting in the diversion of the Yellow River. In the following decades, Zhongshan East and other provinces suffered from the Yellow River disaster.

Second, the long-term war has caused the decline of agricultural production and the hardships of farmers. In addition, the Qing government stepped up the search and payment of war expenses and reparations, and farmers' ability to resist natural disasters was more fragile than before. Once there is a slight famine, there will be a tragic situation of hungry people everywhere and starving. For example, after the suppression of the peasant movement war in the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, "the people's strength is particularly poor, and it is difficult for Jin @ ⑦ to support 10 years old." . (Note: Quoted from Yan: Modern Economic History of China, People's Publishing House, p. 840th. According to the report, "Since the boxer twice compensated the soldiers in the Sino-Japanese War, the amount spent in the past has soared by 40 million to 50 million. Although the cloud has not been assigned, the provinces have searched invisibly. ..... Rich people can be self-sufficient, and Chinese products are all thrifty. For poor servants, cowards are displaced, while the strong are thieves. " (Noe: Li Wenzhi: Information on Modern Agricultural History in China, Joint Publishing Company, 1957, p. 9 13. )

Third, the war has also caused great damage to the ecological environment. In many areas after the war, forests were cut down, bark and vegetation were stripped off, barren hills and mountains were everywhere, and large areas of land were barren. For example, after the war in the 1950s and 1970s, the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River and the Yellow River basin, which were originally economically developed, were in ruins. There are many records about this, and only one or two are selected here. Take southern Jiangsu as an example. Before the war, "the population was dense, ... the opposite side started with smoke", but after the war, "look at the weeds, the town blocked the road" and "thorns are everywhere, ... as muddy as a desert" (Note: The Complete Works of Li Hongzhang, Volume 3. Zeng Guofan said in his letter: "In recent years, I have been engaged in military activities. Everywhere I went, I saw houses destroyed and trees cut down." (Note: Complete Works of Zeng Guofan, Letters. In addition, according to the unequal treaties, imperialism cut down trees to build roads in China, and forests in many areas were completely cut down, which led to imbalance of ecosystems, soil erosion and land desertification, and increased the frequency of floods and droughts.

Fourthly, after the two Opium Wars, the great powers obtained the privilege of legalization of opium trade through unequal treaties, and the massive import of opium led to the growing trend of opium cultivation in China. By the 1960s and 1970s, almost all provinces in China had planted poppies, and Gansu, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Shandong and Henan had become places rich in poppies. Because opium cultivation in these areas takes up a lot of labor and cultivated land, grain production has become an inevitable trend. Ceng Guoquan, the governor of Shaanxi Province, analyzed the evil consequences of opium cultivation from two aspects: geographical location and manpower. He said: "Although this famine in Shanxi Province is called a natural disaster, it is really caused by personnel. Because poppy is widely planted in China, folk accumulation is gradually exhausted, and there are few such bumper years. When it comes to shortage, I'm at a loss. ..... Chajin Province covers an area of more than 530,000 hectares, and its geographical location is limited. If we plant more poppies per mu, we will get less food per mu. Because of the heavy profits, Wang Jing often planted poppies in fertile fields, biàn@⑧, and put the grain in barren places, leaving the place destitute. ..... The poppy is about to be harvested, and when the farm work is tight, the manpower will be driven away from the poppy, and the fertile land is barren and cannot be cured. This manpower is also slack. Poor geographical location, reduced manpower. Therefore, people in the sky at that time would only get the middle barnyard grass, which is bitter without wheat and straw; In the event of a natural disaster, it will be hopeless. " (Note: The Memorial of Zeng Zhongxiang, Volume 8. )