On 24th, ecologists from the State Ecological Monitoring Bureau of the Russian Federation made a final assessment of the feasibility of the construction scheme of the Far East oil pipeline. The results show that among the 52 experts, 43 people signed against the plan submitted by the Russian national oil transportation company. The reason is that the oil pipeline will be laid along the northern edge of Lake Baikal, and some places are only 800 meters away from the shore of the lake. Once an accident happens, the oil in the pipeline may penetrate into Lake Baikal, causing a huge ecological disaster. Russia's national oil transportation company must draw up a new plan. As early as 1994, China and Russia began to discuss the construction of an oil pipeline project to lay the Russian Far East to the anniversary. China and Russia have repeatedly issued statements on strengthening energy cooperation, including oil pipeline projects. After years of repeated discussions, China Oil and Gas Company and Russian Jocks Oil Company signed the General Agreement on Basic Principles and Consensus of Long-term Crude Oil Purchase and Sale Contract for Sino-Russian Crude Oil Pipeline at the end of May 2003. However, just when Jocks Oil Company announced that the oil pipeline was about to break ground, Khodorkovsky, the then president of the company, was arrested by the Russian security department, and Jocks Company was also fined heavily, and the Sino-Russian crude oil pipeline plan ran aground.

At the same time, Russian media claimed that all kinds of documents on the Anda Line signed by China and Russia since 1994 are only "preparatory work, not contracts, so they have no legal effect", and Russia "should not bind its hands and feet with the documents already signed".

However, after China held this empty and non-binding cooperation agreement and negotiated with Russia for many times in a unilaterally understood "strategic partnership", Russian high-level officials repeatedly said that they would strengthen energy cooperation with China. At the dawn of the oil pipeline project, Japan joined the competition for the direction of the oil pipeline in the Far East by providing 7.5 billion US dollars, providing oil field development technology and assisting Russia to develop new oil fields in eastern Siberia.

After some struggles and repeated verbal promises from Russian high-level officials, China lost the battle with Japan for the Far East oil pipeline at the end of 2004. Jankov, Russian Deputy Minister of Natural Resources, announced the decision to veto the Anda Line at an environmental protection conference in Lake Baikal in 2004. On July 2, 2004, Khristenko, Minister of Industry and Energy of Russia, met with China's Ambassador to Russia. He said that although the Russian government attached great importance to developing energy cooperation with China, after a lot of demonstration work, Russia had basically decided that the Nakhodka oil pipeline scheme to Japan was feasible. This is the first time that Russian high-level officials have made such a clear statement on the Sino-Japanese oil war in the Russian Far East.

In 2005, it seems that the Russian high-level officials announced that they would consider building a branch in China to a limited extent, and said that they would break ground as soon as possible in 2006. So this time Russian ecologists rejected the project, which made the Sino-Russian Far East oil pipeline face the threat of freezing again.

Before the Russian President announced the priority of building the Anda line, Russian experts had several years to confirm whether the direction of the Anda line "affected environmental protection". In addition, less than a few months later, the first "environmental veto" was shelved by the federal president. Why is there another "environmental veto" on Putin's manifesto? Is Russia a presidential system or an environmental decision-making system? These seemingly absurd questions have exposed the strategic ambiguity deliberately forged by Russian top decision makers.

While calling China a strategic partner, Russia is also highly vigilant about its development. Controlling China's crude oil imports can relatively restrict the lifeblood of China's economic development. Since China has the ability to advocate a long-term oil investment of 654.38 billion US dollars in Iran, it has extended its influence to the rear of Baku oil field in Russia, hoping that Russia will vigorously promote the Sino-Russian Far East oil pipeline, so that Russia's oil supply will not only lose its role as an exotic product, but also play a catalytic or supplementary role in the huge oil transaction between China and Russia, which greatly violates Putin's original intention of announcing "China priority" to partially control the economic lifeline of China and China's foreign policy.

Russian "China priority" decision or "expert veto" was originally a double-edged sword, a trick written, directed and performed by KGB President Putin. It depends on whether the Chinese are willing to serve various Russian policies, whether they have arrogant ambitions, and so on. It's just that the Japanese are ignorant and join hands with the United States to resist the United States at any cost, so that their ideology is blindfolded.

In particular, apart from the statement of intent or the government agreement on "total quantity" (I understand that this "total quantity" is equivalent to a vague word), the legally binding annual oil supply agreement stipulates that Russia will provide10 million tons of China oil in 2005. Under various Russian difficulties, China gave in and agreed to reduce it to 7 million tons by 2005. Besides buying a lot of second-hand military equipment to save the Russian arms industry, what is the return of China's nearly $8 billion oil investment in Russia?