1948165438+10, after the Liaoshen campaign, the strength of the two sides changed. The Kuomintang army decreased from 4.3 million before the war to 2.9 million, and the People's Liberation Army increased from 1.2 million before the war to 3 million. At that time, the whole situation of the national war situation was increasingly unfavorable to the Kuomintang. In northern Jiangsu, southern Shandong, East China and Central Plains, the Huaihai Campaign has started. Five armies of the Yellow Corps were besieged in Nianzhuang, northern Jiangsu, and the strategic intention of annihilating Jiangbei Herry Liu Group was becoming a reality. On the northwest battlefield, Hu Zongnan and Peng fought and lost, and they won and won. They firmly restrained the northwest field army in the northwest and did not help other battlefields at all. On the battlefield in North China, our army adopted the strategy of not attacking Taiyuan and Hohhot for 24 hours, leaving our thoughts to Fu in Peiping and Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing.

At this time, for Chiang Kai-shek, if we can abandon the deployment of troops from North China and North Jiangsu to the front line of the Yangtze River, it will at least increase the great difficulty for the PLA to launch the campaign of crossing the river in the later period. It is not known whether to maintain the system of crossing the river, because the strength of the two sides was basically the same at that time, and the Kuomintang army still had great advantages in equipment and services, especially in the air and sea. But Chiang Kai-shek made another bad move strategically. First of all, he misjudged that the Northeast Field Army would not enter the customs soon. "The Lin Biao Bandit Department has been playing for more than 50 days, and it is difficult to recover without rest in March and April." According to the conventional judgment, it is right. The point is that Mao Zedong never played by common sense. Based on the above judgment, he hesitated on the issue of withdrawing from the south, which delayed the best opportunity. After Dongye entered the customs, the daylily got cold when he wanted to leave. Second, he and Fu made mistakes in arranging troops. At that time, there were more than 600,000 Fu troops and the Kuomintang Central Army in North China. Before Dongye entered the customs, his troops had great advantages compared with the Third Corps of the North China Military Region, so Fu had capital and made rude remarks in his letter to Chairman Mao. Chiang Kai-shek agreed to Fu's operational policy of "temporarily guarding Peiping, Tianjin, controlling Haikou, expanding strength and sitting tight" because he felt that as long as he invested heavily in guarding Tanggu's seaport, even if Lin Biao's Dongye entered the customs, he could quickly withdraw south. The subsequent development of the war proved that the plan was just an armchair strategist. When Fu arranged 600,000 troops in a long snake array, Xibaipo smiled.

165438+1October16. Call Lin, Luo and Liu: "We have considered your problem and think that if Yang's position and Yang Chengwu are assembled in Suidong, Fu can be prevented from retreating to Suiyuan, but Fu and the Central Army cannot be prevented from retreating to the sea, and this goal cannot be achieved by encircling Zhangjiakou. Because the enemy * * * has 35 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry divisions, if the enemy is determined to retreat from the sea, he can concentrate more than a dozen divisions to meet the enemy in Zhangjiakou and Tianjin and Guangzhou to gradually transport by sea. Baoding garrison is composed of two divisions of the security team. Surrounding them or not is not related to the overall situation, and there have been retreats in the near future. ..... The main force of Fu Department is near Beiping. We have considered that your main force will enter the customs as soon as possible, surround Tianjin, Gushu and Tangshan, and rest under siege, so that the enemy cannot escape from the sea. Please consider whether it is better to enter the customs as soon as possible, or whether it is better to complete the rest plan in the northeast and then enter the customs. Please cable the result. "

17, 14, Lin, Luo, Liu and Tan (Zheng) called the Central Military Commission: "(1) It is difficult for the main force in Northeast China to enter the customs early, because after the liberation of Northeast China, the thinking of the troops fluctuated greatly. Soldiers in Northeast China are afraid to leave their hometown and go too far. Even some cadres began to develop hedonism, which needs to be solved vigorously. ..... At the same time, the recruitment of new recruits and prisoners has not been done well, and it will take quite some time to strive for the work, otherwise the attrition will be more serious. In addition, the winter clothes, cotton caps and cotton shoes of the troops have not been issued. (2) In order to quickly complete the preparation for dispatch, we changed the original training and consolidation plan on June 5438+04, focusing on solving the problem of soldiers entering the customs, striving to do a good job in consolidating and supplementing new recruits and captured soldiers, and educating cadres against anarchy and lack of discipline. We turned military education into an opportunity to March and fight in the future. All the captains asked for an extended break, but we didn't reply. (3) This autumn attack (referring to the autumn offensive launched by the Northeast Field Army, that is, the Liaoshen Campaign) caused fewer casualties. Although I can enter the customs ahead of time, I am now in Shenyang. The company was easy to enter the customs in Jinzhou, but suffered more than * * * 10000 casualties in the autumn attack, and needed necessary rest. We intend to strive for the ninth vertical in Haicheng and Yingkou and the tenth vertical in Montenegro to be dispatched as soon as possible. (4) If the enemy decides not to defend Peiping and Tientsin, and when our main force in Northeast China has not yet entered the customs and begins to find that our main force has already entered the customs, it will definitely start to retreat. Therefore, it is better for the troops inside Shanhaiguan pass (including the 4th and 4th 1 1 vertical units) to surround the bigger enemy before the main force in Northeast China moves, and it is better to stall the enemy. (5) The above information and opinions are for reference only, please indicate. "

The difficulties mentioned in Lin Biao's telegram did exist objectively in the Northeast Field Army after World War II, but the fighters suffered a little loss. For example, during this period, Chiang Kai-shek or Fu suddenly woke up and ordered the south to withdraw, which caused endless troubles. Chairman Mao has realized the seriousness of the problem. 18, 18, called Lin, Luo and Liu again in the name of the Central Military Commission, changed the previous discussion and decided to advance into the Northeast Field Army. "..... (2) I hope that you will immediately make all columns prepare for departure in a day or two. On 2 1 or 22, the whole army or at least eight columns will cut corners and March at the fastest speed, suddenly encircling the three enemies of Tangshan, Tanggu and Tianjin, making them flee without fighting, and striving to make the Central Army surrender (this may be very big). (3) I hope that after you give the order to start, you will start first and take command in Jidong. (4) Yang has been stopped in Fuping, and he is preparing to leave near Zhangjiakou to cooperate with Yang Chengwu to stop Fu Xijin. Xu Zhou has called back and agreed to stop attacking Taiyuan.

19 At 9: 30, Lin, Luo and Liu reported to the Central Military Commission: "Your call at 18 was received. We will definitely follow the call and start on the 22 nd to deploy another cable in detail. "

At this point, the problem of the Northeast Field Army entering the customs in advance has been solved. After the Northeast Field Army entered the customs, as analyzed by Mao Zedong Power Company, such a huge mobile corps swept away the fallen leaves wherever it went.