The establishment of the "Northwest Federal Government" and the divergence of strategic policies between the Red Army and the Fourth Army after the meeting were the beginning of Zhang's anti-party separatist activities (1May-August, 935).
1935 In May, before the first and fourth armies joined forces, Zhang set up the so-called "Northwest Special Committee" in Maoxian without authorization. The SAR has a Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and just like the central organization, a "Northwest Coalition Government" has been established. Zhang served as the secretary and chairman of the special Committee of the allied government. Why "coalition government"? In Zhang's own words: "It was the political liberation movement that helped the people." In fact, it is an independent government agency. He wants to replace the organizational form of the Soviet regime with federal autonomy. 1at the end of 932, before the Red Fourth Front Army entered Sichuan, he wanted to set up an autonomous government. (1) But the Red Army failed to realize its intention when it entered Sichuan. However, it can be seen from the highest military command organ of the Red Fourth Front Army in Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet Area that Zhang is engaged in the northwest center, and its highest military organ is the Northwest Revolutionary Military Commission, not the Sichuan-Shaanxi Revolutionary Military Commission. Zhang realized that the Sichuan-Shaanxi Soviet area was not located in the northwest. Obviously, he has other intentions. He wants to break away from China's national conditions, imitate the Soviet Union, engage in "alliance with the United States" and practice national self-determination. It can be seen from his congratulatory message from the Northwest Special Committee to celebrate the establishment of the "Federal Government" that the banner he said was erected: "The leadership of the Northwest National Liberation War was unified, which laid the base camp of the northwest rear area of China Revolution", "Tibet and Xikang can be recovered in the west, Xinjiang and Qinghai can be reached in the north, Yunnan and Guizhou can be promoted in the south, and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Sichuan-Guizhou Soviet area can be integrated, which is a huge red front to crush the imperialist Kuomintang. This is the final victory over the imperialist Kuomintang and the last new stage of the China revolution. " (2) Obviously, he thinks that it is impossible to win in the central region, and the China Revolution can only develop in the ethnic minority areas in northwest. This is Zhang's erroneous analysis of the revolutionary situation in China. He didn't see that the rise of ethnic contradictions would inevitably change the changes of class relations. His fantasies, which are not in line with the reality of the China revolution, are actually impossible.
On May 30th, Zhang, in the name of the chairman of the Northwest Federal Government, published the Declaration on the Establishment of the Northwest Federal Government and the AnnouncementNo. 1 of the Northwest Federal Government, claiming that he "led 300,000 elite soldiers of the Red Fourth Army, the 26th Army of the Shaanxi-Gansu Red Army, the 25th Army of the Southern Shaanxi Red Army and the 90th Army of the Southern Sichuan Red Army, and won complete victory in Sichuan and Northwest China." "Unite and lead 150 million people to cooperate with the 600,000 Western Expedition Army of the Central Red Army" and send a telegram to the whole country, the whole world and the Red Army guerrillas in the name of the Northwest Federal Government. (3) Trying to create a fait accompli and force international recognition. Zhang knew that the Central Red Army was going to move to western Sichuan, and the troops were heading for Tianquan, Lushan and Baoxing. At this time, his intention and purpose of organizing the "Northwest Federal Government" without authorization are self-evident.
In mid-June, after the Red Army joined the Fourth Army, regardless of the objective situation, Zhang always believed that the Red Army used to be a powerful force directly led by the CPC Central Committee, but now it is in rags, inadequate equipment and a large number of staff attrition, which must be caused by the leadership line of the CPC Central Committee. Therefore, he has always been careless and skeptical about the line, principles and policies of the CPC Central Committee. 16, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission sent a telegram to the Fourth Army, clearly pointing out: "In the future, the general policy of our first and fourth armies should be to occupy the three provinces of Shaanxi, Gansu and Sichuan and establish Soviet political power in them." (4) Zhang wants to establish the whole "Great Northwest Plan", that is, the Northwest Federal Government, and the first step is the Chuankang Plan. On 17th, Central Committee Zhang disagreed with the policy of establishing Soviet regime in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Gansu provinces. He believes that it is difficult to replenish Beichuan's terrain, and it is "unqualified" to fight from Minjiang River to the east and "no food from the north". (5) It is advocated that the Red Army should go north through Aba grassland and develop in Qinghai, Gansu and Xinjiang, and attack south in case of difficulties. Since then, there have been major differences with the CPC Central Committee on strategic policy. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made a detailed analysis of the topographical features of western Sichuan. At present, we should concentrate our firepower on breaking through Pingwu first, and take this as the hub for moving northward. Otherwise, it is difficult or even impossible for large troops to go north to Gansu and Qinghai through Aba-Mu nomadic area, but to go south in the direction of Chuankang. Even if they succeed for a while, there is no future. So attacking Pingwu and Songpan at this time is an important move. (6)
In order to unify strategic thinking, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting of the Political Bureau in Lianghekou, north of Mao Gong, on June 26th. The meeting decided to attack the north, first to seize Longnan, in order to create the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu revolutionary base. On the 29th, the Central Military Commission formulated the battle plan of Songpan, with the intention and purpose of eliminating the enemy of Hu (Zongnan) in Songpan area and controlling the roads in the north and northeast, so as to facilitate the northward operation and development. (7)
Going north to Gannan is a strategic decision made by the CPC Central Committee after correctly analyzing the national situation and the situation of the enemy and ourselves, which is very beneficial to the development of the Red Army China Revolution. Shaanxi-Gansu region has a large area and many roads. It is a region with relatively dense population, rich products and more Han residents in northwest China. At the same time, the enemy factions are complex and there are many Han residents. At the same time, the enemy factions are complex and there are many internal contradictions. This is not only conducive to the mobile operations and enemy annihilation of the Red Army in sports, but also conducive to the development and expansion of the Red Army and the supply of materials. In particular, it can quickly form a center to guide the national revolution to meet the needs of the climax of the anti-Japanese national liberation movement.
However, Zhang made a right-leaning estimate of the revolutionary situation in China at that time. He didn't believe that the country's politics and military affairs had changed in favor of the revolution, but thought that after the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in the central base area, the China revolution entered the stage of general retreat. Based on this right-wing estimation of the revolutionary situation, he overestimated the strength of the enemy and underestimated the strength of the Red Army, and completely lost confidence in the revolutionary future of the Red Army in defeating the enemy, creating new base areas, and making the Party and the Red Army leaders of the northwest anti-Japanese national war close to the anti-Japanese front. Therefore, he advocated avoiding the enemy's main force and retreating to the western border of China. To respect the corner and avoid fighting.
Zhang not only opposed the correct policy of the central government politically and politically, but also regarded the army as a capital for personal gain in an attempt to achieve his ulterior motives by relying on the strength of the army. It is precisely because of this that he can ignore the party's strategic policy, implement it, or even change and resist it. At the meeting of the two estuaries, he verbally agreed to the policy of the CPC Central Committee going northward, but did not implement it after the meeting, and even openly opposed it. One set of yang, one set of yin. This has seriously hindered the implementation of the younger brother's strategic policy by the CPC Central Committee and the two armies. When Zhang returned to Zagunao (headquarters of the Red Fourth Army) from Hekou, he held a meeting of cadres, created rumors, attacked the central authorities, incited distrust of the central authorities and undermined unity. He carried out factional activities that resisted the central strategic policy, undermined the unity of the first and fourth armies, and prevented the Red Army from going north. On the one hand, the Party Central Committee led the army's main force northward to Zhuokeji, and the Red First Army Corps and the Red Thirty Army Corps advanced to the Maoergai area west of Songpan through Matang and Kangmao Temple. On July 10 and 16, the Red Army Corps and the Red Army Corps entered Heishui and Dangba areas, and the CPC Central Committee and Comrade Mao Zedong also arrived in Lu Hua via Zhuokeji. At this time, Zhang ordered the Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee he controlled to call the Central Committee, suggested strengthening the Red Army General Command, adding a Standing Committee, and asked Zhang to be the chairman of the Military Commission, giving him the power to "act arbitrarily".
From August 4th to 6th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting of the Political Bureau in Shawo near Maoergai, and reiterated the strategic policy of the meeting of the two estuaries. The meeting pointed out: "The establishment of the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area is a historical task before the first and fourth armies. The cause of this base area is not only the rear of the Red Army's operations, but also the territory of a reasonable Soviet country that promotes the progress and development of the entire China revolution. " (8) The meeting also proposed to strengthen the Party's leadership over the Red Army, enhance the prestige of the Party Central Committee in the Red Army, and safeguard the unity of the two armies. At the same time, the meeting called on the Party and the Red Army to resolutely oppose such right opportunist ideas as exaggerating the enemy's strength, doubting the central policy and not daring to advance boldly. Obviously, this is an anti-party separatist activity against Zhang.
In order to quickly carry out the strategic task of going north, the Central Military Commission decided to abandon the original Songpan campaign plan and re-formulate the Xia Tao campaign plan, dividing the troops into two armies, Aba and Ban You, respectively, crossing the grassland and occupying the Xiahe and Taohe river basins in Longnan. (9) On August 15, the army on the right, led by Zhu De and Zhang, the political commissar of the Red Army, began to advance to Aba via Zhuokeji. On the same day, after analyzing all aspects, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China pointed out to Zhang: No matter from the aspects of topography, climate, grain and grass, enemy situation, etc., we must make a rapid advance from Banyou to Xiahe with the main force, and the main forces of the first and fourth armies take the right, leaving only Aba to cover the rear. But at this time, the left army has entered Aba from Dazang Temple and Zhuokeji. ( 10)
On August 12, the Party Central Committee led the right-wing army to arrive near Maughai, where a meeting of the Political Bureau was held. According to Comrade Mao Zedong's report, the meeting made the Supplementary Decision on the Current Strategic Policy on August 20th, and decided that under the current circumstances, the main force of the Red Army should "quickly occupy the Taohe River basin with Zhou Min as the center (mainly the east bank of the Taohe River) and attack eastward according to this area, so as to gain a vast area of Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia and become a powerful pillar and base for the continued development of the Soviet movement in China" (16543).
After the Mao Gai meeting, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission led the right-wing army from the Mao Gai area on August 2 1 day, and advanced to Sakano, and telegraphed the spirit of the Mao Gai meeting to Zhu De and Zhang. I hope that Zhang will change his original idea of going out from Aba and quickly move closer to the right, so that the main force of the army will focus on class support and make * * * develop together with Gannan. At the same time, Xu, the commander-in-chief of the former enemy of the Red Army, and Chen Changhao, the political commissar, also called Zhang, hoping that the left army would immediately move closer to the right, or quickly get off work, so that the two forces would be concentrated in Xia (River), Tao (River) and Fujian (State). And pointed out: the main force is divided, the future is at stake, and indecision will delay the revolutionary event in China. (12) It can be seen that it is no accident that Zhang insisted on going out of Aba from the left. At the intersection of two estuaries, he tried to turn left to the south. Therefore, after Zhang arrived in Aba, he refused to obey the repeated orders of the CPC Central Committee, and his separatist tendency rose spontaneously, thinking that the distance between the left and right roads was hundreds of miles, which was a rare opportunity for him to leave the CPC Central Committee for independence.
Zhang set up a pseudo-central government in the south, openly playing the banner of anti-party separatist regime (1September, 935 to1October).
Zhang set up a pseudo-Central Committee in the south, which was the peak of his anti-party separatist activities. After the meeting of the First and Fourth Armies, he went from doubting the Party and not believing in the correctness of the Party's leadership, to the instructions and strategic policies of the opposition party, all the way to the establishment of a pseudo-Central Committee in the south and openly splitting the Party. Zhang's public anti-party separatist activities are not accidental, but have been planned for a long time, which is the inevitable result of his individualism, warlordism and anti-party behavior.
At the beginning of September, I called Zhang and asked him to leave Mowa and Banyou quickly and move closer to the Right An Army. He stressed that if our army concentrates its main forces from Wudu, Xigu and Zhou Min, it will surely win great victories. On September 3, Zhang called the Central Committee: On the vast grassland, we can't move forward, but we can only wait and die. Not only will we lose the opportunity, but we will also be hindered. And decided that all left-wing troops would assemble in Aba within three days. (13) Zhang stubbornly insisted on taking Aba as the center, repeatedly used the terrain as an excuse to refuse to move closer to the right army, forcing the fifth army of the vanguard of the left army, which had entered near Mowa, to return to Aba and stop going north. (14) Since then, Zhang publicly opposed the instructions of the Central Committee. On September 9, Zhang proposed a plan to retreat to Danba, Ganzi, Daofu, Tianquan and Lushan along with the main force of the Fourth Army. He also claimed: "I think Chiang Kai-shek has a lot of contradictions with the Sichuan enemy. Fighting south is the real attack, and he will never be a turtle in a jar." (15) It is also said that according to reliable tour guides, Danba, Ganzi, Daofu, Tianquan and Lushan are all better than Xia Tao, and Qionglai Dayi is even better. The Party Central Committee sent a telegram to Zhang: "At present, the only way out is to go north, and the enemy's situation, terrain, residents and supplies are extremely unfavorable to me, which will make the Red Army suffer unprecedented difficulties. The central government believes that the policy of going north should never be changed, and the left road should go north as soon as possible. " ( 16)
Zhang not only refused to execute the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's lawsuit, but also ordered the right-wing troops of the Red Fourth Army to go south with the Central Red Army. In view of Zhang's stubborn insistence on his separatist activities in the south, the Central Committee held an emergency meeting in Brazil on September 9, and decided to lead the Central Organ and the First and Third Army Corps to the north alone. 10, the party central Committee issued a letter to comrades on the implementation of the policy of going north, indicating that the policy of going north is correct and it is impossible to go south to Sichuan, so we had to retreat to Kangding and starve in vain, sacrificing our lives, which was of no benefit to the revolution. And shouted: "There is no way to go in the south!" "Going south is a dead end!" 1 1 day, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China telephoned Zhang again, instructing him to immediately "lead the left-wing army into Banyu and Brazil, which must not be violated" (17). 12, Zhang called back to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, accusing the 1st and 3rd Army Corps of advancing eastward alone, which was "endless escape, and I really regret it in the future", and "soldiers will freeze to death without winter clothes" (18).
On September 12th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a meeting in the Russian community in Gansu. At the meeting, comrades made an important report on Zhang's right-wing separatist mistake and future strategic policy. The report deeply analyzes the differences and disputes with Zhang since the meeting of the CPC Central Committee and the Red Fourth Army, and seriously points out Zhang's mistakes such as "retreat policy", "evil act of splitting the Red Army" and "warlordism tendency" and their long-term historical roots, and warns Zhang that if he goes his own way, he will embark on the dangerous road of setting up another "Central Committee", confronting the CPC Central Committee and even leaving the Party. The meeting adopted a decision about Comrade Zhang's mistake. Practice has proved that Comrade Mao Zedong's foresight is completely correct. In less than half a month, Zhang publicly raised the anti-party banner and confronted the Central Committee.
When the Party Central Committee led the First and Third Army Corps and the Central Committee northward, Zhang not only persisted in his mistakes, but even intensified them, slandering the Party Central Committee for "trying not to lead all the Red Army, but leading a secret escape", forcing the Fourth Army and the Thirty Army of the Left Army to go south from Aba respectively.
It was ten days in September, and despite the patient persuasion and education of the CPC Central Committee, Zhang called the Aba meeting to split the Central Committee and prepare for the establishment of the "Central Committee". There is an eye-catching banner on the rostrum of the meeting, which reads "Oppose Mao, Zhou, Zhang and Bo to flee to the north" (19). At the meeting, Zhang criticized the consistent "Right-leaning" line of the CPC Central Committee, militarily. At the meeting, President Zhu De was repeatedly asked to express his nostalgia. Comrade Zhu De solemnly said, "I am a native of party member. At the meeting of the two estuaries in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, I raised my hand and agreed to go north. It is impossible for me to oppose going north today. The route of the Central Committee going northward is correct, and we should support going northward. If you go south, I can't help it. The road to the south is impassable. There is no way out and it will not succeed. " (20) Comrade Zhu De defended the northward route of the CPC Central Committee, and it was wrong to persuade Zhang to oppose the CPC Central Committee. However, under the control of Zhang, the meeting illegally passed the so-called Aba meeting resolution, attacking and slandering the correct line of the CPC Central Committee's insistence on going northward to resist Japan as "right opportunism escape route", "undermining the command system of the Red Army" and "undermining the unity of the Red Army". And beautifying yourself, retreating south is the offensive route. (2 1)
14, when the Party Central Committee led the 1st and 3rd Army Corps from the Russian border, it telegraphed Zhang again, earnestly explaining that the Party Central Committee led the 1st and 3rd Army Corps northward alone only to realize the strategic policy of leading the national war of resistance, and attempted to pave the way for the 4th and 30th Army of the Left Army and the Right Army with its own hard struggle, so as to facilitate their northward advance. At the same time, Zhang once again urged to lead the Fourth Army northward. 15, Zhang went his own way and evacuated the Red Fourth Army he led and the Red Fifth Army, which belonged to the Red Army, to the south. On 15 and 17, he successively issued an order and a political guarantee plan for the army to go south, publicly slandering and attacking the Central Committee among cadres and soldiers, but he said nonsense: "Because of the escape route of some right-wingers in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, our opportunity to move north was ruined, and right opportunists deliberately delayed our necessary preparations for moving north." Therefore, our strategic policy is to concentrate our main forces on attacking south. "He also said:" It is our primary task to go south on a large scale and destroy the remnants of the Sichuan army "to deceive the vast number of commanders and soldiers. In late September, forced and instigated by Zhang and mobilized by political organs at all levels, the 4th and 30th armies of the Left Army moved south from Aba and Baozuo, respectively, and assembled in the areas north of Matang, Matsuoka, Dangba and the 4th Jias. (22) Along the way, the autumn wind was chilly in the snowy grassland, the weather was getting colder, the soldiers were short of clothes and shoes, and food was insufficient. The difficulty is far more than crossing the grass for the first time, resulting in the sacrifice of many Red Army officers and men. On September 18, the Party Central Committee led the Red Army to Hadapu, and the troops were reorganized. At the same time, they sent telegrams to Zhu De and Zhang. Regarding the situation and enemy situation after entering Gansu, I hope to "continue northward immediately." "The CPC Central Committee waited here for three days and didn't get a reply from Zhang, so it decided to continue northward.
10.5, Zhang publicly raised the banner of anti-bathing, announced the establishment of a pseudo-Central Committee in Zhuomudiao (now Marcand County), and illegally made a so-called organizational resolution, and set up the so-called Central Committee, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, the Central Secretariat, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, the Central Government and other organizations, claiming to be the chairman, and staged a farce of "wearing a yellow robe to add to the body". He also passed a resolution in the name of the self-reliant "the Political Bureau of the Central Committee", claiming to cancel, Bo Gu and Luo Fu's posts, expel the Central Committee member and party member, and ordered Yang and Ye Jianying to be wanted and dismissed for investigation. Zhang immediately called the Central Committee and arrogantly declared: "Here, in the name of the Central Committee, the Central Secretariat, the Central Government, the Central Military Commission and the General Command. We published a document and had sex with you; You should call it the North Bureau, but so do dungans government and the northern foot army. Don't use the name of the Party Central Committee. First, cancel the name of the fourth army; You have to report to the Northern Bureau, the Northern Route Army and Western rights organizations for approval. " (23) At this point, the anti-party separatist activities reached their peak in Zhangda. Facts have proved that "Zhang's future is to set up another central Committee to confront it" predicted by comrades at the Russian border meeting on September 12 is far-sighted. Zhang Jianli's pseudo-Central Committee is unpopular. Zhu De, Liu Bocheng, Xu and others resolutely resisted and struggled against Zhang's anti-party behavior, and the officers and men of the Red Army gradually realized Zhang's mistake.
The policy of going south was a complete failure. Zhang was trapped in internal affairs and diplomacy and was forced to go west to Dawu and Ganzi. In this way, we will continue to confront the central authorities and explain their mistakes. (1935 1 1 month to1March 936)
After Zhang completed the organizational procedure of the puppet central government, the enemy's situation changed greatly. The enemy deployed troops in Jinchuan to stop the Red Army from going south. Liu's two brigades advanced to the coastal appeasement (now Daikin), Chonghua and Danba of Dajinchuan, with the main forces in Jintang, Ya 'an, Hanyuan and Xichang. One of Yang Sen's four brigades entered the Maogong (now Xiaojin) and Fuli lines along the coast of Xiaojinchuan, and the other was in Tianquan, Lushan and Baoxing areas. A group from Deng Xihou entered Rilongguan and other places east of the government, and its main force was located in Qionglai, Dayi and Shuimogou. In addition, Liu Xiang, Sun Jian politicians, Li Jiayu and Xue Yue are mainly distributed in the area between Minjiang River and Fujiang River in the north of Chengdu. In order to carry out his wrong policy, open the road to Tianquan and Lushan Mountain, and realize his idea of establishing a base area near Chuankang,1On October 7, Zhang issued the Campaign Plan of Sui (Beijing) Chong (China) Dan (Pakistan) Mao Gong, which divided the troops into two columns and attacked south along both sides of the Great Jinchuan. Since the 8th, the whole army began to take action, even in places such as appeasement, Danba, Chonghua and Maogong, defeated six brigades including Yang Sen and Liu, and captured more than 3,000 people. As soon as the battle was over, Zhang released "Heaven (all) reed (mountain), Ya (an) and Qiong (Qiong)" in December. On 24th, the troops crossed the snow-covered Jin Jia Mountains all the year round and attacked the enemies of Baoxing, Tianquan and Lushan. After the campaign was launched, Liu Xiang, a warlord in Sichuan, quickly increased the remaining regiments in eight locations and gathered around the famous mountains to prepare for a decisive battle with the Red Army. When our army advanced to the famous mountain and Baizhangguan Pass, Zhang ordered the troops to take risks under the crazy blocking of the enemy's superior forces. They met the enemy and fought hard for seven days and nights, with heavy losses. They withdrew from the fighting in late 1 1. Although the Red Army instructors fought bravely, their troops suffered more than 10,000 casualties. This is a turning point for Zhang to lead his troops south, from offensive operations to defensive retreat, and it is also a serious setback for Zhang's wrong policy.
Contrary to the difficult situation caused by Zhang and Zhang's policy of going south to the Red Army, the policy of the CPC Central Committee going north to Shaanxi and Gansu has achieved complete victory. After the main force of the Red Army arrived in the Shaanxi-Gansu base area, it smashed the enemy's third "encirclement and suppression" together with the Shaanxi-Gansu Red Army, consolidated and expanded the Shaanxi-Gansu revolutionary base area, and promoted the rapid development of the national revolutionary situation. After the news of these victories reached the frustrated troops going south, the commanders and soldiers were greatly encouraged and many cadres began to doubt Zhang's policy of going south.
After the great battles of Tian, Lu, Ming, Ya, Qiong and Qiong, the enemy situation became more serious and the Red Army was extremely passive. At this time, it is impossible for the troops to move eastward and southward. Local work is also difficult. This area is vast, sparsely populated, backward in production, lacking in food, mountainous and huge in army, and it is increasingly difficult to replenish personnel and materials, even winter is a problem. The original intention of establishing local governments in Maogong, Danba, Baoxing, Tianquan and Lushan areas has not been realized. Facts have proved that Zhang's policy of going south is not feasible, and going south can only be a dead end.
1On February 25th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau in northern Shaanxi and passed the Resolution of the Central Committee on the Current Political Situation and the Party's Tasks. Lin Yuying (Zhang Hao), the representative of China Gonggong International, returned to China and arrived in northern Shaanxi, bringing instructions from * * * Production International. The meeting listened to Lin Yuying's instructions and conveyed the spirit of the "Seventh National Congress" of * * * international production and industrial production. On 27th, Comrade Mao Zedong made a report on "On Strategies against Japanese Imperialism" at the meeting, and formulated the correct strategy for establishing an anti-Japanese national united front. When the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China telegraphed the spirit of this meeting, his strategy to attack the Party's anti-Japanese national united front was to "surrender to class enemies and give up his own ideas". "Korean sacrifice crocodile" is impossible.
1936 1 6, Zhang called and accused the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China of "underestimating the revolutionary role of ethnic minorities and expressing doubts about the possibility of the first victory of the revolution in the northwest". (24) trying to make the international industry recognize his illegal pseudo-central organization. This is the only hope for * * * to produce internationally since Zhang confronted the CPC Central Committee. He thought that with his long-term relationship in * * * production international and his consistent service to * * * production international, * * * production international would agree and support his line. The result was beyond his expectation. Calling Zhang as the representative of * * * Production International, he pointed out: "* * * Production International fully agrees with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's political line in China." "The China Revolution has become a great factor in the world revolution. The Chinese Red Army has a high status in the world, and the Long March of the Central Red Army is a victory. " (25) Later, Zhang Guantian called Zhang again: I hope to give up the second party and set up the Southwest Bureau according to the opinions of the international delegation. Zhang is still stubborn
In view of the fact that Zhang's anti-party separatist activities have reached the level of openly setting up a false Central Committee, 1 22, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee made the "Decision on the Establishment of the Second Central Committee by Comrade Zhang", pointing out: "Comrade Zhang has a tendency to set up the second Party, which is tantamount to separating himself from the Party and the China Revolution. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to announce the decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 1935 September 12 in the Russian border, in addition to ordering Comrade Zhang to immediately cancel all his' central positions' and give up all anti-party tendencies. "
The concern of the CPC Central Committee and the positive influence of international production have aroused strong repercussions in the Red Fourth Front Army. Going south and hitting a wall, there is no way to go, but it has educated the majority of commanders and soldiers. Therefore, the call for going north to resist Japan and meeting with the central authorities to safeguard the unity of the party is getting louder and louder. In this case, Zhang telephoned the international delegation of * * * * on 27th, saying that he "agreed in principle to the international line of * * * *", "We gradually agreed with the current strategic line, strived for inner-party unity in an emergency, and also expressed a new attitude to the Central Committee of the Brothers' Office, while still using Chairman Mao's name abroad", and put forward unreasonable suggestions. (26) Reng Zhang didn't believe in the CPC Central Committee and argued with it endlessly, demanding that * * * international reorganize the Politburo. Zhang also complained on the phone that the Central Committee "didn't telegraph the change of our party's strategic line in advance, and didn't tell us how international decisions were discussed and what we knew, which not only showed negative feelings, but also didn't take revolutionary interests as the premise" (27).
On 28th, Zhang made a report on the climax of the national revolution and the party's strategic line at the meeting of activists in various organs. In this report, he explained in his own words the basic spirit of the Wayaobao meeting on the establishment of the anti-Japanese national United front. He said: the anti-Japanese national United front is the strategic line indicated by international industry, and the comrades of the Second and Sixth Corps and northern Shaanxi all agree. He also said; "Disagreements about the Party's previous political and organizational opinions can be submitted to the Party's Seventh Congress for settlement, and we cannot part ways with the comrades in northern Shaanxi." (28) Zhang is a duplicitous figure. Although he agreed with the line of the CPC Central Committee and international organizations in principle, his anti-party separatist activities did not stop.
At the beginning of February, the situation of the enemy changed more seriously. Xue Yue and other six or seven divisions and the main force of Sichuan Army launched a massive attack on Tianquan and Lushan areas, and the Red Army was in a more difficult situation. There are strong enemies in front and no base areas in the rear, so supplies have become a big problem. If this continues, there will be a danger of total annihilation. In the Outline of Resolutions on the Future and Current Urgent Tasks of the Soviet Movement in China, written by the pseudo-the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Zhang has to admit this fact. He said: "It is unfavorable for the Red Army to stay in Chuankang area for a long time", "It can't adapt to the national conditions of resisting Japan and Chiang Kai-shek" and "food shortage" makes the work of local ethnic minorities more difficult. To get rid of the unfavorable situation. Decided to turn to the northwest with the main force, enter Xikang Province, and strive to rest and replenish in this area, so as to stand by and act. On February 1 1, Zhang issued the "Battle Plan for Kang (Ding) Road (Fu) Furnace (Huo)", and the troops gradually withdrew from Tianquan, Lushan and Baoxing, and then transferred to Danba, Dawu, Ganzi through Davy and Maogong. The serious consequences caused by Zhang's split.