Battle of Pingxingguan; The Victory of Pingxingguan

The Pingxingguan victory was the first victory after the Eighth Route Army left the anti-Japanese battlefield in North China, and it was also the first great victory of the China army since the outbreak of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.

When the Eighth Route Army set out for North China to advance into Shanxi, with the cooperation of Chahar's troops, the Japanese 5th Division was attacking along Pingsui Road of the Great Wall in an attempt to attack Taiyuan South and seize the hinterland of Shanxi, and cooperated with the North China Army of Pinghan Road from the right. China's Second World War Zone has made a battle plan to stop the Japanese along the Great Wall. In Pingxingguan, he was determined to assemble heavy troops to annihilate the invading enemy and asked the Eighth Route Army to cooperate with the Japanese attack. In order to cooperate with friendly forces, defend Shanxi, and stimulate the military strength of the Eighth Route Army, the Eighth Route Army 1 15 Division successfully carried out an ambush battle and won the first battle with great victory.

In early September, 1937, according to the operational plan, the Eighth Route Army 1 15 Division set off near Pingxingguan. Pingxingguan, located in the northeast of Shanxi Province, is the throat artery in the northeast of Shanxi Province. On both sides, the peaks and peaks are overlapping, steep and steep. On the left, there are commanding heights such as East Fort and Laoye Temple, and on the right, there are mountains such as Baiyatai. In front of the pass is a narrow passage extending from southwest to northeast, which is an ideal place to ambush and annihilate the enemy. On the 2nd, the 2nd1Brigade of the 5th Division of the Japanese Army attacked Pingxingguan from Lingqiu, occupying the Dongpochi area. On the 23rd, 1 15 Division was determined to seize the weakness of Japanese arrogance and neglect of defense, ambush the enemy by using the favorable terrain in the northeast of Pingxingguan, and hold a meeting of cadres above the company level for in-depth combat mobilization. Late at night on 24th, 1 15 division secretly entered the preset battle positions such as Baiyatai by night and heavy rain. At dawn on the 25th, the follow-up troops of the 2nd1Brigade of the 5th Division of the Japanese Army took more than 100 cars and attached more than 200 wagons, and marched from east to west along the Lingqiu-Pingxingguan Highway. At about 7 o'clock, all the troops entered the ambush position of 1 15 division. 1 15 division seized the fighter plane, immediately ordered the whole line to fire, and launched an attack at the right time when the enemy was in chaos. 1 15 The first 1 division annihilated the enemy vanguard and prevented it from fleeing south along the highway; Part of them cut off the troops surrounding the Japanese rear and cut off their retreat; One rushed across the highway and quickly seized the Laoye Temple and its northern highlands; A Japanese aid that prevented the early occupation of the East Artillery Pool; One blocked the reinforcements sent by the Japanese Fifth Division. After a fierce battle, the Japanese army was completely annihilated and won a total victory.

This battle has achieved remarkable results. The Eighth Route Army 1 15 Division * * * wiped out more than 000 Japanese troops 1000, destroyed more than 200 cars 1000, and seized more than 20 rifles1000, machine guns, a cannon and a large number of military supplies.

Under the situation that the Japanese army marched in and the Kuomintang army was losing ground, Xing Ping Guanjie effectively dealt a blow to the madness of the Japanese army, broke the myth that the Japanese army was invincible, and made the people of the whole country see the hope of the Chinese nation, thus greatly inspiring the people's hearts and morale of the whole country. The news spread, all walks of life in the country rejoiced and sent congratulatory messages in succession, which greatly improved the prestige of the * * * production party and the Eighth Route Army. At the same time, in the whole strategy, it won the preparation time for Xinkou operation, effectively contained the action of the Japanese 5 th Division, and supported Pinghan Road operation from the flank. (Contributed by China People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression Memorial Hall)

Recently hit TV series Ode to Yan 'an and Movies on Taihang Mountain/Zhan Zheng/2007-05-03/178130020D79232. HTML reappears in Guan Jie, Xing Ping. For a long time, people's understanding of this matter is vague and even biased. Please look at the real history of Pingxingguan Victory.

Pingxingguan Campaign, also known as Pingxingguan Campaign and Pingxingguan Victory, was a campaign that sensationalized the whole country during the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression period. But for a long time, some people don't know much about the specific situation of this campaign, and even have some incorrect understanding. So it is necessary to clarify some facts.

The Pingxingguan Campaign was conceived by Peng, approved and agreed by the Eighth Route Army Headquarters, and Lin Biao specifically deployed and commanded it.

1937 after the full-scale outbreak in War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, China * * * achieved the second cooperation. The Red Army of Workers and Peasants led by China * * * Production Party was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army in late August, and quickly moved to Shanxi's anti-Japanese front. At the same time, Peng Xian, the leader of China's * * * production party, entered Shanxi to discuss joint anti-Japanese matters with Yen Hsi-shan, commander of the Kuomintang's Second World War Zone, which ruled Shanxi. At this time, the Japanese invaders had invaded Jin, and Yan Xishan wanted to rely heavily on the Eighth Route Army. Therefore, the two sides quickly reached an agreement that the Eighth Route Army used mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare tactics to attack the Japanese army and cooperate with friendly forces. During the talks, Yen Hsi-shan put forward a plan to fight the Japanese army in Pingxingguan, Shahe and Fan Shi, and asked the Eighth Route Army to cooperate. In this regard, Peng, deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, put forward the Eighth Route Army's cooperation plan: friendly troops adhered to the front of the flat pass, and the 115 th Division of the Eighth Route Army secretly gathered at the side of the enemy road to attack the enemy from the enemy side. Yan Xishan agreed.

In late September, Zhu De, Peng, Ren and Zuo Quan, the main leaders of the Eighth Route Army, gathered in various places. On September 2 1 day, the front branch of the Central Military Commission held a meeting to discuss the situation in Shanxi and the operational plan of the Eighth Route Army. At the meeting, Peng expounded the idea of cooperating with friendly forces to fight the enemy of Pingxingguan, which was unanimously endorsed by the participants. Accordingly, the Eighth Route Army headquarters formulated operational instructions. On September 23, Zhu De, Xiang Peng 1 15 division issued an order, "1 15 division immediately sent troops to Pingxingguan and Lingqiu to attack the enemy of Pingxingguan". At the same time, the Eighth Route Army 1 15 Division, as an advance unit, advanced near Pingxingguan in late September. Lin Biao followed the vanguard troops and arrived near Pingxingguan. According to the survey of the terrain and the analysis of the enemy's situation, he suggested to the Eighth Route Army headquarters, the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong to concentrate on fighting a battle.

People may not know Mao Zedong's attitude towards the Pingxingguan Campaign. In fact, Mao Zedong has made it clear. After the Eighth Route Army dispatched, Mao Zedong instructed to implement the strategic shift. However, this is put forward in view of the fact that some generals "recall the taste of the past" and hope to fight mobile warfare and ignore guerrilla warfare. At that time, there was no objection to concentrating troops for mobile warfare under conditions. As early as the Luochuan meeting, Mao Zedong emphasized the independent mountain guerrilla warfare, and pointed out that this tactic "includes destroying the enemy corps and developing plain guerrilla warfare under favorable conditions, but focusing on mountains". After receiving Peng and Lin Biao's operational ideas, he repeatedly studied them and called back on September 2 1 day, agreeing with the opinion put forward in front that one brigade should be concentrated and cameras should be used to attack the enemy for the time being. Mao Zedong's reply is crucial to the Pingxingguan campaign.

The Battle of Pingxingguan was specifically commanded by Lin Biao. In the Battle of Pingxingguan, Lin Biao explored the terrain of Pingxingguan for many times, chose the only way for Japanese troops to ambush, and formulated two regiments to intercept the advancing enemy. 1 Regiment cut off the enemy's retreat, an independent regiment and cavalry battalion blocked the enemy's reinforcements, and 1 Regiment was used as the operational deployment of the reserve team to fight on the spot. In the battle, he broke through the original plan of using 1 brigade, but actually used the strength of the whole division, which changed according to the actual situation, and also reflected his desire to fight a big battle and achieve great results. Adapting to circumstances is a common thing in military command and should be allowed. This change has played a positive role in the victory of the Pingxingguan campaign. In a word, the victory of the Pingxingguan campaign was the result of the overall deployment of the Central Military Commission and the bloody battles of all the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army 1 15 Division, and it was also inseparable from Lin Biao's command.

The Pingxingguan campaign was deployed in the battle plan put forward by Yan Xishan, but it was carried out independently by the Eighth Route Army, and the inaction of the Kuomintang troops affected the expansion of the results.

As mentioned earlier, although the Pingxingguan campaign was carried out under the framework of the operational plan planned by Yan Xishan, the Eighth Route Army was independent. It is a basic agreement that guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare behind the enemy lines cooperate with the Kuomintang's frontal operations, which is reached by the representatives of China and Chiang Kai-shek of the Kuomintang Central Committee and Yan Xishan, a powerful faction in Shanxi. Independent guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare of the Eighth Route Army behind enemy lines are the basic contents of this agreement. The Eighth Route Army abided by this principle when fighting in Pingjingguan. The Eighth Route Army 1 15 Division is responsible for planning, deploying, using troops and fighting. In the battle, no Kuomintang troops participated in the war, nor did they contain the Japanese army. There should have been the cooperation of the Kuomintang army, but the Eighth Route Army did not cooperate at the beginning of the Pingxing Pass. 1 15 division sent people to contact the nearby Kuomintang troops many times, but all failed. After the Battle of Pingxingguan, according to the agreement with the Kuomintang troops, the Eighth Route Army 1 15 division troops immediately advanced on the Japanese troops in Dongpochi in front of Pingxingguan, and seized the highland around Dongpochi at dusk that day, surrounding the Japanese troops in the basin around Dongpochi. However, the Kuomintang troops did not attack as planned. Yang Dezhi, then head of the 685th regiment of the 343rd Brigade, recalled: According to the scheduled plan, the Kuomintang troops would attack with us at the same time. After we destroyed the enemy on the highway, they turned to the East Artillery Pool and cooperated with them to destroy the city walls and divisions. Unexpectedly, our brothers and I ran to the east pool and surrounded the enemy, but there was no sign of a Kuomintang soldier. It turns out that they didn't attack at all. The Japanese army in this area was not completely annihilated because of the slow operation of the Kuomintang army, and the results of the Pingxingguan campaign did not expand.

The Battle of Pingxingguan was the first great victory of China Party troops since War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, which had far-reaching influence.

The battle of Pingxingguan wiped out more than 65,438+10,000 Japanese troops. Judging from the whole history of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, it was not a big battle, but it shook the whole country and had far-reaching significance. First, since the Anti-Japanese War, China's army has fought bravely, but it has not achieved good results. At that time, the battle of two battles in Shanghai on the downtown was in a stalemate, and China's army suffered serious casualties. Baoding, Shijiazhuang and other big cities, large areas of land in the northern section of Heping Han and Jinpu Road quickly fell, and Yan Xishan's Jin army also lost its teachers and land. The Battle of Pingxingguan wiped out thousands of Japanese troops cleanly, which was the first great victory of China's army since War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. Therefore, the Kuomintang government said, "This is an unprecedented victory for the China army on the Pingsui line." It has dealt a heavy blow to the rampaging Japanese army since the invasion of China, especially because it hit the ace division of the Japanese army, so this blow is particularly heavy and meaningful for the Japanese army. And its more significant significance lies in that it has greatly inspired the anti-Japanese fighting spirit of the people throughout the country. As Xu, then chairman of the Kuomintang Battlefield Mobilization Committee in the Second World War, pointed out: The special significance of the Pingxingguan campaign "lies in breaking the invincible myth of the' imperial army' and improving our morale." Second, the Battle of Pingguan dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese army, which not only broke the Japanese army's strategic attempt to break through Pingguan and attack the troops in China's World War II area and cooperate with the main forces of the Japanese army in North China to draw the Han Road from the right, but also frustrated the Japanese army's offensive momentum to the hinterland of Shanxi, dampened the Japanese army's momentum and made it afraid to make any move again, which provided an opportunity for China to deploy new battles, thus effectively supporting War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the frontal force of China. Third, the Eighth Route Army took the initiative to confront the main divisions of the Japanese army with weapons that were far less poorly equipped than those of the Kuomintang army, and even those that were despised by civilian armed forces at that time, and won the first battle, highlighting the fighting capacity of the Eighth Route Army, thus greatly improving the prestige of the Eighth Route Army and the prestige of the China * * * production party. Fourthly, the Pingxingguan Campaign improved the understanding of the CPC leaders on the laws of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. 1On September 29th, 937, Mao Zedong further put forward the operational policy of the Eighth Route Army based on the experience of Pingxingguan: "The fundamental policy is to win over the masses and organize the guerrillas of the masses. Under this general policy, we will carry out conditional centralized operations. " Soon, he summarized it as "independent guerrilla warfare and mobile warfare", thus perfecting the operational guiding ideology of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression led by our party.

Note: Pingxingguan victory and Pingxingguan campaign are two concepts that are often confused but completely different. The Battle of Pingxingguan was a defensive operation of our Jinsui Army against Japan in the depth of Pingxingguan, and it was a major battle of Taiyuan Campaign, which was ultimately defeated because the Japanese army broke through Pingxingguan. The victory of Pingxingguan refers to a short-term small-scale ambush battle carried out by the Eighth Route Army in the Pingxingguan campaign to cooperate with the Jinsui Army's Pingxingguan campaign. The battlefield is located in Qiaogou area to the west of Pingxingguan and Maling in the direction of Guangling. The battle successfully ambushed the Japanese army trying to pass the Pingxing Pass, annihilated about 2 1 brigade trench troops of the Japanese army 1000, and the Eighth Route Army suffered more than 600 casualties.