Only by respecting the bottom line and respecting common sense can we build a long-lasting business
The Year of the Rat is coming to an end and the Year of the Ox is approaching. What lessons have been learned from the ups and downs of the business world in the past year that are worth remembering? ? We've picked out the top 10 losers for our readers' pleasure. "Happy families are all alike, and every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." The same goes for shopping malls. These top ten business failures once again remind us that only by respecting the bottom line and respecting common sense can we have a long-lasting business.
10
Xuebajun: The unicorn died suddenly in the cold wind
In December 2020, the news of Xuebajun’s bankruptcy and closure hit the hot searches. Previously, academic masters known as “unicorns” and “Hurun Gazelles” were the miracles in the minds of many TMT entrepreneurs.
Xuebajun started out as a photo-based question search product, and was once as famous as Yuanqiku and Homework Help. After accumulating original traffic with learning tools, Xuebajun began to explore more educational forms. After 2016, only one-on-one, small class classes and photo-based question searches have been retained. In 2018, Xuebajun announced that its one-to-one monthly revenue exceeded 100 million, with a renewal rate of 87%, and it is expected to reach 1 billion in revenue by the end of the year.
After Xuebajun suddenly declared bankruptcy, a large number of parents and employees began to demand owed tuition fees and wages. Many of them unknowingly took on education loans. According to data disclosed by Zhang Kailei, the major shareholder, founder and CEO of Xuebajun, 50,000 students, 3,000 employees, 1,000 teachers and more than 100 agents have been affected.
Behind the collapse of the top student is the epitome of the K12 online 1-on-1 track. Zhang Kailei said in an open letter that in the past three years, Xuebajun has not raised a large sum of money and has been on the verge of breaking its capital chain at least five times. This is the dilemma of most online 1:1 companies. In order to reverse the decline, Zhang Kailei also tried to sell the small class to save 1 to 1, but the transaction was not completed due to negative news.
But even if the sale is successful or financing is obtained, and the opportunity to move is obtained, it will only allow Xuebajun to last longer, and things have not fundamentally changed - the cost of acquiring customers has increased, and the low gross profit situation is difficult to change. Autonomous hematopoiesis is almost a luxury. At present, the Internet venture capital bubble is dissipating, and companies with failed business models are increasingly difficult to win the favor of investors. A break in the capital chain is almost inevitable.
After the thunderstorm, Xuebajun executives actively dealt with the aftermath, contacted other educational institutions to take over employees, connected Xuebajun students for other educational institutions, and sold the photo-taking question search business to supplement class fees and Wage gap. At the end of January 2021, there was news that Shenzhen Parallel Line Online Education Company was negotiating to acquire Youxue Xiaoban.
The story of Xuebajun has sounded the alarm for small and medium-sized online education institutions. Since it is becoming more and more difficult to obtain external financing, and we are unable to compete with leading companies in terms of investment, we must calm down, polish product features, and refine operations to avoid dying in the next winter.
9
Marginalized by Ali, Xiami Music closed down
On January 5, 2021, Xiami Music announced that it would close its service one month later. On February 5, Xiami Music ceased service completely, and Xiami’s history stopped in the Year of the Rat.
Xiami Music was founded in October 2007. The founder Wang Hao is a guitarist in the university band, and the other founder Zhu Qi is a folk musician. From 2008 to 2010, Xiami Music completed three rounds of financing, with investors including Shenzhen Venture Capital and Shanda Group. In 2013, Xiami was acquired by Alibaba.
Xiami, which was backed by a giant, once had a high profile, and the number of registered users on the platform once exceeded 20 million. Many industry insiders interviewed by "Finance" believe that Xiami is special only because it is "a product made by musicians."
Xiami Music has two unique values ??for musicians: first, it has the most comprehensive music library on the Internet; second, it helps independent record companies discover artists with similar styles.
But for non-professional music lovers, the value of shrimp is limited. Capital pursues profits, while users follow copyright. Xiami’s user-self-upload model has resulted in a large number of pirated songs appearing on the platform.
In 2015, the National Copyright Administration began to regulate music copyright and combat piracy. Xiami Music's other competing products purchased a large number of copyrights this year, but Alibaba's senior management never considered copyright as an important strategic position, which ultimately led to Xiami missing the opportunity.
As of June 2020, Kugou Music has 281 million monthly active users, QQ Music has 268 million, KuWo Music has 164 million, NetEase Cloud Music has 138 million, and Migu Music and Xiami Music have approximately 40 million each.
Xiami Music continues to be marginalized by Alibaba, lacking copyright, losing users, and poor data performance.
A Xiami executive told Caijing that Xiami’s closure is a normal business adjustment. Next, it will explore more services in music business scenarios and launch the “Yinluo” platform to help musicians and Labels expand more music usage channels.
The reason for Xiami’s failure was copyright, but its original intention was to help musicians make money. This slightly ironic contrast reminds us that the musicians who create copyrights and the music platforms that sell copyrights are two different interests. Mainly, the prosperity of the platform does not mean that the life of musicians will become better, but the latter is the source of all prosperity.
8
The actual controller misappropriated a huge amount of funds from Shede Winery, and the local government launched an attack
Shede Winery, one of the "Six Golden Flowers" of Sichuan Wine ( 600702.SH), in 2020 when the liquor sector was singing all the way, it was suddenly ST, which was the biggest "thunder" in the industry.
But looking at the company’s financial report, the various data are very healthy. In 2018 and 2019, its operating income was 2.21 billion and 2.65 billion respectively, and its non-net profits were 300 million and 510 million respectively. Even under the epidemic, the revenue in the first three quarters of 2020 was 1.76 billion yuan, excluding non-net profit of 290 million yuan, which is a good performance.
Its ST nature is very special. It was neither continuous losses nor insolvency, but funds misappropriated by the original actual controller - SkyOcean Group and its related parties embezzled a total of more than 4 billion yuan in two years. As of the Dongchuang incident, 480 million yuan had not yet been returned.
Even though a huge amount of money was misappropriated, as of June 30, 2020, ST was willing to still have 1.16 billion yuan in monetary funds in its account, and it had not been damaged.
Sichuan Tuopai Shede Group, which holds 29.91% of the shares of Shede Winery, was originally 70% controlled by Tianyang Group and 30% held by the Shehong local government. Tianyang misappropriated funds from listed companies, and the local government began to take action. In the autumn of 2020, a large number of senior executives of Shede Liquor Industry were controlled by the public security department on charges of "suspected breach of trust and harming the interests of listed companies." It remains to be seen whether Zhou Zheng, the controller of SkyOcean Group, can escape responsibility.
At the end of 2020, under the control of the local government, 70% of Tuopai Group’s shares held by SkyOcean Group were publicly auctioned, and finally sold to Yuyuan Shares (600655.SH) for a consideration of 4.53 billion yuan. Compared with the 3.822 billion yuan spent by Tianyang in 2016, the value-added rate is not large.
Since then, Guo Guangchang has become the actual controller of ST.
At that time, in order to raise funds for mergers and acquisitions, SkyOcean Group borrowed 2.3 billion yuan and issued bonds of 1.5 billion yuan through its affiliated companies. Unexpectedly, Huanjing Real Estate was in mourning after being hit by policies such as purchase restrictions. Tianyang, which invested heavily in real estate in Yanjiao, Langfang, is also in trouble. Finally, Tianyang, who was demolishing the east wall to repair the west wall, extended its black hands to Shede Liquor Industry.
It was once a common problem for some state-owned holding companies that the actual controller misappropriated funds of listed companies. ST's reluctance proves that private capital holdings are not immune to such shortcomings. There is still a long way to go to improve corporate governance structures and strengthen capital market supervision.
To be fair, SkyOcean Trading has been well received by the industry in recent years, regardless of its brand, market, or specific performance. After Guo Guangchang took over, ST's share price soared, showing that the capital market was optimistic about its future.
7
State-owned coal giant Yongmei Holdings defaulted on multiple credit bonds
In mid-to-late November 2020, Yongmei Holdings failed to repay multiple credit bonds as scheduled. Debt, falling into continuous default. Yongmei Holdings was condemned by the National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors and suspended from debt financing instrument-related business for one year; three lead underwriters who participated in the underwriting of "Yongmei Bonds" were punished, and six institutions including China Chengxin International were warned.
Yongmei Holdings is a large state-owned coal enterprise in Henan Province and one of the top 500 companies in China. Henan Energy and Chemical Industry Group, a wholly-owned company owned by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Henan Province, controls 96.01% of Yongmei, and Industrial International Trust holds the remaining shares.
At the end of 2018 and 2019, Yongmei Holdings’ total assets were 162.34 billion yuan and 164.27 billion yuan; total liabilities were 125.59 billion yuan and 126.01 billion yuan. During the same period, operating income was 48.99 billion yuan and 47.02 billion yuan; net profit attributable to the parent company was -1.14 billion yuan and -1.32 billion yuan.
Yongmei Holdings is large but not strong. In addition to the low operating level of the company itself, coal is the core business of Yongmei Holdings and the main contributor to gross profit. The company's efficiency is too dependent on the coal market. Yongmei Holdings' non-coal businesses have poor profitability. Among them, the gross profit margin of the chemical business has dropped from 18.1% to 2.1% in recent years, which has dragged down the company's overall performance.
What’s more serious is that Yongmei Holdings has a huge amount of funds occupied by internal affiliated units of the major shareholder. At the end of 2019, related parties accounted for as much as 10.446 billion yuan!
Yongmei's default severely damaged investor confidence in the bond market. Some credit bonds in related industries and provinces plummeted, and many bonds were canceled. The industry predicts that this incident will cast a shadow on the financing environment of some provinces and some state-owned enterprises in the next few years, making bond issuance more difficult.
6
Danke Apartment, eggshells were broken all over the floor
In the winter of 2020, the capital chain of Danke Apartment (NYSE: DNK) broke, triggering Domino’s effect. In the freezing cold wind, a large number of landlords who had not received their rent demanded to terminate their contracts with Danke, which triggered many violent conflicts between landlords and tenants. Currently, all Danke properties have been removed from the shelves and operations have been suspended.
Danke Apartment was established in Beijing in January 2015 and listed on the New York Stock Exchange on January 17, 2020. The top three shareholders are Tiger Fund, Joy Capital, and founder Gao Jing.
Danke Apartment’s business model is “second landlord” housing leasing. The company’s main source of revenue is rent. In 2019, the total revenue was 7.13 billion yuan, and the net profit attributable to the parent company was -3.44 billion yuan. Total debt is 8.63 billion yuan.
In June 2020, Gao Jing was suddenly taken away by relevant agencies for investigation, and co-founder Cui Yan became the acting CEO. Previously, Danke’s cash flow crisis had already emerged. First, suppliers were generally in arrears, causing cleaning, maintenance and other service providers who were owed money to be unable to spend their money. Danke's service quality declined, and tenant complaints increased rapidly. By the winter of 2020, violent conflicts between landlords and tenants who could not receive rent continued.
The main reason for the explosion of eggshells is blind expansion. From 2017 to 2019, the number of rooms in Danke’s camp increased nearly 30 times; in the direction of expansion, Danke also made strategic mistakes. In 2019, Danke’s key expansion areas are second-tier cities with lower square footage efficiency.
Danke has made a huge initial investment in adding new properties. According to Danke’s prospectus, the average cost of each new house will be recovered after 12-20 months. From 2017 to 2019, Danke’s annual losses increased rapidly from more than 270 million yuan to more than 3.4 billion yuan.
The sudden outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic also hit the rental market hard and catalyzed the explosion of eggshells. Because they are optimistic about future rent increases, Danke generally signs long-term contracts of 4-6 years with landlords, and provides higher offers to compete for the market. However, due to the epidemic, the rental market prices across the country have generally dropped, the unit price of Danke has declined, and the occupancy rate has also been under pressure, making it impossible to guarantee sustainable cash flow.
After the Danke scandal, under the coordination and promotion of the government, the owners and tenants of Danke properties successively terminated their contracts with Danke, and WeBank, the provider of "rental loans", gave up its personal claims against the tenants. , and converted to receivables from Danke. However, the arrears of payment to suppliers, unpaid wages to employees, and rent advances from long-term tenants have not yet been substantively resolved.
5
Beijing-based real estate giant China Fortune Land Development’s debt is overdue of 5.255 billion
On the evening of February 1, 2021, China Fortune Land Development (600340.SH) issued an announcement. It was admitted that debts of 5.255 billion yuan were overdue. As of January 31, 2021, the company's available monetary funds were 800 million yuan, and it was unable to repay the due debts of financial institutions.
China Fortune Land Development was founded in 1998 by Wang Wenxue. The company's main business is industrial new cities and commercial office operations, and the Beijing-ring area is its base camp.
China Fortune Land Development’s industrial new city construction adopts a cooperation model with local governments, with government leadership, enterprise operation, and benefit sharing. Since 2018, China Fortune Land Development has completed its layout around 15 core urban areas across the country, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Hangzhou, and Wuhan.
Large-scale expansion does not mean that the company's fundamentals are good. In July 2018 and February 2019, Ping An invested twice in China Fortune Land Development, with a total investment of 17.9 billion yuan, thus becoming the second largest shareholder with a 25% shareholding ratio, but compared with China Fortune Land Development's more than 200 billion yuan (as of interest-bearing liabilities in mid-2020), Ping An’s capital injection is still difficult to turn the tide.
At the debt committee meeting, Wang Wenxue generally attributed the debt crisis to three points: First, the epidemic. In September 2019, China Fortune Land Development invested 11.6 billion yuan in Wuhan. The sudden outbreak of the epidemic caused the business plan to be almost interrupted; secondly, it misjudged the situation around Beijing and invested too much. In 2017, Langfang, Zhangjiakou, Baoding and other places around Beijing issued "purchase restriction orders", and the property market around Beijing suffered a heavy blow. Although China Fortune Land Development's sales increased by 25% in 2017, its operating cash flow turned from positive to negative. , was -16.228 billion yuan, a drop of as much as 309.04%; third, the early expansion was radical and management was not refined enough. In 2019 and 2020, China Land Development’s annual land acquisition scale was more than 30 billion yuan.
In addition, the business model of Industrial New City also indirectly caused the company's cash flow to be tight. Its industrial new city projects mostly cooperate with local governments. The project account period is generally 3-5 years, and the payment cycle is at least two years longer than that of ordinary commercial real estate development.
China Fortune Land Development is seeking support from the Hebei Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government, and the Langfang Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government. The mayor of Langfang said that the government will provide policy support, urgently allocate financial funds, speed up the repayment of part of the government's payables, and make every effort to help enterprises speed up sales collection.
4
"Mr. Luxury Mansion" Tahoe Group defaulted on mid-term notes and became the industry's "loss king"
July 6, 2020, Tahoe Group (000732.SZ) medium-term note defaulted and the capital chain was broken. Founder Huang Qisen decided to give up his position as the largest shareholder and introduce investors. However, except for Vanke Group's support of 2.4 billion yuan with stringent conditions, Tahoe Group did not find more support, nor did it reach a settlement with creditors.
On January 30, 2021, Tahoe Group announced that it expected a loss of 4.17 billion to 5.52 billion yuan for the whole year of 2020. There is not much suspense about winning the "Loss King" in the real estate industry that year.
Tahoe Group is a representative of Fujian real estate companies and was founded in 1996. The "Chinese Courtyard" series of products for high-net-worth home buyers is Tahoe's label, earning Huang Qisen the nickname "Mr. Luxury Homes." In 2017, Tahoe Group's sales exceeded RMB 100 billion, and in 2018, sales reached RMB 130.34 billion, ranking 20th among national real estate companies in sales.
In 2019, Tahoe showed signs of crisis - high debt, loss of senior executives, tight cash flow, and frequent accidents. A year later, Tahoe's capital chain broke and it fell from the peak to the bottom. As of early February 2021, Tahoe's market value was 6.77 billion yuan, down nearly 95% from the highest point in 2018.
There are three main reasons for Tahoe’s rapid decline:
First, as central financial supervision has become stricter after 2018, Tahoe has insufficiently assessed the regulators’ determination to deleverage and misjudged the situation. , when the industry shrinks, it still amplifies financial leverage;
Second, the company is mainly deployed in the first line, and its main products are high-end residences. When first-tier cities limit prices, purchases, and sales, and focus on urgent needs, the luxury housing market It becomes difficult;
Third, the pace of transformation is too slow. At the end of 2019, Tahoe planned to sell off a batch of high-quality houses that were just in demand, but encountered the epidemic, resulting in no centralized delivery of projects, accelerating the break in the capital chain.
3
In 2020, Ziguang Group fell into a debt crisis due to the aggressive “buy, buy, buy” activities.
As of February 1, 2021, the cumulative amount of matured debt of Ziguang Group was RMB 2.11 billion, and the total principal and interest of the company's wholly-owned subsidiaries' U.S. dollar debt that had matured was US$1.56 billion.
Ziguang Group was established in April 1993. In 2010, Beijing Jiankun Investment Group was introduced through shareholding reform, holding 49% of the shares; Tsinghua Holdings remains the controlling shareholder, holding 51% of the shares. Jiankun Chairman Zhao Weiguo has been the chairman of Ziguang since 2010.
After Zhao Weiguo took charge of Ziguang Group, he launched a number of acquisitions and positioned his business in the two hard technology fields of chips and cloud network equipment. At present, Ziguang Group has become China's largest comprehensive integrated circuit company. It has a number of subsidiaries targeting the chip field, such as Yangtze Memory, Unisoc Microelectronics (002049.SZ), Unisoc Zhanrui, and Lilianxin, etc.; other subsidiaries, such as H3C and Unisoc Cloud, are oriented to IT equipment and cloud service market.
Ziguang Group’s revenue in the first half of 2020 was 34.75 billion yuan, and net profit attributable to the parent company was -3.38 billion yuan; total assets were 299.65 billion yuan, and total liabilities were 202.94 billion yuan.
Industry insiders generally believe that Tsinghua Unigroup’s debt crisis today stems from its previous aggressive “buy, buy, buy,” excessive acquisitions and over-reliance on bond financing. In addition, its subsidiary Yangtze Storage needs to burn a lot of money in the long term.
Will Ziguang’s debt crisis get bigger and bigger in 2021, causing it to fall into bankruptcy and reorganization? There is no shortage of concerns in the industry. However, compared with Peking University Founder, which defaulted earlier, Tsinghua Unigroup is a leader in independent chips and has higher strategic importance. Its follow-up plan has attracted much attention.
2
Liaoning’s key state-owned enterprise Brilliance Group went bankrupt and reorganized
On October 23, 2020, Brilliance’s private placement bonds defaulted. Brilliance Group announced that the total principal and interest amount of debt default was 6.64 billion yuan. On November 20, the Shenyang Intermediate Court ruled that Brilliance Group entered bankruptcy and reorganization procedures.
Brilliance Group is a key state-owned enterprise in Liaoning Province. The largest shareholder, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Liaoning Province, holds 80% of the shares, and the second shareholder, the Liaoning Provincial Social Security Fund Council, holds 20% of the shares.
In 1992, capital master Yang Rong founded Brilliance Group. In the same year, it acquired the assets of Jinbei Automobile, an old state-owned enterprise, and listed it in the United States, becoming the first Chinese company to be listed in the United States. In 2001, it became the first private enterprise to form a joint venture with a multinational automobile giant. In 2002, Brilliance became a wholly-owned state-owned enterprise. From 2006 to 2018, Brilliance has been helmed by Qi Yumin, the former deputy mayor of Dalian. In March 2019, Yan Bingzhe, the former deputy mayor of Shenyang City, took over as chairman of Brilliance.
After 2006, Brilliance once took the lead in building its own brands, with models such as Zunchi and Junjie out of stock.
However, after China's automobile market entered a mature stage, Brilliance's own brands quickly fell behind due to poor product capabilities, and were overtaken by private companies such as Geely and Great Wall and established state-owned enterprises such as SAIC and GAC.
Brilliance Group has 4 listed companies, among which Brilliance China (1114.HK) owns 50% of BMW Brilliance’s equity, but this will drop to 25% after 2022.
Just looking at the financial report, we cannot draw the conclusion that Brilliance Group is in high risk. In the first half of 2020, Brilliance Group's net profit was 6.3 billion yuan and operating cash flow was 5 billion yuan; in 2019, these two figures were 11 billion yuan and 24 billion yuan respectively. However, this is the data after merging the statements of subsidiaries. Brilliance Group cannot use the funds in the accounts of listed companies and can only use the money of its own brand wholly-owned subsidiaries Zhonghua and Huasong. However, the sales of these two companies are not good during the epidemic. Due to the impact, production has been discontinued to this day.
As of the end of June 2020, Brilliance Group’s total assets were 193.3 billion yuan and short-term debt was 102.7 billion yuan, while Brilliance Group’s available funds were only 34.6 billion yuan.
As a holding company, Brilliance Group does not engage in physical business itself, but serves as a financing entity to finance its subsidiaries. But where is the raised money invested, and what are the results? At the creditors meeting on November 30, 2020, representatives of Brilliance Group who were asked many times did not respond.
On January 12, 2021, the Shanghai Stock Exchange publicly condemned Brilliance Group, its chairman Yan Bingzhe, and the then chief accountant and head of information disclosure Gao Xingang for the bond default of Brilliance Group.
The industry is not optimistic about the reorganized Brilliance Group. Sun Yong, dean of the China-Germany Noha Automotive Vocational Education Research Institute, believes that due to the deterioration of the political and business environment and the loss of credibility of the company, as well as becoming a minority shareholder in the BMW joint venture, it is a high probability that Brilliance Group will be merged and reorganized in the future.
1
Luckin Coffee’s financial fraud led to delisting and internal strife
In April 2020, Luckin Coffee (Nasdaq: LK) revealed that it had fabricated sales Data and financial fraud amounted to 2.2 billion yuan. Two months later, Luckin Coffee was delisted in the United States. On January 31, 2020, the short-selling agency Muddy Waters claimed that it had received an 89-page anonymous short-selling report, which directly pointed out that Ruixing had falsified data.
In October 2017, Luckin Coffee opened its first store and was listed on Nasdaq in May 2019, setting a record for the fastest listing of a Chinese startup company. Luckin Coffee quickly made wealth and burst the bubble. It is undoubtedly the most shocking capital market story in the Year of the Rat.
The two founders of “Luckin Speed” and the former largest and second largest shareholders, Lu Zhengyao and Qian Zhiya, lost all their Luckin shares after the fraud, and were the shareholders with the largest voting rights. Dazheng Capital should be Ruixing’s current talking point.
In September 2020, the China Securities Regulatory Commission decided to impose fines of up to 2 million yuan on 45 companies, including two Luckin-related companies, for Luckin’s false propaganda. In December 2020, Luckin agreed to pay a fine of US$180 million to reach a settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Luckin announced that former CEO Qian Zhiya and former COO Liu Jian were responsible for financial fraud, but they have not yet assumed any legal responsibility after being fired.
In December 2020, Ruixing disclosed unaudited financial information for the first three quarters, saying that the company’s revenue had grown by double digits and everything was on the right track. However, the shock of financial fraud continues.
At the beginning of 2021, Luckin staged an internal fight between Lu Zhengyao and Qian Zhiya demanding the removal of CEO Guo Jinyi. The internal friction and competition were far more complicated than the outside world understood. Lu Zhengyao, who no longer holds any position in Luckin and does not own Luckin shares, should have been completely separated from Luckin, but recent circumstances have shown that this is not the case.
In the past few months, Luckin has stopped diversified businesses such as the Xiaolu Tea franchise, focused on its main coffee business, reduced subsidies, and closed hundreds of offline coffee shops. A Luckin employee told Caijing that there are many people within the company who have resigned or want to leave, and the sales volume of a single store is lower than before the fraud scandal broke out.
Luckin’s financial fraud is egregious in nature, not only illegal but also seriously damaging to business ethics. But from a business perspective, Luckin’s main focus is coffee delivery and online and offline integrated services, which fill the service gap of coffee veteran Starbucks, improve the “people-friendly” nature of coffee, and make the business model sustainable.
Through the Luckin incident, we have also seen that Chinese consumers are relatively tolerant of companies that commit financial fraud, and they are willing to pay for high-quality and low-priced coffee. Therefore, Luckin, which was hit hard by financial fraud, still has its future in its own hands.
Postscript
Since everyone has his own misfortune, it is actually difficult to summarize the rules. But if we don’t summarize, we will feel that there are some shortcomings, so let’s risk it and say a few more words.
First, "Morality comes before work. Small companies do things, big companies conduct themselves." This is the motto of Mr. Liu Chuanzhi, an older generation entrepreneur. Mr. Lu Zhengyao also has a connection with the Lenovo Group. Unfortunately, the motto has gone through his ears and his greed has stayed in his heart, and he just destroyed Ruixing's good cards.
There was no reflection after the Dongchuang incident, and he is still making trouble. I wonder what the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas he worshiped felt.
Second, entrepreneurs must have a spirit of risk-taking, but risk-taking is not the same as gambling. Being nine out of ten is conservative, but at least it must be five out of ten. China Fortune Land Development, Tahoe, and Danke all emphasized external environmental factors in their self-summaries, such as the epidemic, regulation, and uncontrollable government accounts receivable. But under the same external environment, why did nothing happen to Vanke Longhu and why did nothing happen to Ziruxianghu? When making business decisions, you cannot assume that everything is ready and I just need to make the final step. If multiple prerequisites such as ABCDEFG are established before your grand plan can be realized, and missing any one of them will lead to a domino effect, then your plan is basically nonsense. For example, the problem of government accounts receivable has been present in all walks of life for many years. Then it is not a variable, but a constant. If you do not cover this inherent risk when making decisions, what is it if it is not gambling?
Third, the scale complex is unnecessary. The essence of running a business is to create value for shareholders, employees, customers, and society. A big company has a lot of problems like diabetes, heart disease, and osteoporosis. Such a big company has nothing to do with it. significance. The defeat of Danke Huaxia Tahoe Brilliance Ziguang is inseparable from blind expansion. The reason why they are keen on scale expansion stems from the understanding that "big is good" and "big will never fail" in the bones of generations of Chinese entrepreneurs.
Fourth, product power is the foundation of everything. Product power is 1, and marketing power, capital power, business model power, etc. are all 0. Without 1, no matter how many 0s there are, it is useless. This sentence applies to each of the top ten defeats in the Year of the Rat. If you want to give a typical example, it must be Brilliance. As a car company, in addition to the car owner who removed the word "Brilliance BMW" from the car logo, how many Brilliance cars have you seen running on the street?
Fifth, state-owned enterprises are not safe havens. The government will not blindly cover the bottom line. Investors must have full risk awareness. The default of debts by large state-owned enterprises such as Brilliance, Ziguang and Yongmei is one of the iconic business phenomena in the Year of the Rat. In the past, state-owned enterprises enjoyed advantages in financing, account terms, etc. because of the government's implicit credit endorsement. What happened this year reminds us that corporate credit and government credit are two different things. The government will not give unlimited endorsement to state-owned enterprises. When state-owned enterprises are concentrated, This is especially true in areas where government financial resources are limited. Investors should remain vigilant about this and try to stay away from companies that regard credit as nothing and laws as child's play, such as Henan Nenghua Group, Sichuan Tianyang Group and their affiliated companies that wantonly misappropriate funds from their listed companies.