Innovation refers to using existing thinking patterns to propose insights that are different from conventional or ordinary people's thinking, and using existing knowledge and materials. Here are the successful innovation cases of foreign companies that I have compiled. Let's take a look. Take a look.

Wu Jun, the author of the IT best-selling book "Top of the Wave", put forward an impressive "genetic determinism", that is, when a large company wants to transform and occupy new fields and make disruptive innovations When it comes to products, they often fail miserably.

China Mobile announced that it will establish a new media group and it will be officially put into operation in January 2015. On the evening of October 15, Lenovo Group announced that it would establish a new subsidiary to build China's leading Internet-based smart terminal and service business based entirely on the Internet platform. The company will officially start operations on April 1, 2015, and will have an independent company name and a new sub-brand...

In the era of great changes in the mobile Internet, China Mobile and Lenovo Group Large companies have also accelerated their pace of innovation. When large companies innovate, people are often full of expectations, and at the same time they also have a little doubt. When a large company innovates, it involves too many things. Can the innovation they do really succeed?

Wu Jun, a former Google senior engineer and author of the IT best-selling book "Top of the Wave", proposed an impressive "genetic determinism", that is, due to the influence of the company's genes, when a large company wants to transform and occupy new In this field, when making disruptive innovative products, they often fail miserably.

For example: Motorola, Nokia, Intel, and Microsoft, although they occupied undisputed monopoly positions in their industries, they all declined to varying degrees after the times changed and the industry transformed. The dilemma of innovation within the corporate system has become the norm.

When Jack Welch talked about this issue, he once said: "It is more difficult to manage a new production line with an output value of $50,000 in the first year than to manage a new production line with sales of $500 million. The 20th year of a business is more difficult."

Therefore, the probability of failure of new projects initiated within the system of large companies is very high. In the Internet industry, large companies often fail to make innovative products compared to start-up companies. The products that failed in large companies can be said to be "skeletons":

Baidu "Yes"

Baidu I have been thinking about how to carry unsold commercial traffic. From Baidu Side, Baidu Youa to Lohas, and Baidu Maps, Baidu has been exploring the O2O field, but the results are not satisfactory.

At the end of 2010, the local life service product Baidu was launched in public beta, and Baidu Youah launched a life channel to test local life services. In March 2011, Youa Mall closed and officially transformed into a life service platform. However, the development of Baidu Youa Life has not met external expectations. In order to have more autonomy, Youa split from Baidu at the end of 2011 and later changed its name to Ailehas. But Lohas was not a success. O2O has gradually been dominated by mobile Internet, and its advantage is at the lower end of the line. The Internet side no longer has the advantage, because users have to enjoy services anytime and anywhere... The following are the reasons for the failure of Baidu's "Youa":

In 2007 In October, Baidu established an e-commerce division and announced its entry into e-commerce in a high-profile manner. Choosing C2C as a breakthrough point, Baidu hoped to create "the largest online personal trading platform in the Chinese Internet field." Baidu believed at that time that e-commerce based on search engines was an inevitable trend in future development, and its greatest advantage would be to become a leader in this field. King.

In October 2008, Baidu Youa, which carried countless expectations, was officially launched, and boasted that it would "defeat Taobao within three years." However, at the end of March 2011, Baidu issued an announcement saying that Youa would close in one month. Youa’s mall business will be transferred to partners such as Lekutian and Yaodian 100 in a planned manner. Then at the end of 2011, Baidu’s e-commerce division was split into an independent company. In 2012, "Youa" was rebranded as "Alohas" and relaunched, but was positioned as a local life information service platform. Since the launch of Lohas, the business has been constantly adjusted, and many people in the industry said they couldn't understand it. On March 31, 2011, Baidu's e-commerce website "Youa" announced that the products, stores, and transaction-related functions of the Youa shopping platform will be closed in one month, and the mall business will be transferred to Lekutian, Yaodian 100, etc. Partners.

"Youah" is gone...

Reason: Untimely development

Youah was officially launched in 2008. It has caught up with the fastest development of online shopping in the past three years. It can be said that Youa was born at an inflection point in the development of e-commerce. Why does a good opportunity have no good results? The following points are the main reasons for its failure:

1. Strategic mistakes

After Yesah went online, its goal was to be the second in Taobao. This positioning led Youah to adopt a follow-up strategy. Different from traditional industries, or even the traditional Internet field, the leaders in various subdivisions of e-commerce often have an absolute advantage, such as Taobao and JD.com. Users have formed a dependence and habit on it.

Later, if challengers do not have disruptive and differentiated innovation, it will be difficult to break the existing market structure.

2. The traffic advantage is no longer

E-commerce is a market that desperately needs user stickiness. When Baidu imports traffic to the Youa platform, it needs to go through many steps. For example, the registration and certification of buyers and sellers, and application for payment tools such as Baidu Pay, this is an attenuating process. Every time it passes through a link, part of the flow is attenuated. So every step is a risk. In the end, there are not many left that can settle down and become core indicators, and the traffic advantage becomes smaller and smaller.

3. Lack of attractive business models

Simply competing for traffic is no longer suitable for the development of e-commerce at this stage. Baidu has realized this. In the new e-commerce strategy launched in the first half of 2010, Baidu returned to its search advantage, launched a variety of advertising forms to fully meet the search placement of e-commerce customers, and launched and gradually opened up based on 'box computing' product search.

4. Imbalanced diversified resource layout

The success of diversified business depends on two points: whether you are based on your core competitiveness; whether the resource allocation is reasonable.

If Baidu wants to succeed in e-commerce, the key is to find managers who truly understand e-commerce. Li Mingyuan, the founder of Youa who resigned last year, was once highly praised by Robin Li for his outstanding performance in the community field; but his experience in the e-commerce field was blank. Even if he did an excellent job at the execution level, he still could not escape the fate of failure.

In terms of diversified allocation of resources, Baidu has its own model. Usually when a new business unit is established, the parent company will send a capable person to be the general manager. Compared with the management team of start-up companies in the Internet field, which is composed of three backbones: CEO, CTO and marketing director, the general manager of Baidu's business unit often shoulders three responsibilities and faces very great challenges. Baidu attaches great importance to you, but Baidu's resource allocation follows the 721 principle, that is, the core search business can be allocated 70% of the resources, the search-related business can be allocated 20% of the resources, and the innovative business is 10%. Regardless of whether Youa is a search-related or innovative business, both of them have multiple projects, and the funding and management support Youa can get is only a fraction or a tenth of it.

In addition, the operational-level talents of the parent company have not yet formed a sharing mechanism with its business units. In other words, the management talents of the business units are not the first-class talents of Baidu as a whole. Under such an architecture and resource model, it is not easy to do well.

Smart FUN e-commerce

In the huge Internet territory of "Emperor Penguin" smart FUN, there are still several areas that have not been able to stand in the front row, and e-commerce is one of them. "Taking traffic to control the princes" has been the only way for smart FUN to win in the past. In most new fields, smart FUN can always rely on its traffic advantage and user base to quickly delineate its own sphere of influence, rewrite the competitive landscape, and segregate its territories. One side even came out on top. But in the field of e-commerce, traffic is no longer the sword of Shang Fang, and the late-mover advantage with universal effect suddenly fails. E-commerce, for smart fun, is more like a new business that is different from the past. Internally, the future development of smart FUN e-commerce was once compared to climbing Mount Everest, which is self-evidently difficult and dangerous. After stumbling for nearly 10 years, Smart FUN e-commerce seems to have finally sorted out its development ideas, various internal and external resources, united the front, and tried to achieve a counterattack through the path of "WeChat + mobile e-commerce". Regardless of success or failure. At present, it cannot be avoided that smart FUN e-commerce has left too much "homework" in its early years...

Reason 1: Traffic shackles

Smart FUN CEO Ma Huateng once said frankly, "(e-commerce) Shang) took many detours." Explaining Smart FUN’s e-commerce business is a troublesome task in itself. Even after integration, it still has three e-commerce websites. The bottom layer includes Paipai.com, a C2C platform, which is similar to Taobao; Yixun.com, a B2C self-operated platform, is similar to JD.com; and QQ Online Shopping, a B2C open platform, is similar to Tmall. In addition, there are Kelan Diamond Network, Gaopeng Network, B2C online shoe store Haolemai, mother and baby community website, group buying website F Group, etc. invested in the e-commerce field by Smart FUN.

After smart FUN imported traffic to Paipai, it was able to obtain high sales at that time, but customers left after buying the cheap promotional products. Xiao He is also a success, and Xiao He is a failure. Traffic is the most important "trump card" of the smart FUN system. For backward fields, they often rely on users and traffic to seize the opponent's market in the rhythm of imitation and improvement. The success of smart FUN can be summarized as the "QQ+" model, which takes QQ as the core and uses free social functions to "bundle" users onto the smart FUN ship, and then sell games, videos, searches, reading, etc. on the ship. kind of project. In the field of e-commerce, smart FUN is still trying to copy this model, but unfortunately, the traffic advantage has failed.

Baidu has it, which can be said to be a lesson learned from the past. Although Baidu once introduced huge traffic and supported the e-commerce business "Baidu has it", it ultimately failed. Li Mingyuan, founder of Youa, once concluded: “Behind e-commerce, it’s actually more about the supply chain, commodities, logistics, warehousing, and brand building.

E-commerce competes with products and business services, rather than the detailed design and website experience of shopping websites. ”

“Traffic can indeed bring click-through rates and achieve the purpose of gathering popularity, but it may not be able to make business; even if business is made, it may not be able to retain customers.” "IBM senior strategic analyst Wang Qi believes that to some extent, traffic may be a shackle for smart FUN to develop e-commerce. Smart FUN is accustomed to pushing promotional information with traffic, resulting in sales and promotional activities being too highly correlated, but customer retention The rate is relatively low.

“Buying goods by chance when seeing attractive prices is only episodic and does not last long. Wang Qi further analyzed that the "QQ+" model is essentially based on social relationships. For purely Internet-based products, due to its characteristics of "light" and "fast" fixed circles, the spread of social relationships is more Advantages. However, e-commerce needs to transform social relationships into business relationships, involving many links such as supply chain, warehousing, logistics, etc., which are far from being solved by traffic.

In addition, traffic plays a vital role in the B-side ecosystem. In the shaping of e-commerce, smart FUN e-commerce has also taken a detour. Wu Xiaoguang, CEO of smart FUN e-commerce, once said frankly that in the past, smart FUN only drove traffic to the e-commerce platform, which was a planned economy operation method. “If we use the real market, In an economical way, the internal traffic of smart FUN is marketized, allowing merchants to spend their own money to buy traffic and cherish the traffic more. At the same time, smart FUN e-commerce must establish a good ecological environment to provide merchants with more non-paid traffic and form organic growth. "Wu Xiaoguang said.

"It would definitely be simple and crude if we just use low-price or even free traffic to attract merchants. "The aforementioned industry insiders said frankly that merchants prefer to solidify customers in search instead of solidifying traffic in promotions. They also need an increasingly prosperous platform on which to do business for a long time.

Reason 2 :The Sorrow of the Supply Chain

Traffic shackles may only appear under certain circumstances, but supply chain issues are the most important lesson that smart FUN e-commerce lacks in the development of e-commerce. At the beginning, there was a debate in the industry. Some people believed that e-commerce companies were still "light companies" and did not need to "circle" suppliers like department stores and home appliance chains, let alone build their own logistics and warehousing.

< p> The path taken by smart FUN e-commerce is exactly the opposite of what Li Mingyuan described. According to a former product manager of smart FUN e-commerce, the product managers and engineers of smart FUN e-commerce are more obsessed with testing the online shopping process and response speed. Hope to reduce steps and improve the experience, but ignore the supply chain, logistics and other business systems that require stronger technical support.

Another reason is that Smart FUN prefers internal incubation. He told reporters that before, most of Smart FUN’s mainstream businesses were incubated internally, such as research and development, promotion, payment, etc. The initial e-commerce development was based on this idea, but it failed.

"The Alibaba e-commerce company originally started out as a B2B business, and is relatively good at handling B-side relationships and building a platform ecosystem; JD.com has a traditional retail background and has always had a close relationship with suppliers. "An investor familiar with smart FUN e-commerce told reporters that the chain of e-commerce is actually longer than that of general Internet products. Smart FUN's seemingly strong online advantages cover customer perception, logistics, warehousing and other links. In the supply chain, some things are trivial.

Everything has a cause and a result. The supply chain relationship that smart FUN e-commerce missed in the early years is more directly reflected in the expansion of categories. Retention rate, more importantly, is related to survival. A typical foreign case is the battle between Amazon and Newegg. With the advantage of scale, Amazon easily suppressed 3C even though 3C home appliances only accounted for less than one-third of its scale. Vertical website Newegg, and category expansion has also accumulated large cash flow

According to monitoring data from the China E-Commerce Research Center, as of the first half of 2013, Tmall accounted for 50.4% of the online shopping market. %; JD.com ranked second, accounting for 20.7%, Suning.com accounted for 5.7%, and Smart FUN e-commerce accounted for only 5.4%.

Reason 3: Time window

"As an e-commerce platform, we look back and see that you can start from a strong category, but it cannot be everything to you. Bu Guangqi, vice president of Intelligent FUN and CEO of Yixun.com, said that the platform must have a strong carrying capacity. If we position this feature into the service system and support system, there will be greater space in the future. But the problem is that Internet competition There is an unwritten rule - user inertia, that is, for products with the same characteristics, people are not accustomed to changing the products they are accustomed to using at will. Smart FUN e-commerce that expands categories is more like a race against time to solidify users. After all, it is easier to retain users than to win back users when searching for smart FUN e-commerce instead of purchasing other categories of goods on other websites.

With the rise of WeChat, it seems. It brings huge room for imagination to smart FUN e-commerce. Once, Zhang Xiaolong, the "godfather" of WeChat, asked Bu Guangqi if he could "kill the (Taobao) shopping cart."

So on last year's "Double 11" day, Yixun.com teamed up with WeChat to launch the WeChat store. Obviously, in the field of IM, WeChat is already far ahead, surpassing its opponents by several blocks; while smart FUN e-commerce is still far from matching WeChat in terms of size. One of the basis is that although the WeChat store has averaged around 10,000 orders per day since the launch of "Double 11" last year, the unit price of goods is mostly in the range of more than 200 yuan. "Century-old stores are common, but century-old Internet products are rare." An Alibaba executive once said that it is not easy to cultivate and transfer users' purchasing habits, and Alibaba is also actively developing mobile e-commerce and promoting mobile Taobao. , Weitao, Taodiandian, Laihuang and other products.

The executives of Smart FUN e-commerce have always been reluctant to talk about the competition with Alibaba’s e-commerce companies, but they once said privately: “The disparity is so big that I haven’t thought about it now.” However, Smart FUN e-commerce He has always regarded JD.com as an opponent, and he did not hesitate to invest a large amount of funds and traffic to support Yi Xun against JD.com, and even entered the Beijing market, JD.com’s home base.

China Mobile’s Fetion

Recently, China Mobile’s actions have attracted much attention. In addition to 4G, China Mobile is also accelerating its transformation this year, trying to adapt to the rapid growth of mobile Internet by establishing independent companies, and new media companies and Internet companies have been born. At present, the preparatory work of the new media company is running normally. According to the plan, China Mobile will establish a new media group company and five subsidiaries in music, video, reading, games, and animation. The company's future name will be "Migu Culture Technology Group Company". It plans to complete the industrial and commercial registration by the end of October and invest 104 in three years. billion to build a new media giant and strive to officially put it into operation in January 2015. Let’s break down China Mobile’s innovations over the years: officially introducing iPhone 5S and iPhone 5C that support China Mobile’s 3G and 4G networks; releasing its first self-branded 4G mobile phone; cooperating with smart FUN, using WeChat to promote traffic red envelopes, etc. It is not difficult to see that the giants are trying More innovation... Of course, China Mobile has had many failure cases on the road of innovation, and Fetion is one of them...

In May 2007, China Mobile established Fetion; June 5, 2007 The first version of Fetion was launched in 2008; as of the second quarter of 2009, Fetion users had reached 184 million, an increase of 64.9% over the same period in 2008, but user activity was only 29%, while smart FUNQQ maintained Average user activity is 40%. By the end of 2010, the number of active users of China Mobile Fetion had reached 183 million, and its domestic instant messaging market share ranked second after smart FUNQQ. On June 26, 2011, China Mobile transferred the operating rights of Fetion to Guangdong Mobile's southern base. The operating rights were changed and Fetion's business was completely abandoned by China Mobile.

There are many reasons for the failure of Fetion, but the main reasons are three points:

1. The "god"-like existence of qq

Fetion did not understand smart FUN No matter how much impact it has, most netizens still mainly use smart FUNQQ. What are the main reasons for this?

1. The appearance and icons of the software are dull and not as smooth, comfortable, vivid and realistic as the intelligent FUNQQ software design. The appearance of the software is equivalent to the layout design of an advertisement. Without good software appearance and icons, users will feel uncomfortable using it. I originally used this software for entertainment, but I am disgusted by the dull Fetion layout and I am still in the mood. Do you want to use your Fetion?

2. Fetion’s expressions are not vivid enough. The size of the expression is too large and is seriously out of proportion with the window.

3. The spacing between messages in the Fetion message window is uncoordinated, which also gives users an uncomfortable feeling and greatly reduces the appeal of Fetion. The above three points are ultimately due to the lack of appearance design of Fetion. I wonder if you have noticed that mobile design is inherently dull, or dullness is Mobile's patent. If you want to catch up with smart FUN Mobile in appearance, you should pay more attention to it. Intelligent FUN learning should even be innovative and even surpass it.

2. Super Pain Point

That is: Fetion should not be attached to the mobile phone number and should not change with the change of the mobile phone number, but should allow users to have a fixed Fetion signal that remains unchanged , users can bind FeiSignal to different mobile phone numbers at will. When the user is not online, messages will be sent to the user's mobile phone via SMS. This prevents users from having to change their signal when changing their number.

3. Operational management is terrible

In 2007, Fetion business began to be included in the annual KPI assessment indicators of provincial mobile companies, and became the task of provincial mobile companies. They were all promoting Fetion, and Fetion exceeded The number of users of many IM applications at that time soared. However, some people said at the time: Fetion's operations were outsourced, which made it more difficult to manage Fetion and posed hidden dangers to the subsequent development and improvement of Fetion software.

1. Fetion has excluded China Unicom and Telecom users since its launch. Originally, being bound to a mobile phone number was Fetion's advantage, but China Mobile turned it into a disadvantage. The key issue in the interoperability between the three operators on Fetion is that there is a fee for replying text messages to Fetion, and the charging issue between the three operators is also a difficulty.

In various industries, it is difficult to find such a seemingly inseparable state of affairs as China's three operators. It has wasted too much money, stifled too much energy, and increased too much internal friction.

2. Too single application and no extension. After Fetion started, version updates were too slow and there were no good derivative products. Some of the packaging that imitates QQ is not done well. 3. Who can stand the perverted KPI promotion? 4. The mobile client has various inconveniences, poor advertising and promotion, lack of real marketing, vague positioning, rigid appearance, and no ability to create momentum...

There is another very important thing to say about Fetion, The management simply does not want to promote Fetion and infringe on its own SMS revenue. There is some truth to this.

Nokia

On the morning of September 3, 2013, Microsoft and Nokia officially jointly announced that Microsoft would acquire Nokia’s mobile phone business unit for US$7.17 billion and obtain relevant patent authorizations. This means that Nokia has lost its most dazzling pearl in the past, leaving only two non-core businesses: mapping and network communications. After experiencing repeated impacts from smartphones represented by Android and Apple in the past five years, Nokia, the former leader in the mobile phone industry, finally put an end to this hopeless struggle. Faced with the market value of Nokia, which had a market value of 303 billion euros in 2000, falling to a sale price of US$7.17 billion, there is always some curiosity and responsibility for people to review the process of Nokia mobile phones from prosperity to decline. Summarizing the various aspects of Nokia’s “more success the more it fails” may have some reference value for other companies. The following are some major lessons from Nokia’s failure:

1. Moved slowly and missed the opportunity for smartphones

No company can become a victorious general. Simulator turned into 2G mobile phone, Nokia surpassed Motorola. With the advent of the 3G smartphone era, Nokia should be alert to the possibility of being surpassed. But it didn't. Nokia is the global leader in mobile phones, overlooking all mobile phone manufacturers. When the iPhone came in 2007, Nokia mocked that Jobs had to first convert brand awareness into market share. Then Android phones came. Samsung and HTC both got up because of Android. The era of touch screens came, but Nokia still stuck to Symbian and physical buttons on mobile phones. As a result, Nokia's market share dropped from more than 40% in 2008 to 25% in 2011, and was subsequently surpassed by Samsung.

2. The mentality of the boss is causing trouble, and he is unwilling to form an alliance with the newcomers in the operating system

Today, it is a certainty that Nokia will belong to the Windows Phone platform. Previously, there have been voices saying that Nokia will do something about it. Android mobile phones have illusions, and Nokia's share has declined. As long as Nokia makes Android, it can always win back the victory with its excellent hardware capabilities. But he didn't. The reason why Nokia chose the operating system is to see whether it can become its leader, which is consistent with its boss mentality. In Nokia's view, choosing the Android system is the best thing to do, and it is only Google's largest OEM, working for Google. By choosing Microsoft, you can build another mobile phone system ecosystem. However, from 2011 to 2013, the Windows Phone ecosystem lagged behind other systems, leaving Nokia alone.

3. The strategy is wavering and constantly starting from scratch

When many smartphone manufacturers are competing for market share, Nokia should make full use of its advantages and find Go in one direction firmly. But it didn't. Symbian has no longer adapted to the development of the smartphone era. Except for Apple, almost all mobile phone manufacturers have turned to the Android platform. Nokia chose to cooperate with Intel to build Meego from scratch, but then gave up. All previous investments were in vain. Less than a week after the release of the Meego-based N9, Elop made it clear that despite the huge response of the N9, Nokia would still abandon MeeGo and focus entirely on the development of Windows Phone. In early 2011, Nokia formed an alliance with Microsoft and fully shifted to the Windows Phone platform, almost starting from scratch again. No matter how good the foundation is, it can't withstand the torment.

4. Adherence to traditional thinking and closed strategies led to the failure of the mobile Internet strategy

In 2007, Nokia took the lead in launching the mobile Internet Ovi store in the world, which was one year earlier than Apple's App Store. . Then Google launched Google Play, and the success of Apple and Google's app stores proved that we should not try to take over the industry chain, but should be open to cooperation. But it didn't. Contrary to the open platforms that Apple and Google strive to build, Nokia's transformation to the Internet is more like a vertical integration targeting the Internet. In order to launch location-based services, Nokia spent huge sums of money to acquire navigation software companies, map companies and even related operating websites. However, this take-all model of the entire industry chain does not seem to enhance Nokia's competitiveness in the Internet world. After spending $15 billion, Nokia's Ovi strategy failed.

5. The market is always underestimated, and huge investments in R&D cannot be converted into productivity.

As early as 2004, Nokia developed touch technology internally, and even the now popular 3D technology. Looking at Nokia's financial report, Nokia's R&D expenses in 2010 were estimated to be 5.8 billion euros, more than four times that of Apple. Nokia had the largest R&D resources that were supposed to be turned into weapons on the battlefield. But it didn't. They always say that the market is too small, no one wants to buy it, and it costs too much. It wasn't until a year after the launch of the iPhone that Nokia launched its first mobile phone with touch technology. But Nokia had mastered touch technology for several years by this time.

6. Poor employment, it is risky for Americans to take charge of European-style companies

Nokia is a Finnish company. In September 2010, American professional manager Stephen Elop took over Taking charge of Nokia and becoming the first non-Finnish "head" is a magnificent adventure in itself. After he took office, Nokia's market value fell from 30 billion euros in 2010 to 10 billion euros this spring. Since Nokia announced its cooperation with Microsoft in February 2011, the company's stock price has fallen by more than 50%. Nokia's current CEO, Stephen Elop, comes from Microsoft. After taking office, he has continuously used pro-Microsoft strategies, repeated strategies, and doubts about his undercover. There is a lot of distrust of Elop within Nokia. Some shareholders even launched Plan B and asked the board of directors to expel Elop.

Now, after the transaction between Nokia and Microsoft is completed, Elop will return to Microsoft and report directly to Ballmer. Everyone lamented Nokia's fate, but Elop's smile remained unchanged.

Nokia’s social portal Facebook Home

Social giant Facebook has been trying to deeply integrate more content into Android smartphones for many years, so it grandly released Facebook in April 2013. Home. Shortly after its release, Facebook Home began to show signs of decline, and the number of early users was far less than expected. "This is not the right product at the right time," said Gartner analyst Brian Blau. "Facebook always thought they could turn things around, but they didn't have the conditions to do it." Since its launch, Facebook Home has Downloads have been declining. It only ranks in the top 500 in the app download rankings in 19 countries, and in most countries, it only ranks in the 300s to 400s in the downloads rankings. On September 15, 2014, Facebook disbanded the Facebook Home engineering team. This move means that Facebook's dream of entering the smartphone market is over. The following are the reasons for its failure:

1. Focus on increasing the number of users

From the purpose of publishing, Facebook launched Facebook Home with the intention of increasing the number of users using Facebook, but the final result is In the past, Facebook users only switched to another Facebook application in form, just with a different name. From the perspective of increasing the number of users using its own application, Facebook Home is completely superfluous.

2. The functional design is unreasonable and touches the bottom line of users

But when users use Facebook Home, the above-mentioned information that naturally appears disappears. Facebook Home is apparently suspected of invading users’ smartphone homepages. Just after Facebook Home was released, a related survey by the well-known technology blog Mashable showed that 77% of voting users chose "yes" when asked whether Facebook Home was an invasion of Facebook homepage, and 84% of voting users were very concerned about this. "Invasion" shows that Facebook Home gives users the feeling of being forced to buy and sell. And this is what users find most objectionable.

3. Conflict of self-interest with partners

From the perspective of partners, in the early days, Facebook Home was only supported by HTC, a mobile phone manufacturer, but then HTC First quickly entered the market. Exited. Many mainstream mobile phone manufacturers are unwilling to cooperate with Facebook because they are considering developing their own theme applications.