This honeymoon-like Sino-Soviet relationship lasted for several years. During this period, although some important events happened in the Soviet Union, such as the death of Stalin and the appearance of new leaders, it did not affect the friendly and cooperative relations between China and the Soviet Union. In line with the political, economic, military and cultural relations during the honeymoon period, the two parties and countries of China and the Soviet Union also maintained a "high degree of ideological consistency" and almost no "differences". Under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, the two sides pursue the ideology of socialism and * * * productism, speak with one voice internationally and adopt the same line and policy. Although there are contradictions and frictions in the honeymoon period between China and the Soviet Union, it only involves some specific problems encountered in the process of dealing with bilateral relations, and has nothing to do with theoretical, line, policy and ideological issues. Although the leaders of the two countries complained to each other privately, they never raised their "complaints" to the level of "ideological differences", let alone openly attacked each other. It is particularly worth mentioning that although Mao Zedong criticized Stalin's chauvinism as a great power many times and criticized that some of Stalin's views and practices were "not in line with Marxism", China leaders never said so when Stalin was alive, neither in public nor in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, nor did Mao Zedong. In fact, this is not surprising. In the process of leading the China Revolution, the Producer Party of China got the guidance and help from the Soviet Party and government and Stalin. Therefore, the producers of China, including Mao Zedong, have always claimed to be Stalin's students. At the beginning of the founding of New China, although China won the revolutionary victory, he lacked the experience of socialist construction and had to continue to learn from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union, and obtained the guidance and help from Stalin. Because of this, among the * * * producers in China at that time, as in the past, there were superstitions about the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and Stalin to some extent. In their minds, Stalin is the mentor and leader of the international proletarian movement after Lenin and the theoretical authority of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet Union was founded by Lenin and led by Stalin. He is the leader of the production parties in various countries, and the Soviet Union is an example for socialist countries. In that case, China and China can only keep up with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union, and can only continue to accept Stalin's guidance and help. It is impossible and dare not have any doubts about the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and Stalin. Even if you are not satisfied with some specific practices of the Soviet side, it is impossible and dare not doubt the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and Stalin in theory, line and policy. In a sense, the ideological consistency between China and the Soviet Union during their honeymoon period is actually the result of China and New China's efforts to "catch up" with the Soviet Union.
However, the "honeymoon relationship" between China and the Soviet Union and the "complete ideological agreement" lasted for some time, but it did not last long. As time goes by and the situation changes, Sino-Soviet relations will inevitably change. Sure enough, from 1956, the ideological "complete consistency" was affected, and later, the "honeymoon relationship" between China and the Soviet Union was gradually shaken.
The ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union were originally caused by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union. 1At the 20th National Congress of the CPSU held in February, 1956, Khrushchev, the new leader of CPSU, made a secret report on personality cult and its consequences, sharply criticized Stalin's serious mistakes, and put forward the view that capitalism can peacefully transition to socialism through the "parliamentary road" in the summary report of the congress. (Note: See the Origin and Development of the Differences between Soviet Leaders and Us-Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU, People's Daily1September 6, 963. ) This unusual practice has produced great repercussions not only in the Soviet Union, but also in China and the whole world. The Central Committee and Mao Zedong attached great importance to Khrushchev's secret report and immediately held several meetings of the Politburo Standing Committee to discuss the matter. The results of the discussion showed that the initial reaction of China leaders was complicated. It is believed that Khrushchev and the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union both "uncovered the lid" and "poked the hole" when criticizing Stalin. Mao Zedong said: "To say that he lifted the lid means that his secret report shows that not everything is correct in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and Stalin, which breaks the superstition. To say that he made a mistake means that the secret report he made has serious mistakes in both content and method. " (Noe: Wu Lengxi: Memories of Chairman Mao, Xinhua Publishing House, February 1995, pp. 4-5. ) In short, Mao Zedong and other central leaders on the one hand did not object to Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin's mistakes, and even thought that it was good to make it bigger and liberated the minds of producers in various countries. On the other hand, they think that Khrushchev's approach has shortcomings, that is, criticizing an important figure like Stalin and making a surprise attack without consulting the Brothers Party in advance; Kill Stalin with a stick, or completely deny Stalin, only talk about mistakes, not merits. (Noe: Wu Lengxi: Memories of Chairman Mao, Xinhua Publishing House, February 1995, pp. 6-7. ) This shows that the Central Committee of China did not fully agree with the views and practices of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and had its own views on how to treat Stalin. The differences between China and the Soviet Union have broken the past situation of "complete agreement" on major issues of principle. What is more noteworthy is that China's leaders not only criticized the Soviet Union's practices internally, but also wrote and published two articles, Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship and Re-discussion on Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship. For the first time, they euphemistically expressed their different opinions from Sue. Apart from the differences between the two sides on Stalin, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also disapproved of the theory of "peaceful transition" put forward by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union, believing that it violated the principle of violent revolution of Marxism-Leninism. However, in the first year, Mao Zedong and others did not argue with the leaders of the Soviet Union on the issue of "peaceful transition", nor did they publicly publish articles criticizing Khrushchev's views. Until 1957+0 1 June, Mao Zedong led the meeting, because in the draft declaration drafted by the Soviet union, the issue of peaceful transition was raised again.
Shortly thereafter, in addition to the above two major differences, the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union made new progress. Due to the indirect influence of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union. Poland and Hungary occurred in 1956. China's Central Committee was dissatisfied with the Soviet Central Committee's handling of the Polish-Hungarian incident, and put forward its own different views, thus criticizing the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union for their chauvinistic mistakes in dealing with the relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and so on. But relatively speaking, before 1957, the differences between China and the Soviet Union on other issues were not as important and noticeable as the Stalin issue and the peaceful transition.
After the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union, there were major differences between China and the Soviet Union, and it was certainly not accidental that the situation of "complete agreement" changed in the past. In my opinion, there are at least the following important reasons: first, the two sides have different experiences, lack understanding of each other, and have different starting points to see the problem, so differences are inevitable. Take Stalin as an example, regardless of whether Khrushchev's approach is completely correct or not, after all, he started from the situation and needs of the Soviet Union, including Khrushchev's own political needs, while China's leaders didn't know much about the inside story of Stalin's administration, and they didn't have a personal understanding of the serious consequences caused by Stalin's mistakes, and they mainly considered the problems from the needs of international capitalism and China, so their views naturally wouldn't be completely consistent with those of the Soviet side. Second, the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev exposed and criticized Stalin's mistakes, ruthlessly broke the myth that Stalin was always wise and correct, and the myth that the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union were perfect weakened Stalin, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's long-term self-centered position, broke superstitions and liberated the world's producers, including China. But before the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union, especially during Stalin's rule, this situation was impossible. Third, after several years of practice and development in the early years after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the new China has gradually grown up, and the leaders of China have gained some experience, especially their own views on how to carry out construction. In addition, the Soviet leaders who came to power after Stalin's death, including Khrushchev, are inferior to Mao Zedong and others in terms of qualifications, prestige and experience, which greatly enhanced the self-confidence of China leaders such as Mao Zedong, and there is no need to stay in the Soviet Union as in the past. Mao Zedong's different moods, different treatments and different performances during his two visits to Russia 1949 and 1957 most vividly reflected this point.
Today, it seems that the differences between China and the Soviet Union after the 20th National Congress of the Soviet Union are not only understandable, but also not a bad thing in itself. At least, it is normal to have differences, but it is not normal to be "completely consistent" like "honeymoon". More importantly, as long as the two sides handle it properly, ideological differences will not necessarily have a negative impact on the existing friendly and cooperative relations. The fact of 1956- 1957 has proved this point.
Realistically speaking, in the more than two years before the summer of 1958, although there were major differences between China and the Soviet Union on Stalin, peaceful transition, relations between the two brotherly countries and other issues, Sino-Soviet relations not only did not regress, but even developed further, which was closer than before 1955. During this period, not only the two sides continued their friendly cooperation, but the Soviet Union also increased its assistance to China. An outstanding performance is that China and the Soviet Union signed the New Defense Technology Agreement on June 1957+00 because the Soviet Union promised to help China develop missile nuclear weapons and agreed to provide China with atomic bomb samples. The ideological differences at that time did not reverse Sino-Soviet relations, of course, for a reason. The author believes that, first, there are not many differences and arguments between the two sides, and they are limited to the scope of general theoretical issues and have not directly related to each other's national interests; Second, in the debate, it was mainly China that criticized the Soviet side, while Khrushchev and others had to be patient with the Chinese criticism because they were in trouble and needed the support of China leaders. Third, China also needs economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union, and hopes to continue to safeguard the overall situation of Sino-Soviet friendly cooperation. Therefore, its attitude and methods in criticizing the Soviet Union are cautious, and it has no intention or practice to provoke the Soviet Union, so the debate can be conducted in a calm atmosphere. It can be seen that as long as it is handled properly, ideological differences are not necessarily related to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.
(2)
Although the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union did not harm the relationship between the two sides for more than two years after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union began to reverse and gradually deteriorated from the summer of 1958. It is true that the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations can not be entirely attributed to ideological differences, but it is undeniable that ideological differences have also played a considerable role in aggravating the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. What needs to be seriously studied is how ideological differences aggravated the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations after the summer of 1958.
The author thinks that, on the whole, ideological differences began to damage Sino-Soviet relations after the summer of 1958, because other new disputes between China and the Soviet Union have further widened ideological differences and intertwined with other disputes, and both sides have adopted a wrong attitude towards differences and disputes. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects:
First, since the summer of 1958, China and the Soviet Union have clashed on many issues involving national interests, which not only increased the differences and disputes between the two sides, but also made the ideological differences that seemed insignificant suddenly more serious, complicated and destructive.
In international exchanges, any country must undoubtedly proceed from its own national interests and safeguard its own national interests, and China and the Soviet Union are no exception. However, during the "honeymoon period", because the two sides basically followed the principle of "equality and mutual benefit", they did nothing to harm the interests of the other country. Although there were "frictions" on some minor issues, there was no dispute on the big side. However, since the summer of 1958, the situation has changed, and China and the Soviet Union have clashed on a series of issues involving national interests. The initial storm was the long-wave radio station and the joint submarine fleet incident that summer. The Soviet side, out of its own needs, took advantage of China's hope to get Soviet help to build submarines, and proposed that the two sides cooperate to build a long-wave radio station and a joint submarine fleet in China. China, on the other hand, thinks that this is an attempt by the Soviet side to control China under the pretext of helping China. The two sides have been arguing about this for months. Mao Zedong was furious and Khrushchev flew to Beijing to defend the Soviet Union. Although nothing happened afterwards, both sides planted a bad feeling from then on. Then, in August of that year, the Taiwan Province Strait dispute happened again. In order to attack the Chiang Kai-shek clique and warn the United States not to interfere in China's internal affairs, China launched a campaign of shelling Jinmen and Mazu without consulting the Soviet side. Although the Soviet side ostensibly expressed its support for China and opposition to the United States, it was actually dissatisfied with China for fear that the shelling of Kinmen and Matsu would cause American armed intervention and drag the Soviet Union into the US-Soviet War, and then unilaterally tore up the "New Defense Technology" signed by 1957+00. 1959 China takes self-defense measures to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and opposes Indian provocations on the Sino-Indian border. However, the Soviet side believes that the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border is not conducive to the relaxation of Soviet-American relations and undermines the peaceful atmosphere of Khrushchev's visit to the United States. So regardless of China's repeated opposition, publicly issued a statement in favor of India. In addition, the Soviet Union was also dissatisfied with China's Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune Movement, while China was quite critical of Khrushchev's enthusiasm for establishing relations with the United States, and so on. Obviously, the above disputes all involve each other's national interests. Generally speaking, in international relations, the conflict of national interests will inevitably affect the quality of bilateral relations, so the conflict of national interests between China and the Soviet Union will inevitably damage the relations between the two sides. Even without ideological differences, Sino-Soviet relations will be reversed. However, different from general international relations, there are not only national interests but also ideological problems between China and the Soviet Union, and they are always inevitably intertwined, making the problems more complicated and serious.
That's what happened. Generally speaking, the dispute between China and the Soviet Union over national interests has caused mutual dissatisfaction and ill feelings, which has intensified mutual distrust. All sides began to doubt each other's motives and even thought that the other side had ulterior motives. China and the Soviet Union are both countries that attach importance to ideology. When there are more and more problems, all parties should find the reasons from the ideological aspect and dig the roots from the aspects of theory, line and policy. It is precisely because of these arguments that China and the Central Committee of Mao Zedong began to suspect that the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev violated Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism on many issues, and then made the judgment that Khrushchev and others embarked on the road of revisionism or semi-revisionism. Mao Zedong and others thought that if there were no problems of theory and route, how could Khrushchev do so many things that harmed socialist China? ! At the same time, the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev also thought that there must be something wrong with the theory and line of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of Mao Zedong, which deviated from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and made mistakes in dogmatism and adventurism. It can be seen that the conflict of national interests actually promotes the escalation of ideological differences. Judging from some specific issues in the above disputes, some issues involve both national interests and ideology. For example, different evaluations of the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune Movement in China involve the theoretical line and political issues of how to build socialism and * * * productism. Another example is the attitude towards the United States, which is both a diplomatic issue and a theoretical issue. At that time, China opposed the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States, citing the fact that the essence of imperialism has not changed, imperialism is the root of war, and it is impossible to truly love peace. Therefore, Khrushchev is keen to please American imperialism and beautify its leaders, which is contrary to Marxism-Leninism. In this way, the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union have further expanded with the conflict of national interests, far beyond the scope before 1958.
What is more noteworthy is that on the one hand, the conflict of national interests promotes the expansion and escalation of ideological differences, on the other hand, the sharpening of ideological differences intensifies the conflict of national interests. This is even more obvious after 1960. When Khrushchev besieged China at the Bucharest meeting in June 1960 and tried to subdue China, he took further actions, tore up all contracts and agreements to aid China, and withdrew all Soviet experts who helped build in China, thus causing greater conflicts of national interests between China and the Soviet Union. 1963, in order to attack and retaliate against China in the ideological public debate, the Soviet Union changed its consistent position and decided to sign a partial nuclear test ban treaty with the United States and Britain to prevent China from possessing nuclear weapons, which made China very angry and finally decided to part ways with the Soviet Union. All these examples show that when the conflicts of national interests and ideological differences are intertwined, they are mutually causal and promote each other, making differences and disputes more and more serious and out of control, and eventually leading to the deterioration and breakdown of bilateral relations.
Second, in the face of the widening ideological differences, both China and the Soviet Union have changed their previous cautious, practical and calm attitudes and adopted self-righteous, opinionated, imposing, uncompromising and infinite supremacy, which has plunged the dispute into a vicious circle of constant retaliation and counter-retaliation, thus irrevocably aggravating the deterioration and breakdown of bilateral relations.
Although after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet Union held different views on some major issues, and their views were not necessarily correct at that time, as mentioned earlier, both sides were relatively cautious in dealing with their differences, and they were basically practical. Although they also have internal arguments and criticize each other, they all pay attention to being calm and not imposing on others. However, after the summer of 1958, due to the conflict of national interests and the expansion of ideological differences, the two sides began to become restless and arbitrary.
This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: First, self-righteous and opinionated. In the face of differences, both sides believe that their views are truly in line with Marxism-Leninism, while the other side is wrong and violates Marxism-Leninism. In an argument, both sides stick to their own views and always criticize each other, but they don't care whether the other's opinions are reasonable, and they are even more reluctant to make self-criticism. The second is to impose it on others without compromise. Both sides claim to have a desire to settle their differences. However, in internal talks again and again, in articles published again and again, both sides insist that their views are the most correct, claiming that only when the other side accepts their views, admits and corrects their mistakes can they eliminate their differences. As a result, the so-called negotiation and discussion turned into criticism of the other side. Both sides described each other's criticism as an "attack", while the Soviet side accused China of being "anti-Soviet" and the Chinese side accused the Soviet side of being "anti-China". To make matters worse, in the argument, both sides adopted the practice of "finding fault in eggs" and "settling old scores" in an attempt to defeat the other side. Obviously, their views are very close, but their formulations are different. However, instead of seeking common ground while reserving differences, the two sides are determined to find out the so-called "differences in principle" and make a big fuss. To settle old scores in history is to dig up past disputes and scold each other. In fact, things have passed, and the result of doing so can only increase each other's bad feelings. The third is infinity. The differences are very specific and involve a specific content. We could have distinguished "right from wrong" through concrete analysis, that is, adopted the so-called "practical method". However, with the widening of differences, both sides changed their attitudes and adopted the attitude of "unlimited priority", raising every difference to the attitude of whether it conforms to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the height of Marxism-Leninism against revisionism and opportunism. The Chinese side believes that the Soviet side has implemented an uncompromising revisionist line, Khrushchev is a "traitor" who betrayed Marxism, proletarian revolution and dictatorship, and implemented the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, and so on; The Soviet side also gave China a lot of labels, such as dogmatism, adventurism, Trotskyism and so on. In short, hats are flying all over the sky and the procedures are getting higher and higher. It is true that there is no "right and wrong" in the differences between the two sides, and it is not impossible to distinguish "right and wrong" through discussion. However, what is "truth" is not up to you, nor can it be proved by quoting classics, nor can it be judged by imposing on others and infinite metaphysics, but can only be tested by practice and history. Practice and history have proved that many viewpoints that both sides thought were correct at that time were actually incorrect. Many viewpoints that both sides insisted on in the dispute could not stand the test of history, as Deng Xiaoping said: "After more than 20 years of practice, looking back, both sides talked a lot of empty talk." (Note: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III, People's Publishing House, 1993, 10, page 29 1. The fourth is constant retaliation and counter-retaliation. In a dispute, both sides accused the other side of provoking the dispute first, so their own side only "fought back in self-defense" and only exercised "the right of reply to the other side's attack." In fact, they are constantly retaliating and retaliating, and the result is bound to fall into a vicious circle. No one is willing to give in, and even thinks that giving in is "surrender" or "concession" to the other party. Therefore, the differences will only increase.
Third, in order to defeat the other side in the ideological struggle, both sides adopted the practice of "open debate", which made it go to extremes and became a fatal blow to Sino-Soviet relations.
As we all know, when the ideological dispute between China and the Soviet Union finally reached its peak, it was a large-scale "open debate". Practically speaking, the occurrence of "open debate" has its inevitability. As analyzed above, since both sides are stubborn and uncompromising, and take this dispute so seriously, it will inevitably lead to an "open debate". Generally speaking, ideological differences between political parties, countries and even individuals are likely to take the form of an "open debate". We can't completely deny "open debate". Generally speaking, it is not unreasonable that "the more the truth is argued, the clearer it becomes". However, the large-scale "open debate" between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s was unusual and should be regarded as another matter. First of all, the scale of the debate is unprecedented, which is rare not only in the history of the international producer movement, but also in the history of mankind. Secondly, both sides of the debate are big parties and forces that have never appeared in history. Both sides have huge human, material and financial resources, and hundreds of millions of supporters. At that time, they were called modern means of communication, so they had a wide impact on the world. Third, and more importantly, the two sides hold their own words, and the serious opposition, sharp contradiction and arrogant attitude are also very rare in history. Although such a large-scale "public debate" was once dubbed by Mao Zedong as just a pen and ink lawsuit, "the sky will not fall", "the tree will grow as usual", "the fish in the river will swim as usual" and "it will be all right to argue for 10,000 years" (Note: Wu Lengxi: Debate for Ten Years, Volume II, Central Literature Publishing House, May 1999, No.96544). Even because ideological differences are the main content of the big debate, the essence of the conflict of national interests is covered up. The big debate has also become a big criticism. The two sides scold each other in newspapers and on the radio, which will not have any positive effect except making the opposition between the two sides more serious, making mistakes deeper and more unwilling to compromise. This has been proved by history. In a word, the way of public debate has pushed the ideological dispute between the two sides to the extreme, which is undoubtedly a fatal blow to Sino-Soviet relations. After the public debate, Sino-Soviet relations had no choice but to break down completely.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union have indeed played a very important role in the deterioration and breakdown of bilateral relations. The reason is that ideological differences are intertwined with conflicts of national interests, and both sides have adopted incorrect attitudes towards differences and disputes. It must be pointed out that the author does not completely deny the existence of "right" and "wrong", right and wrong in differences and disputes, nor does he completely deny the necessity and significance of some "struggles", such as China's struggle against the Soviet Union's attempt to control China. However, as far as the main content of the ideological dispute and the main way of the debate between the two sides are concerned, it has basically no positive significance and can be asserted. As for who should bear greater responsibility in the Sino-Soviet dispute, it needs specific analysis, but this is not the question to be answered in this article and needs to be discussed in another article.
(3)
The ideological differences and disputes between China and the Soviet Union and their harm to the relationship between the two sides have left many important historical lessons for people, which are worth learning seriously by future generations. Limited by space, this article can only briefly mention the author's preliminary views.
First, when dealing with the relations between countries, we should separate national interests from ideology as much as possible and talk about the factors of ideology and social system as much as possible.
Between different countries, there are both national interests and ideological problems, whether the ideology and social system are basically the same or between fundamentally different countries, contradictions will arise. When dealing with the relations between countries, we should focus on safeguarding our national interests, which is basic and primary. Although ideological differences and social system differences cannot be ignored, they are secondary after all and should be diluted as much as possible. It is particularly noteworthy that the dispute over national interests must not be confused with ideological differences, otherwise, Sino-Soviet relations may deteriorate and break down again.
Second, we should be very cautious about the ideological right and wrong of other parties and other countries, especially the theories, lines and policies put forward by other fraternal parties and countries, except those involving the interests of our country and the interests of all countries in the world. We should not affirm and deny them easily, nor should we comment on them arbitrarily.
This is because all countries have their own special national conditions, and political parties in all countries always put forward their own theories, formulate their own routes and policies and explore them in practice according to their own experiences and national conditions. Because other parties and countries have different experiences, they don't know much about these parties and countries, and it is difficult to understand their ideas. Therefore, they should not judge their own right or wrong easily, let alone use their so-called "principles" and "frames" to trap others and tell them what to do. As Deng Xiaoping said: "Any big party, middle party and small party should respect each other's choices and experiences and treat other parties and other parties equally." If they make mistakes, they should correct them themselves. (Noe: Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III, People's Publishing House 1993+00, p. 236. )
Third, if the fraternal party and the fraternal country do have major differences of principle involving both sides, but they are not clear, the correct party thinks it is necessary to adhere to them, and should also adopt a reasonable attitude, discuss with each other, or criticize each other appropriately. At the same time, the other party is allowed to put forward or reserve different opinions, and try to "seek common ground while reserving differences" instead of imposing them on others, and try to avoid taking the form of "open debate".