I once said in an article that it was accidental and inevitable that I embarked on this road of studying. In isolation, each stage is caused by accidental factors, but the results of the previous stage virtually prepare for the starting point of the next stage. My father is engaged in the history of the Soviet Union, and he suffered a lot for it. I vowed never to follow my father's path again, but when the culture was extremely poor during the "Cultural Revolution", all I could read was the complete works of Marx and Engels and some historical books left after the "property raid". 1969 after graduating from junior high school, I, a "black five child", was deprived of the right to go to school and jumped the queue in the rural areas in the arid areas of central Gansu. 1974, a very "accidental" opportunity made me enter the Foreign Languages Department of Lanzhou University as "I can educate my children well". When I graduated, I heard that I wanted to recruit graduate students. At that time, only a few months before the exam, it seemed that the basic knowledge of "studying at home" was still useful, just like with the hand of God, I embarked on the road of my father again. When I was in graduate school, my focus was Russian history. There was no breakthrough in the academic papers, graduation thesis and scientific research tasks I attended at that time 19 17. I have a small career in my heart, not modern history. It's not just my father's experience that left a deep impression on me, mainly because I have a clear understanding of myself and my logical thinking ability is not strong. Textual research, just sort out the ins and outs of history. Once I rose to the metaphysical level, my theoretical foundation stood out. Only from the professional point of view, I seem to be more suitable for the "first stage." Moreover, during my postgraduate study, I was deeply interested in the social form of Kiev Ross, the influence of the Golden Horde on Russian culture, the origin and development of Russian village communities, and various ideological debates in the19th century. I also wrote some exercises. After working in Shaanxi Normal University from 65438 to 0982, I want to follow the existing ideas. But at that time, the focus of Normal University was modern history, not ancient and medieval times, and the Soviet history research room where I worked only engaged in "the Soviet Union" and not "Russia". I have repeatedly asked that all of you should have desks, and I will continue to ask for legs. Why are you all in the same lane? Without an answer, the subject setting forced me to "turn around", so I reluctantly began to study the Russian rural problems after the October Revolution.
one
"New Economic Policy and Russian Farmers" is the first field I entered. This was not only because the rural reform in China had just started, and the peasant problem became the first breakthrough direction of ideological emancipation and reform and opening up, but also because agriculture was the most prominent field of the Soviet system. From the historical materials I contacted, I felt that the so-called rich peasants in the Soviet Union at that time were only the inevitable phenomenon that the peasants gradually became rich under the new economic policy, so I had the idea of reversing the case for the so-called "rich peasants". During the period around 1982- 1983, not only in China, but also in the historical circles of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries at that time, it was the first time to defend the successful family farms and farmers (so-called "rich peasants") as a whole, and essentially denied the movement of "eliminating rich peasants". Because it involved sensitive fields and cutting-edge topics at that time, I dared not move forward, but I did, and the length was too long. Fortunately, we set up a publication about the history of the Soviet Union, which provided me with a place to publish and let me have a lot of discussions from an empirical point of view. It was because of that time that I was very cautious from every link. I repeatedly checked all the historical materials and documents I could see, made a lot of cards, and then analyzed and demonstrated them. Looking back now, today, with a lot of information and research on the truth of the Soviet model rolling in, these works of the year are not out of date.
From 65438 to 0983, I published a series of articles on the evolution of rural policies and the so-called "rich peasant economy" during the new economic policy period. Based on a large number of statistical data, this paper examines several development stages of the rich peasants, which have always been called "rich peasants" before collectivization: 19 18- 1920 underground economic stage, 192 1 year-/kloc-. The relative peak stage of 1925- 1927 and the self-extinction stage of 1927- 1929. By investigating the semantic evolution of the word "rich peasants" in the history of Soviet Russia and the origin and development of the Soviet rural class analysis method, this paper points out that the traditional meaning of the word "Kulak" in Russian originally refers to "miser" and "miser", and it is an abusive word with no standard. Later, populists defined it as a class, that is, the "young rural bourgeoisie". Later, the Bolsheviks took over this concept, but it was still vague until "eliminating the rich peasants". According to the statistics I can see about the income of the rich peasants, I made a statistical analysis of the "rich peasant economy" in the period of "relative affluence". I think that even in this period, the income from exploitation only accounts for 7.9% of the total income of the "rich peasants" class, while the income from labor accounts for 92%. About 1%. Accordingly, I think the traditional view that the "rich peasants" after the revolution are the rural bourgeoisie and the "last and largest bourgeoisie" is inappropriate. If the rich peasants before the revolution have not been fully bourgeois and developed into economically and politically mature classes, it is fundamental that the "rich peasants" in the new economic policy period, as a class, basically belong to small commodity producers with capitalist tendencies.
Since then, I have been deepening in this field. 1984 I published the article "On 1927-28 Soviet Food Crisis", which led to the collapse of the new economic policy, intensified inner-party struggles, and sharply left-leaning rural policies, and finally formed the "great transformation" of Stalin's model-1927 broke out at the end of the year. It is believed that during the crisis, farmers' commodity grain was not "too little" but "too much" because of "super-industrialization". The cause of the crisis is neither the "attack of rich peasants" as Stalin said, nor the so-called "dispersion and backwardness of small-scale peasant economy", but the excessive industrialization of the Soviet Union and the left-leaning mistake of agricultural policy. I think the influence of scissors difference on the grain crisis is mainly manifested in the production link, rather than the traditional circulation link. It is not so much that farmers hoard grain because of low prices, but rather that low prices have affected the development of commodity grain production. Generally speaking, the food crisis was a phenomenon of imbalance in the proportion of the national economy caused by the rush to industrialization at that time. Due to the urgent need of industrialization, the price system with scissors difference and violating the law of value can not be improved economically, and the left-leaning thought of fearing agriculture and enriching the people has emerged politically. Since neither of them has changed, it is naturally difficult for various anti-crisis policies after 1928 to achieve results. As we all know, the food crisis is the main excuse for the Soviet Union to attack or even eliminate the "rich peasants", and it is also the direct reason for canceling the new economic policy. The clarification of this issue not only deepened my systematic view on the problem of "rich peasants", but also prompted me to further study the deeper reasons and lessons of the final failure of the new economic policy in the Soviet Union.
A year after 1986, I published two articles, namely, Statistical Research on Rural Differentiation in the Soviet Union 1 920s (Soviet Historical Issues 1986, 1) and Statistical Issues of Class Division in the Soviet Union (Slim (1) From the populist statistician and the statistician of the autonomous bureau before the revolution to the socialist statistician, from the demonstration of the two statistical schools of "dynamic research" and "budget research" before the revolution and their influence on the statistical community after the revolution, to the rise and fall of various statistical theories of rural differentiation after the revolution, I have come into contact with a lot. In the early post-revolutionary period, "dynamic research" was dominant in rural statistics, and its representatives were popov and Heyacheva of the Central Bureau of Statistics. During the period of new economic policy, a new school of "budget research" emerged, whose representatives are Kritsman and Geistel of the Academy of Production Sciences. In the later period of the new economic policy, a new statistical theory, represented by Nemo Chinov, was developed, which integrated the above two schools and sublated them. But no matter what kind of statistical theory, it is difficult to prove that there is a serious "class differentiation" in rural areas. Take Neme Chinov's statistical model as an example. In his investigation, only 0.96% of all farmers have exploited 15% in the economy. Although this summative model in rural statistics during the new economic policy period still tends to exaggerate capitalism, even so, it proves that the Soviet Union's estimation of the "danger of rich peasants" is based on political needs and has no statistical basis.
Through this stage of research, I feel that there are too many fallacies in the history of the Soviet Union. As long as we stand on the basis of detailed evidence and science, many problems will be clarified. 1988 I published "On the eve of Soviet collectivization, the problem of" rich peasant economy "disappearing on its own". This paper analyzes the so-called "rich peasant economy" before the great transformation from 1927 to 1929. At that time, due to the grain crisis and the influence of a series of policies and economic climate in the Soviet Union, the farmers' commodity economy shrank sharply. Even according to the standards of the Soviet Union's new economic policy period, the so-called "rich peasant economy" was "self-eliminated" before the movement of "eliminating rich peasants" was launched. The so-called "rich peasants" in this period are no different from the "middle peasants" in the prosperous era of the new economic policy in terms of economic scale, commodity rate and the proportion of exploitation elements in the economy, and are almost the same as the average level of all peasants at that time. Therefore, the later movement of "eliminating the rich peasants" was mainly launched out of political needs and forced collectivization. In fact, it destroyed not only the real rural bourgeoisie, but also the standard in the new economic policy period. Overall collectivization is to organize farmers and provide "primitive accumulation" Obviously, this has nothing to do with whether there is a gap between the rich and the poor in rural areas or whether there is a "bourgeoisie" in rural areas. Even if the small farmers at that time were "all-inclusive", they had to be organized into collective farms as long as the national industrialization needed "primitive accumulation" In order to suppress their resistance and provide primitive accumulation for the collective farm itself, "eliminating the rich peasants" has become a natural thing.
During this period, my research on agriculture and farmers in the Soviet Union was deeply influenced by the Soviet Union's new economic policy thought, especially Bukharin's thought. I mainly tried to correct the fallacy and criticize the "Left" deviation, focusing on denying the threat of capitalism and rich peasants in the Soviet Union at that time, and attributed Stalin's mistakes to going too far, rushing ahead, rushing too fast, expanding and so on. But in the gradual research, I found that these views have serious limitations, especially after in-depth empirical research. I feel that the problem is not that simple. There was no serious threat of capitalism in the Soviet Union during the new economic policy period, but this does not mean that the society at this time is an ideal picture without contradictions. It was only because of Stalin's personal behavior that the painting was destroyed. I feel more and more that the most important thing is not to simply criticize, but to explore why such a system came into being, where it came from and why it developed into this way. This makes me look forward to the "Soviet model". It is true that Russia's "capitalist threat" was not serious during the "great transformation" period, but the profound historical accumulation left by Russia's long feudal tradition was very serious, which formed a sharp contradiction with the modernization trend of the Soviet Union during the new economic policy period, that is, the trend of market economy, democratization and the development of people's free personality, thus making the Soviet Union in the new economic policy era lurk a crisis from the beginning and largely determining the failure of this policy. When criticizing "all-round collectivization", people often idealize the new economic policy before collectivization intentionally or unintentionally, just as when criticizing Stalin, people often portray Bukharin as a new prophet. However, history is always continuous, and the Soviet model has its traditional roots. It is true that the danger of "rich peasants-bourgeoisie" before collectivization was "Left", but this does not mean that there was nothing more negative than "bourgeoisie" at that time.
two
Re-evaluating the "New Economic Policy Thought", mainly Bukharin and Likov (1Chairman of the People's Committee in the 1920s, in charge of economic work) is an extension and deepening of the problem of "rich peasants" in the 1980s. My preliminary study of Bukharin's thought began with his view of "rich peasants" and his theory of socialist diversity. 1985- 1987, I published Bukharin and the Theory of Socialist Model (Soviet Historical Issues 1985,3) and On Bukharin and Socialist Model: An Answer. However, with the deepening of the understanding of the historical macro-system of the Soviet Union, we have a new view on the historical background, nature and reasons of the failure of the new economic policy, and we feel more and more the historical limitations of Bukharin and others' thoughts and their connection with the failure of the new economic policy. Two articles, On Lekov (Soviet Historical Issues1988,3) and Theoretical Roots of Bukharin Tragedy (Soviet Historical Issues1989,2), are the results of this thinking.
There are great differences in personality between Bukharin and Likov: Bukharin, who was born as a scholar and lived abroad for a long time, is a theorist, while Likov, who was born as a farmer and insisted on working at home for a long time, is a doer. Bukharin initially accepted Marxism because of its scientific and logical perfection, while Likov accepted it mainly because of its justice and revolution, and had an urgent desire to solve social problems. Bukharin has always been "left" in the field of ideas or abstract thinking. His moderate tendency in policy thinking is largely due to a humanistic feeling, while Likov has a strong empirical color. His gentleness comes neither from ideas nor from feelings, but from a realistic consideration. Bukharin's theory of commodity economy is basically a "concession theory", while Likov regards commodity economy as natural selection. On the issue of rural differentiation, Bukharin only thought that "rich peasants" were not terrible, while Likov praised these so-called "rich peasants" as "the best leaders of the Soviet Union". Bukharin opposes the suppression of rich peasants by administrative means, while Likov believes that they should not be suppressed by administrative means, nor should they be squeezed out by economic means, but should be allowed to "accumulate freely". Both Bukharin and Likov hoped for the cooperative system because of their lack of enthusiasm for collective farms, but Bukharin was romantically optimistic about the cooperative system, while Likov was worried about the difficulties faced by the cooperative system. On many occasions in the 1920s, as a representative of the "right wing", Likov was as famous as Bukharin, so that in some documents of the "left wing" opposition, Likov and Kalinin were often listed as "right wing", while Bukharin and Stalin were listed as "middle wing". From the historical picture of the 1920s, it can be seen that there are political struggles in the inner-party struggle, but in this country with a strong patriarchal tradition, the inner-party struggle also contains the factors of power struggle or cronyism. For example, the composition of the above factions has a complex personnel background and is not entirely based on the consistency of theory and political views. Among the Stalinist School, there are theories such as Yuri Lalin that are "extremely left", and even Preau Blajin considers them "left", and there are also "extreme right" such as Kalinin, and even "right". But in contrast, the "right wing" is much more political or non-partisan. Of course, they are not completely consistent in theory.
Bukharin and Bukharin's theory is a big topic in this period, and the whole academic circle has a tendency to idealize Bukharin. I don't think so. The ideological transformation of Bukharin and others in the process of transforming wartime productism into new economic policy is only experience and emotion, not ideas. He has changed on the issue of socialist methodology, that is, the socialist road, but he has not changed on the issue of socialist ontology, that is, what socialism is. In the world of ideas, Bukharin still maintains the system he built in the Economics of Transition. There, the "super-economic coercion of the proletariat", the militarization of labor, the command supply economy and the denial of political freedom still maintain the logical perfection and undisputed harmony in the process of thinking. From this perspective, there is no socialist "Bukharin model". The socialism pursued by Bukharin is basically the "Stalin model" socialism, but he hopes to move towards it through a less painful road.
Bukharin's new economic policy theory is mainly based on two foundations. One is the philosophical "balance theory", that is, the new economic policy is only a temporary balance between the two mutations. This not only means that this policy can only be a kind of "breathing space" logically, but will be replaced by "attacking again". More importantly, under the slogan of "balance", the democratic revolutionary nature of the new economic policy has been obliterated. Second, the political theory of "alliance of workers and peasants" actually means that the proletariat and socialism do not need commodity economy in essence, but only for the needs of "alliance", in order to win the support of farmers and take care of the interests of allies. "Balance of power theory" and "worker-peasant alliance theory" were reasonable as philosophical and political viewpoints at that time, but if they were regarded as theoretical fulcrums of Bukharin's new economic policy, it was actually equivalent to saying that there was no difference in principle between the new economic policy and the concession theory, and the difference between Bukharin and the "Left" was only how much and how long.
Bukharin has always regarded commodity economy as the attribute of small production in theory, and firmly believes that socialism is a "unified single organism" without commodity economy, market, law of value and monetary wages. He even thinks that the wage category in the Soviet economy during the transitional period is an unreasonable false form, the result of "small production" pollution, and the "capitalist working mode" imposed on state-owned enterprises by non-socialists from outside. He used the theory of "law of labor consumption" to confront the coexistence theory of "two regulators" in the transitional period of Pleo Buradzinski, which was originally a particularly popular theory during the capitalist war, and was theoretically "left" than that of Pleo Buradzinski.
Opposing socialism with commodity economy and market economy in theory will inevitably lead to the new economic policy being logically regarded as a "suspended execution" of the death penalty in commodity economy. Bukharin put forward the idea of "overcoming market relations on the basis of market relations". Specifically, under the condition that the large-scale socialist industry (which is essentially considered to be commodity-free) is very weak, the strong enemy is forced by four forces, and the external environment is harsh, while using market relations to win the support of farmers, it is possible for state-owned enterprises to seek their own development through exchanges with small agriculture. After industrialization, socialism has the power to resist foreign enemies and transform farmers at the same time. There is no essential difference between the "left" and "right" factions. They all think that the new economic policy is only a policy implemented by countries without industrialization under extremely backward conditions. The only difference is: what should we do when industrialization has not been successful and the threat of war is serious? Which is more important, winning the support of farmers (at the expense of concessions) or accelerating industrialization (at the expense of offending farmers)? Bukharin holds the former view and Stalin holds the latter view. If this is the only point, it should be said that the later facts proved the foresight of the "Left": in World War II, the Soviet Union won the victory not by making concessions to the peasants, but by sacrificing the industrialization achievements of the peasants.
Because Bukharin still thinks that commodity economy and socialism are incompatible in theory, he also thinks that social differentiation under the new economic policy is capitalist polarization like the "leftist", but the difference is that he thinks the speed and degree of differentiation are not so great. Both "Left" and "Right" talk about farmers' problems from the theoretical logic that farmers are "commodity producers", with the duality of laborers and private owners, corresponding to revolutionary and conservative tendencies respectively, and will be divided into bourgeois and proletarians in a market economy. The only difference is that the "Left" emphasizes that farmers are private owners, while the "Right" emphasizes that farmers are workers. In fact, however, at that time, more than 95% of rural Russia were village farmers. At that time, they were not so much "commodity producers" as "Wang Yang Sea" and more like "Wang Yang Sea" in patriarchal villages. Russian peasants are not so much petty bourgeoisie as members of the patriarchal clan system. Their great significance to historical development is not so much the duality of "laborers and private owners" as the independence of human beings. Therefore, although there was indeed a capitalist division in the rural division at that time, from the mainstream, it was not so much the bourgeois and proletarians from the "petty bourgeoisie" as the commodity producers from patriarchal farmers and mature individuals from the "appendages of narrow people". This differentiation is not so much the stubborn resistance of capitalism to socialism as the victory of market economy over patriarchal natural economy. In fact, market economy is the inherent need and essential feature of socialism based on extensive contact and division of labor in developed societies, and its significance is very important for farmers in patriarchal villages. But it is impossible for Bukharin to understand this, so the market economy is either "concession", "retreat" or "detour" for him. In short, it is not the right way, but it just covers up the potential threat of patriarchal factors under the appearance of "alliance", "balance" and "compromise".
Some people say that Bukharin's weakness lies in "only theory without practical countermeasures". I think Bukharin's "no feasible countermeasures" is precisely the limitation of his theory. Some people say that Bukharin denied Soviet socialism ideologically or logically, but he was unable to extricate himself because of his ultimate belief in it, so he had his tragedy. In my opinion, on the contrary, it was Bukharin who insisted on the rationality of socialism in concept, so his "concession" was mainly out of a kind of ultimate concern and compassion except for the situation. Unlike Oscar Langer and Colne, he did not logically deduce their reform conclusions from the reconstructed socialist ontology, but only acted from the moral standpoint of opposing barbaric "primitive accumulation". At this point, he lacks plekhanov's thorough understanding and broad vision of Russia, so it is impossible for him to understand the essence of the new economic policy and face up to the crisis it faces. He can shrug off the propaganda about the "threat of capitalism", but he can't see that the threat of pre-modern feudal system is serious. He can see that individual agriculture still has great potential, but he can't see that rural agriculture is dying out. He opposed Stalin's "revolution", but he didn't realize that the Soviet Union really needed another "revolution" at that time. After experiencing the setbacks of wartime productism, he understood that it was not easy to realize the socialism established in his own ideas, but his views on commodity economy and market were very simple. He seems to think that the commodity economy is a ready-made "Wang Yang sea", and there are too many socialists, so it is not easy to "destroy" (so it is necessary to "make concessions"). As long as "make concessions", it is not difficult to "use". But in a power-dependent society, the result of "laissez-faire" can turn centralization into a lot of lords and unify the country into a mess, but it can't let the market economy replace the natural economy. It can only release countless local forces and barriers, but it can't release a team of entrepreneurs. The policy of "concession" once effectively saved the national economy from the collapse of wartime capitalism. However, as soon as the recovery period is over, the lack of stamina for agricultural development is highlighted. However, Bukharin and others are confined to the traditional ideological framework, and they can neither deepen economic reform into the political and cultural fields, nor promote industry from agricultural reform, or even stop at "relaxing restrictions" in agriculture, and do not stay at the forefront of economic depth. As a result, the market mechanism cannot be perfected, and the farmers' economy naturally shrinks, resulting in the crisis of the new economic policy.
The socialist ontology of Bukharin's thought determines his basic value orientation that "public" is superior to "private". He only regards reforming farmers as reforming small private owners. If they don't like "openness", they have to "give in". But if they stay in the same body all the time, how can they imagine breaking through the same body to pursue "private ownership"? Therefore, on the one hand, Bukharin and others opposed the forced collectivization of farmers in village communities, on the other hand, they severely condemned the attempt to replace village communities with the land use system of independent farms, and actually embarked on the road of populist economic romanticism.
Bukharin enthusiastically advocated cooperative system, but did not see the contractual union of cooperative system as a commodity producer, which was incompatible with patriarchal clan system. Li, a doer, is optimistic about the bright future of the cooperative system, but he is helpless about the crisis of the cooperative system in reality. Bukharin supported raising food prices to stimulate production, but he didn't know that the stimulating effect of prices on production could only be brought into play under the market mechanism, which was exactly the most taboo and not available in rural areas of the Soviet Union at that time. After the food crisis, Bukharin disapproved of "great changes", but agreed to take temporary "extraordinary measures" to buy food. In his view, the essence of farmers' commodity producers is "spontaneous", and as long as they are "loosened", they will reappear. As everyone knows, the farmers in the village community are not "economic men" as described by Adam Smith. Their value orientation is not profit maximization, but quietness, harmony, no differentiation and no competition. As a result, after the first "extraordinary measures" were cancelled, commodity agriculture was not only depressed, but also had to implement "extraordinary measures" again, and it was inevitable to implement the final big changes.
When Bukharin and Stalin finally broke up publicly, they did not doubt whether the model pursued by the latter was correct, but only thought that Stalin's way could not achieve the expected purpose. He asserted that Stalin's stupidity would lead to "peasant riots" and that "the dictatorship of the proletariat was destroyed by extremely cruel class struggle". However, Stalin once again showed that he knew Russian farmers better than Bukharin. After all, they are not American farmers, and they can be conquered by super-economic coercion and violence. Finally, in his last will to future generations, Bukharin only blamed Stalin's morbid suspicion and the meanness of officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and made no mention of the system, system and model. He sighed: "Now that dzerzhinsky is dead, the fine tradition of Cheka has become a thing of the past.". But isn't the "red terror" that trampled on civil rights and human dignity in the dzerzhinsky era the root of Bukharin's tragedy? From Bukharin's understanding of his own tragedy, don't we see a bigger tragedy-the tragedy of Bukharin's route and Bukharin's theory?
three
Next, I focus on the conflict between Russian traditional culture and modernization process and the reconstruction of the historical logic system of the Soviet Union. My research on Russian tradition began with the problem of village community. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, I published the article "Rural Commune and the October Revolution" (Historical Issues of the Soviet Union1987,3), which is the first article to study the role of Russian village communities in and after the China Revolution. Although the October Revolution was due to the development of internal contradictions in Russian society, it was also closely related to the traditional characteristics of Russian national culture and society. As one of the traditional elements of Russia, rural society has an important influence on the occurrence, process and result of the October Revolution. Since19th century, farmers' struggle against the medieval shackles of rural communities and for independent development reached its climax in the 1905 revolution, but after the reform in Stolypin, their struggle direction changed. Originally, Stolypin's 1906 reform was in line with the historical tide of market economy and modernization, but its reform model lacked just social rules and was based on the interests of the powerful. This unfair competitive force and the anti-competitive "justice" demand continued to accumulate, which eventually led to the outbreak of the October Revolution. Under this background, the great historical changes caused by the October Revolution have two aspects: on the one hand, it destroyed the landlord's possession with the land possession of farmers in the name of state-owned land, which laid the foundation for farmers to support the political power, but on the other hand, it destroyed independent farmers with traditional rural cooperatives, which led to the revival of rural cooperatives, thus making Russian history develop in the opposite direction. If the previous reform made Russia's rural areas or Russia as a peasant country embark on the socialist road, then the latter reform decided the later development form of this socialism. In fact, Russia at that time was not the "petty-bourgeois sea of Wang Yang", but the sea of Wang Yang with 350,000 patriarchal villages. To a great extent, the alliance of workers and peasants is not an alliance between the working class and petty-bourgeois peasants against the bourgeoisie, but an alliance between the working class and patriarchal peasants (villages) against the petty bourgeoisie (commodity producers and peasants). Originally, in a country like Russia, the socialist process should not only transform the private nature of farmers, but also transform the patriarchal nature of farmers. However, under the historical conditions at that time, the latter transformation was not only ignored for a long time, but also promoted, which led to the traditional male-dominated culture and made Russia embark on a road with many old Russian characteristics under the banner of Marxism, which was reflected in the issue of village cooperatives, that is, the party generally believed that village farmers were better than independent farmers. If there were criticisms (mainly "Left") against the village community at that time, it was only because the village community was not strong enough to stifle the commodity economy and eliminate the "capitalist tendency". However, no one criticized the patriarchal clan system of the village community, and even regarded the patriarchal clan system of the village community as a favorable factor to overcome the peasant private ownership, which was considered to be the most commendable part of the Russian nation. As a result, the potential of farmers' commodity economy can not be exerted under the patriarchal clan system, which eventually leads to crisis and great changes.
Starting from the influence of the peasant background of Russian road and the traditional roots of Soviet model on its development, I published three articles in succession in 1988, expounding this idea. Russian traditional culture and Stalin's model (the research trend of world history) 1988, 1), the logical system of reflecting on Soviet history (Soviet historical issues1988,2), and the conflict between Russian traditional culture and the modernization process of the Soviet Union (Journal of Shaanxi Normal University 65438+) I think this is in sync with the profound reflection movement that socialist countries are experiencing. The first stage is to criticize the mistakes of individual leaders and policies.