Second, it is necessary to strengthen the legal construction of state ownership and state ownership representative institutions, further improve the "people-people's congress-government-state-owned assets" principal-agent chain, further clarify from the law that SASAC will perform the investor's functions according to law, improve major decision-making procedures such as expert argumentation, risk assessment, legality review and collective discussion and decision, and promote the legalization of state-owned assets supervision institutions, functions, authorities, procedures and responsibilities. Promote the state-owned assets supervision and administration institutions to achieve scientific functions and statutory powers and responsibilities. The statutory duty must be, the law can't be done without authorization, form the courage to be responsible and dare to take responsibility, resolutely correct inaction and chaos, and resolutely overcome laziness and slack. Third, it is necessary to further clarify the overall goal of the modernization of the governance system of state-owned enterprises, the development goal of the state-owned economy, and the governance goal of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises, especially the important economic, political and social goals of the state for state-owned enterprises, and distinguish between public services and commercial services. That is to say, state-owned enterprises are required to become economic organizations that pursue benefits, to provide a large number of public services, and to undertake too many social obligations. The champion of the 100-meter dash requires weightlifting, the champion of weightlifting requires high jump, and the champion of high jump requires all-around. Goose says to chicken, chicken says to duck, language and standard are inconsistent. Only by accurately defining the functions of different state-owned enterprises, with consistent standards and clear classification can we provide an institutional environment for doing a good job in state-owned enterprises.
Two, to realize the modernization of the governance system and governance capacity of state-owned enterprises, we must further promote the separation of government and enterprise. Vigorously promote the decentralization of government agencies and safeguard the dominant position of enterprises in the market. Let's tell a story. In 2005, Minmetals reported to a state department that it would acquire Canadian nonferrous metal giant Noranda Company for more than 2 billion US dollars. However, several clerks, directors and directors of this department sat in the high-rise building of the deep courtyard, thinking that the project was risky and the feasibility study was not sufficient, and they might lose money, and decided not to approve it, which led to the failure of the acquisition that had entered the exclusive negotiation stage. As a result, in the second year, the value of Noranda Company tripled to more than $5 billion, and Minmetals lost the opportunity to leapfrog development. In 2006, considering the low-cost utilization of Australian iron ore and coke in the coastal areas of Guangdong, and close to the high-end steel market, Shanghai Baosteel applied to a certain department for the Baosteel Zhanjiang Iron and Steel Base project in Guangdong with a total investment of nearly 70 billion yuan, but it was not approved until 2065438+May 2002. After the project was approved for 6 years, the market has undergone earth-shaking changes. The steel industry has a serious overcapacity, and the market has been occupied by other enterprises. The business world is like a battlefield. Entrepreneurs fight in the ever-changing market, but they don't charge. They have to ask for instructions from institutions thousands of miles away. It took six years to ask for instructions, not to mention fighting. The Pacific War took only three or four years. The Third Plenary Session clearly put forward: deepen the reform of investment system and establish the main position of enterprise investment. Enterprise investment projects, except those involving national security and ecological security and the layout of the country's main productive forces, are all decided by enterprises according to laws and regulations, and the government will no longer approve them. People sitting in government offices are not smarter than enterprises, and entrepreneurs know the market best. Decentralize, not approve.
Third, to realize the modernization of the governance system and governance capacity of state-owned enterprises, we must vigorously promote the SASAC reform. SASAC, as an ad hoc organization to fulfill the responsibilities of investors in state-owned assets of enterprises, was established only 12 years ago. SASAC itself was born for the reform of China's economic system, and it should be said that it is full of the spirit of reform and the driving force of innovation. However, in the development process of 10 years, SASAC has derived many things, and there are many problems such as excessive management and interference with enterprise autonomy. Director Zhang Yi of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission clearly pointed out at the mobilization meeting of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee that the reform of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission is not tinkering, but making up your mind. With the spirit of a strong man breaking his wrist, we will bruise some people, reform some people and strengthen power management. What should not be managed and what can be managed should be resolutely put in place. We must resolutely implement the general requirements of "focusing on capital management and strengthening the supervision of state-owned assets" put forward by the Third Plenary Session. State-owned assets supervision institutions mainly perform the rights of shareholders' capital contribution, dividend distribution, asset disposal and appointment and removal of shareholders' representatives entrusted by the Company Law. The authority of state-owned assets supervision institutions should stop at the board of directors, not interfere in matters outside the board of directors, and keep a certain distance from the operation of state-owned enterprises. State ownership representative institutions should conduct capital management in accordance with civil and commercial law norms and market means. One of the lessons of the past is that the power and responsibility boundaries and management levels of state-owned assets supervision institutions have not been defined according to law, which has led to frequent administrative interventions and repeated "disorderly release, chaotic collection, and dead collection". We must avoid the lessons of history.
At present, there are still many discussions about "administrative investors" and "market investors". Personally, I think that this concept did not exist in China before, nor did it exist in the West. This concept itself has logical problems, unscientific and imprecise. The existing laws in China only recognize investors. Administration and marketization are not suitable criteria for dividing "investors". First of all, in the market economy, whether it is government departments or state-owned enterprises themselves, their capital contribution or investment behavior will be market-oriented in accordance with the rules of the market economy. Secondly, it cannot be considered that enterprises directly funded by the government are administrative, and enterprises funded by investment companies are market-oriented. They only have different forms of capital contribution, and they are all state-owned capital in essence. The important goal of state-owned enterprise reform is marketization. It is considered that government investment is administrative, which will not only logically deny the investment of state-owned capital operating investment companies, but also fundamentally deny the market-oriented reform of state-owned enterprises itself. Administrative investors and market investors are typical specious, illogical and unfounded concepts.
Fourth, to realize the modernization of the governance system and governance capacity of state-owned enterprises, we must vigorously promote the modernization of the board system of state-owned enterprises. The Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee pointed out that the state-owned enterprises have been integrated with the market economy, so they must adapt to the new situation of marketization and internationalization, and further deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises with the focus on standardizing business decisions, maintaining and increasing assets, participating in competition fairly, improving enterprise efficiency, enhancing enterprise vitality and assuming social responsibilities. Improve the corporate governance structure with coordinated operation and effective checks and balances. Actively promote the modernization of corporate governance structure of state-owned enterprises. At present, there is still a big gap in the modernization of state-owned enterprise governance in China. The board of directors of state-owned enterprises lacks effectiveness. Some enterprises are still registered according to the enterprise law, and there is no standardized board of directors. The decision-making level and management level are highly overlapped, and there is no effective check and balance. The authority to establish the board of directors has not been implemented. There is no real equivalence between responsibility, power and benefit, and there is no right to select and appoint senior managers and the right to assess, reward and punish them according to law. The independence and authority of the board of directors need to be further enhanced, and the accountability system for directors has not been effectively established.
We should promote the modernization of state-owned enterprise governance in accordance with the general requirements of the Third Plenary Session. I suggest perfecting the director system first. Representatives and directors of state-owned shareholders appointed by the state shall be sworn in when they take office. Directors of state-owned shareholders should hold the Constitution of our country, solemnly raise their hands and swear, abide by national laws, be loyal to the rights and interests of state ownership, and faithfully and diligently perform the duties of representatives of state-owned shareholders. The board of directors shall have the right to choose the CEO according to law. The party should manage cadres mainly through management standards, principles, procedures and supervision, exert political influence reasonably and effectively, and select professional managers with market ability and business ability through legal procedures and market principles. In accordance with legal norms, the board of directors' major decisions, incentives and other powers are implemented according to law, and first-class talents with professional level and business insight are attracted, motivated and retained by market-oriented means.
More importantly, it is necessary to establish a professional manager system and give full play to the role of entrepreneurs. The "Decision" proposes: "Establish a professional manager system and give full play to the role of entrepreneurs." It is of great significance to use the concept of "entrepreneur" for the first time, and it has achieved a leap from "enterprise manager", "enterprise leader" to "entrepreneur". Entrepreneurs are far-sighted business leaders, brave in innovation, adventurous, good at capturing changes and seizing opportunities, and are scarce resources to create value in fierce competition. In the future, it is necessary to create an environment for more entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial spirit, charisma and outstanding influence like Liu Mingzhong, chairman of Xinhua International, to appear in China and guide enterprises to achieve scientific development.