The Battle of Guanjia 'nao in the Hundred Regiments War
1, Peng He have differences on how to fight War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.
After the outbreak of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, there were differences between Peng and Yu on how to resist Japan. Zhu De, Peng and others advocated putting the Communist Party of China (CPC)'s main force into the anti-Japanese war, believing that the Eighth Route Army could fight big battles in the form of mobile warfare, and that the growth and development of the Red Army depended on winning battles and winning prestige. Mao Zedong, on the other hand, thinks that it is unfavorable to rashly send these tens of thousands of troops to the anti-Japanese battlefield and lose easily in the battle with the Japanese army, in view of the fact that the Chinese Communist army was small, poorly equipped and weak at that time. The basic interests of the revolution? . Therefore, he did not advocate sending troops too early, opposed positional warfare, mobile warfare and frontal warfare, and even did not advocate concentrated operations to avoid confrontation with the Japanese army. In order to unify the opinions within the party, at the Luochuan meeting in August, 1937, Mao Zedong urged the participants to adopt a resolution that was in line with their own ideas. In order to gain the leadership in the national revolutionary war, we must put the preservation and development of our own strength in the first place. We must adhere to the law of guerrilla warfare during the anti-Japanese war. Fight if you win, and run if you don't win? The Red Army must set out in batches, focusing on mobilizing the masses and creating base areas first. ?
In order to strictly implement its own strategy, Mao Zedong requires all levels to * * *? We should adhere to the operational principle of independent guerrilla warfare and focus our main work on mobilizing the masses and creating bases behind enemy lines. . Mao explicitly warned them that the Red Army should not concentrate on fighting, especially not to expose its objectives and attract the attention of the enemy. Temporarily hide all the troops and save their strength in order to disperse the work of the masses. ? Ask them at the same time? When explaining to all parties in public, he said that the Red Army can't fight positional warfare, can't fight in the plains, is not used to centralized command, and has poor technology and equipment, so it can only fight guerrilla warfare independently in mountainous areas. ? (Yang Kuisong, Battle of Zhongtiaoshan? Send troops? Reading Deng Xiaoping's "Emphasis on Negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in Zhongtiaoshan Campaign", reading history and seeking truth from facts, and "Reading Notes on China's Modern History" (P2 19), we should see that the difference between Mao and Peng is not whether to resist Japan, but how to resist Japan on the premise of preserving and strengthening their own strength. So someone came to a conclusion according to the Luochuan meeting. Mao Zedong is not anti-Japanese? The conclusion is obviously wrong. ? [detailed]
2. During the Hundred Regiments War, I always thought that Peng? Destroy hundreds of enemies or a brigade?
Although Peng's strategy was accepted and achieved great success, Peng did not give up the idea of having a big fight with the Japanese army. Although the Eighth Route Army/KOLOC-0//KOLOC-0/5 Division ambushed the trench team and motorcade of more than 4,000 Japanese troops, the losses in World War I were/KOLOC-0//KOLOC-0/0, and quite a few of the casualties were cadres of regiments, battalions, companies and platoons who came over from the Long March. Does Peng still believe it? Even for Japan's Fifth (Sakahara) Division, which has a high degree of mechanization and firepower, if it is in a mountainous area, it is still possible to win the battle. ? ("Zhu's Estimation of the Current Situation and My Strategic Policy towards the Central Military Commission",1937,65438+February) According to Ou Zhifu, the captain of the Eighth Route Army Secret Service, Peng was full of energy at that time and thought that only by confronting the Japanese army could he win the prestige of the Eighth Route Army. The Eighth Route Army is the main regular army that persists in the war of resistance behind enemy lines. It must not only be able to fight guerrilla warfare, but also attack and persist in tenacious fighting when necessary, and dare to bite hard bones. ? The Hundred Regiments War was launched against this background. ? [detailed]
Peng also found out in the Hundred Regiments War? With the enemy? Sweep? At that time, the Japanese army was generally attached to the strengthening battalion of the puppet army. ? So he? Always try to destroy the enemy so that he can come again next time? Sweep? Dare not take the battalion (equivalent to the battalion calculated by the enemy brigade) as a whole, so as to make it? Sweep? The expansion of the time interval is conducive to our military-civilian mobility. ? Peng's thought was fully revealed in his operational orders. On August 23rd, 1940, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army sent a telegram saying that "the attacking troops of all lines actively stopped the enemy from reinforcing Zheng Tai". We should try our best to prolong the campaign time and expand the results, and we should firmly assemble superior troops and destroy the troops aided by the enemy with hundreds of people or a brigade. Because only in this way can we deter the enemy from giving aid easily, and even if the enemy dares to come to help, we must gather more strength. This will prolong the time and increase the gap between enemy attacks, which is conducive to our destructive actions. ? Four days later (August 27th), there was something similar in the telegram: "The more thoroughly the Zhengzhou-Taiyuan line is destroyed, the more active I will be": in particular, I should attack or come to help the enemy within a brigade and gather the most superior troops to annihilate it. Only by annihilating one or two enemy brigades can we successfully expand our achievements. ? Similar content appeared frequently in later telegrams, showing that Peng? Bite hard bones? How anxious the heart is.
Second, the Battle of Guanjia 'nao caused heavy losses to the Eighth Route Army.
1, Okazaki detachment went deep into the hinterland of Taihang Mountain and gave it to Peng? Destroy a brigade? chance
Just in Peng, anxious? Destroy a brigade? At that time, more than 500 people from the Okazaki detachment (division leader Kenichi Okazaki) of the Japanese 4th Brigade broke into the hinterland of the Eighth Route Army base and attacked the Huangyadong Arsenal. The attack on Huang Yadong's arsenal made Peng furious. He had intended to annihilate one or two brigades. The appearance of Okazaki's detachment just gave him an excellent chance to try, so he immediately ordered 129 Division 386 Brigade to rush to Huangyadong to repel the Japanese army. Okazaki Brigade fled south quickly, and retreated to the vicinity of Guanjia 'nao, Panlong Town, Wuxiang County on October 28th, 65438, and was surrounded by more than 8 regiments 1 10,000 people, including 386 Brigade, 385 Brigade, New/Kloc-0 Brigade, Dead 1st Brigade and the Eighth Route Army Headquarters Special Service Corps. On the evening of 29th, Xiang Peng129th Division issued an operational order, and made the following arrangements for encircling Okazaki detachment. I decided to start the general attack at 4 am on the 30th. Chen Geng commanded the Sixth Brigade (386 Brigade), the Decisive Column (Decisive Column) and the Headquarters Secret Service Team as the left-wing team; Liu Deng commanded five (385th Brigade) and ten (new 10 Brigade) as right-wing groups; I'm in direct command of the mountain artillery company. The command post is located in Chenjia 'nao, northeast of Guanjia 'nao. All ministries should make preparations immediately, and at all costs, regardless of casualties, stubbornly and completely destroy the enemies of Guanjia' nao, Dongzhuang and Nakamura. ? ("The Battle of Peng Guan's Family")
Of course, according to Wang Yaonan, then head of the 28th regiment of the New 10 Brigade, the Okazaki detachment was not idle. Aware of the movement of our army, Okazaki quickly built a circular fortification on the high ground in Guanjia' nao, and dug more than 300 foxholes on the high ground under the hillside. In the foxhole, the Japanese army relied on the high ground fire cover to form the first line of defense. Taking the cave in the center of Guanjia 'nao as the headquarters, the Japanese army transformed the cave near the cliff into The Dark Castle. On both sides of the only slope leading to the foot of the mountain, four caves were transformed into powerful The Dark Castle by the Japanese army, forming a powerful crossfire. The Japanese army built fortifications according to 1: 3, that is, each gun and machine gun had at least two spare fortifications. ? Before the battle began, the Japanese army had built a solid defensive position according to the terrain.
Subsequently, a rare battle in the history of the Eighth Route Army started.
2, but the terrain and weapons and equipment at that time were very different from those of the Eighth Route Army.
Although the Eighth Route Army dispatched 8 regiments 1 10,000 people to surround more than 500 Japanese troops in the Battle of Guanjia' nao, both natural conditions and weapons and equipment were unfavorable to the Eighth Route Army, making it very passive as an attacker.
Topographically, Guanjia 'nao is a hill, the top of which is a few hundred meters of flat land in Fiona Fang, with a steep cliff in the north and a deep ditch below. The east and west slopes are steep, and only the south slope is relatively gentle, which can be used as an attack route. According to Wang Ting, who participated in the battle, he recalled: When we arrived at Guanjialing, the terrain was difficult to control. The cave there faces south. Our troops are from the south, and the hole is one or two feet away from the ditch in front. Below it is a ditch. If the troops want to get close to them, they must come up from the trench. The Japanese piled up fortifications in sacks at the mouth of the ditch We are at a low place, and they are at a high place, so our army suffered heavy casualties. Finally, our army crossed the fortifications and rushed to the entrance of their cave. All the Japanese troops retreated to the cave, which was a cave. With such thick soil, people put a machine gun on the door, and you can't fight at all. ?
In terms of weapons, the Japanese army is well equipped with aircraft assistance, but what about the equipment of the Eighth Route Army? According to Wang Yaonan's recollection: Most of the heavy firearms prepared by our army are mortars. Mortars are bent guns and cannot be fired directly. They hit the target, mostly at the top of the target. When local people dig caves, in order to prevent the cave from collapsing, they leave at least 2 to 2.5 meters of soil at the top of the cave. The power of mortar shells is not enough to collapse the soil layer with a thickness of two meters, let alone destroy the caves dug on the top of the mountain with a protective layer of several meters to ten meters. Our direct artillery shells are limited, and even if we hit the cave, we can only destroy the limited enemy mobile whistle outside the cave. If the enemy in this cave is destroyed by me, other enemies can reinforce this cave from the tunnel. ? It is difficult for the Eighth Route Army to fight this tough battle without heavy weapons.
3. There is a great difference between the commanding ability of the officers of the two sides and the fighting quality of the soldiers, which also makes the Eighth Route Army suffer a lot.
Of course, the greater gap between the two sides is reflected in the commanding ability of officers and the fighting quality of soldiers, and the Eighth Route Army paid a huge price for this:
First of all, before the war began, the Eighth Route Army lost its key position-Liushunao (Fengnao) because of negligence. Liushuling (Fengling) is opposite to Guanjialing South Slope. It is a hill higher than Guanjialing and a corner of Guanjialing. The path from Liushuling to Guanjialing can be controlled by fire. According to Li Maozhi's memory: Commander Chen stipulated that 38 regiments should be handed over to the position on the west slope of the mountain guarded by 25 regiments and 2 battalions. At night 10 or so, 1 The enemy squadron climbed up from a narrow path taken by a goat on the steep slope on the west side of our position, which was the place where the 38th regiment had to meet. Battalion 2 couldn't see the visitor's clothes clearly in the dark, so it didn't ask. Password? Don't ask Serial number? I mistakenly thought that the defense forces of the 38th Regiment were coming, so I withdrew. The enemy walked behind us, passed the area to be guarded, and came to the top of the second battalion to say that the defense here is not yours. ? The enemy mumbled a few words and then rushed at me with bayonets. Our army was unprepared for this sudden impact, caught off guard, made a mess, gave up its position and ran down the hill. In this way, an important position was given to the enemy for nothing, which not only affected the task of completely destroying this enemy, but also increased the casualties of our regiment. What is particularly serious is that the enemy occupied the top of the willow tree, which is higher than the top of the official mountain. Make the enemy's position form a corner and support each other with fire. Let the enemy get a convenient defensive posture and ensure the safety of Guanjia' nao village and ditch. ? (Li Maozhi's "Experimental Exercise of the 25 th Regiment of the Hundred Regiments"; Memoirs of the First Column of Shanxi New Army, p. 567)
Secondly, the lack of experience in dealing with plane bombing has brought a lot of casualties to the Eighth Route Army. According to Wang Yaonan's recollection: 654381October 30th, four Japanese planes came to help. Many soldiers never frown in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy, but they are at a loss in the face of bombing and strafing by enemy planes. Some soldiers ran around, and the front enemy took the opportunity to shoot, causing casualties in our regiment. ? (Memoirs of Wang Yaonan, page 345) The scruples about airplanes also made the Eighth Route Army very passive in the choice of attack timing. According to Wang Ting's memory, It turned out that according to Peng's mobilization, the battle would start at 6 o'clock and end before 8 o'clock, because the Japanese plane would arrive at 8 o'clock, which was very unfavorable to our army. Our troops are all around, but because it is winter and there is no hiding place, we plan to finish the battle before 8 o'clock. In the end, I couldn't fight all day, and there were many casualties. ?
Moreover, the artillery and infantry did not cooperate well, resulting in many people dying under their own guns. According to Wang Yaonan's recollection: 3 1 morning 10, I observed the shelling effect of the division artillery on the frontal enemy of the 772nd regiment through a telescope. Suddenly, I found that the 772nd Regiment was preparing for the artillery fire of our army and attacked the enemy violently at the risk of being hit by its own shells. The artillery of the 386th Brigade stopped shelling after discovering the movement of the 772nd Regiment. It is impossible for the division artillery to see the attack of the 772nd regiment and not stop shooting. The soldiers of the 772nd regiment are approaching the peak, and suffered heavy casualties under the attack of our artillery fire and enemy side fire. Without strong reinforcements, the 772nd regiment can't hold on. I immediately gave the order, and the first and second battalions of our regiment attacked and reinforced. At this point, the division artillery stopped shooting. The enemy discovered our army's attempt, mobilized mobile troops to launch a counter-charge, and all the 772nd regiment 100 soldiers who rushed up were martyred. ?
Also, the Eighth Route Army's awareness of using geotechnical operations to change unfavorable terrain is obviously not as good as that of the Japanese army. It can be said that the Japanese army's literacy and skills in using terrain to build fortifications are very high. According to Li Maozhi's memory, Liu Bocheng made the following comments on the fortifications built by the Japanese army afterwards. The enemy's field fortifications are very delicate. He was designed according to the plan of defending to the death, determined to die in the battlefield and loyal? The emperor? . He's on the flat land at the top of the mountain, imitating? Bagua array? Dig a circular core fortification and surround it with three traffic trenches? Taijun? Our command all deep traffic trenches can communicate with each other. Many cat ear holes have been dug in the trench, and each hole can accommodate three or five people. Large bunkers and traffic trenches are covered with door panels. Dig traffic trenches in all directions from the core position to the cliff, and dig bunkers at the edge of the ground. During the day, the enemy retreated to the core position to monitor the edge of the ground. As soon as I climbed to the edge of the ground, he aimed at shooting and shot us down. He occupied the front line at night, so I couldn't rush up. I rushed to fight the enemy in waves, but the follow-up troops went up slowly and could not completely annihilate the enemy. ? Compared with the Japanese army, the Eighth Route Army's awareness of changing the negative effects of unfavorable terrain through geotechnical operations is much weaker. In the whole operation, only the 769th regiment had a geotechnical operation, dug a road on the mountain wall and occupied some positions. Most other troops can only use primitive methods such as building ladders. As a result, a few people or even a dozen people at a time failed to achieve the purpose of the attack, but increased casualties.
In addition, in hand-to-hand combat, the physical quality of the Eighth Route Army soldiers is not as good as that of the Japanese army, which also increases many casualties. In terms of communication, the Japanese army is equipped with a radio station, which can contact superiors and friends at any time, which has brought great difficulties to the Eighth Route Army in blocking enemy reinforcements. All these show the gap between the Eighth Route Army and the Japanese army, which has brought a lot of trouble to the Eighth Route Army. ? [detailed]
4. The Eighth Route Army suffered too many casualties, and Liu Bocheng and Chen Geng had serious differences on whether to continue attacking Guan Jia 'nao and Peng.
Despite this series of unfavorable factors, the Eighth Route Army soldiers continued to attack, and the fighting was very cruel. Five hours after two battalions of the 772nd regiment attacked, 1 battalion was basically wiped out. There were only three people left in the 1 company of more than 70 people, and the company commander Liu Xianmo was killed. 3 even more than 50 people, only the instructor Li Zhengyin and two wounded; There are 68 people in 4 companies, and only 4 people are left in the end. There were nearly 200 people in the whole battalion, and in the end, less than 10 people were not injured. The tragic situation can be seen.
The heavy casualties made the commanders of the Eighth Route Army hesitate whether to continue attacking Guanjia' an. Chen Geng, who is in command ahead, calls Peng, suggesting? The terrain here is not good for me. Can you put Okazaki Brigade down and choose another favorable terrain to ambush him? It's too expensive to call like this! ? Peng refused:? No, once the Japanese army is released, it will be difficult to beat him again. It must be destroyed here! Even if it's all gone, we have to get rid of the house! ? Chen Geng was in a hurry: it's all spelled out now. What will we do in the future? I don't approve of playing like this! ? Peng Huaide was unmoved: Add it after spelling it out. Troops that can't fight hard will have no future! Opinions can be reserved, but orders must be carried out! ? Chen Geng had to continue to organize troops to attack.
129 Teacher Liu Bocheng couldn't sit still. He called Peng and suggested that the troops evacuate temporarily and find another fighter plane. Liu Bocheng replied? My boss Peng, we can't afford this money! The terrain in Guanjia 'nao is not good for me, and there are too many casualties in our army! ? But Peng still insists on fighting. Finally, Liu Bocheng got angry. He said to Peng. You're angry, brute force! I don't agree to fight this war again! ? Peng did not give in and said? If you can't get the pass, cancel the designation of 129 division and behead it, regardless of size! ?
In this way, the battle of Guanjiadeng was fought for two days and two nights at Peng's insistence, and the Eighth Route Army, which was ultimately dominant, failed to completely annihilate the Okazaki detachment. 1 65438+1October1,Japanese reinforcements approached Guanjia 'nao under the cover of 10 planes. The ministries of the Eighth Route Army suffered huge losses because of successive attacks, and it was inconvenient to fight against the Japanese again. Peng had to order the troops to stop attacking and quit fighting. Fifty or sixty remnants of the Okazaki detachment were able to escape. Chen Geng recalled that the Eighth Route Army suffered more than 2,000 casualties (including more than 2,000 people killed 1 1,000), and more than 280 bodies and three piles of ashes were left behind by the Japanese positions. Our army captured 2 wounded people, more than 50 rifles and 6 light and heavy machine guns. Regarding the casualties of the Japanese army, there have been several statements that the Japanese army killed 50 people, 6 1 person, more than 300 people and more than 400 people. As for which statement is the most reliable, further research is needed. But in any case, the battle of Guanjia' nao was indeed a heavy casualty for the Eighth Route Army. Many companies fought less than a third, and more than half of the platoon battle backbones were lost during the Red Army period, and their encirclement and suppression goals were not achieved.
Third, the dispute caused by the battle of Guanjia' nao
1 After the war with Guan Jia 'nao, people have been accusing Peng.
Whether the battle of Guanjia 'nao is right or wrong is still controversial at present. Even after the Hundred Regiments War, some people accused Peng of his command mistakes. According to Wang Ting's memory: After the Hundred Regiments War, Peng Zhen, Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping and other key troops gathered together to study why we suffered heavy casualties. Finally, a conclusion is drawn that the encirclement is too dead, so we should give them a way out, let them run on three sides and let them run in the middle. We should strike them in the middle of their movement. It should be like this. ? At the symposium on North China work in early 1945, it turned out that the battle of Guanjia' an was Peng's? A mistake? One of them was criticized. In this regard, Peng also admitted that he did have a command error: Always trying to find a way to destroy the enemy, this idea is not in line with the actual situation at that time. Because the troops were too tired, the combat effectiveness was weakened, which made the 129 division suffer more casualties. ?
2. But there are also many generals who support Peng.
Despite a lot of criticism, some people still don't put in a good word for Peng. For example, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping said in their letter to Song Renqiong in March 1942: Some comrades said that the command in the third stage of the Hundred Regiments War was wrong, which was incorrect. Because the third stage is anti? Sweep? It's just that the last question is whether to call Guan Jia 'an or not. Our conclusion is correct. If we don't fight this war, we will lose too much politically. This battle has actually stopped the enemy from rampaging in the base area with one brigade. ? Chen Geng also said:? This victory tells the enemy that Taihang Mountain is not a no-man's land, and he can swagger and rampage. ? Bo Yibo, then political commissar, also recalled:? Mr. Peng asked me to decide to send two regiments to fight, and I was very active. Although the losses in the battle were great, these two regiments also came out and became the two main regiments with the strongest fighting capacity of the death squads. ?
Not only that, but the battle of Guanjia' nao also benefited the Eighth Route Army. According to Wang Yaonan's recollection: Peng Zong, left chief of staff Liu Bocheng and other leaders carefully watched the Japanese fortifications. Obviously, after the Japanese army touched Guanjia' nao in the dark, it was able to repair fortifications regardless of fatigue and continue to fight against the impact of our four brigades with one brigade, which proved that the Japanese army was well-trained and skilled in geotechnical engineering. I reported the characteristics of Japanese fortifications to Peng Zonghui. President Peng asked me: If the Japanese attack you with such fortifications, can you not let me say: no way. My reason is that the Japanese army has flat-fire guns and sufficient ammunition. Field fortifications can't stand repeated blows. If permanent fortifications are reinforced, at least most of the traffic trenches should be covered with door panels and logs. A large number of mines should be buried in front of the position to supplement our army's ammunition shortage. These experiences and lessons are beneficial to the Eighth Route Army's participation in major battles in the future.