The Battle of Songhu was1August 3, 937, the battle of China's army against Japanese invaders attacking Shanghai, also known as "August 13th Battle of Songhu". This was the first important battle in War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, China, and it was also the largest and most tragic battle in War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. After three months, the Japanese army invested more than 300,000 people in eight divisions and six brigades, killing and injuring more than 70,000 people. China's army invested more than 600,000 people in 75 divisions and 9 brigades, with casualties reaching 1.5 million; By 1937, 165438+ 10, 12, Shanghai fell, the battle of Songhu ended and the battle of Jiangyin began. During the Battle of Shanghai and Song Dynasties, China's soldiers and civilians fought bloody battles, which shattered Japan's arrogant plan of "destroying China in three months", bought time for moving out a large number of factories, mines, machinery and strategic materials from Shanghai and other places, and played an important role in persisting in the long-term war of resistance.
Summary of military requirements
Songhu area controls the Yangtze River estuary in the north, Hangzhou Bay in the south, the East China Sea in the east and Nanjing in the west, and its strategic position is very important.
Yes, it is the industrial and commercial center of China. If occupied by the Japanese army, China will suffer serious economic and financial losses.
Strike, if the Japanese army from Shanghai to the west, can threaten Nanjing or return to Jiangxi to threaten Hankou, so it is necessary for both sides.
Fight for the region.
First, strategic points:
1 Shanghai: It is the largest port in China, and its gains and losses have a great impact on China's economy. There is also a Japanese concession in the city, where troops are stationed frequently, which can be used as support and guarantee for Japanese reinforcements.
Jiaxing: Located in Shanghai and Hangzhou? The intersection of Sujia Railway is the transportation hub and the main point of the auxiliary supply line of the national army in Songhu area.
Kunshan: Key Points of Online Replenishment of National Army in Songhu Area.
Changshu: It is the intermediate hub of Five Blessingg Online.
Wuxian: For Beijing and Shanghai? Sujia railway intersection.
Jinshanwei: Suitable for landing. You can surround Shanghai after landing.
Songjiang: It is the contact point between Shanghai and Hang Jian, and also the key point of the auxiliary supply line of the national army in Songhu area.
Second, the traffic:
1 Does the railway include Beijing and Shanghai? Shanghai and Hangzhou? Songhu? Sujia railway is the main and auxiliary supply line of the national army.
What are the main expressways in Beijing and Hangzhou? Beijing and Shanghai? Shanghai-Hangzhou trunk line, with vertical and horizontal roads and developed traffic, has the value of maneuvering and transporting materials for both the enemy and us.
3. Beach head of coastal harbor: Most of the coastal areas in this area are beaches, Wusong? Chuansha? Liuhe? Baimaokou in Hangzhou Bay and jinshanwei area are both favorable beaches for landing.
Fortress: Is there Wusong Fortress? Jiangyin Fortress controls the export of the Yangtze River, and fortifications have been built around Songhu Lake, including the Five Blessingg Line. The fortifications of Xicheng line are the strongest, followed by the west bank of Suzhou River and Zhapingjia line, and there are also bunkers in Zhabei area.
Verb (abbreviation for verb) obstacle
1 Taihu Lake: It is the biggest obstacle in China. If the Japanese army moves westward and forms a division between the north and the south, it will be conducive to the implementation of the national army's interior operations.
Huangpu river: it runs through the north-south direction of Shanghai, so it can't participate, which limits the mobility of the army and is beneficial to the defense of the national army, but it is beneficial to the naval activities of the Japanese army.
Liuhe: Located on the west side, except for some rafters and crossings, you can't get involved, which is conducive to the national army's defensive warfare.
Yangtze River: Located on the north side of the territory, it can limit the Japanese army's circuitous actions and serve as a natural cover for the left side of the national army, but it is beneficial to the activities of the Japanese navy.
Yangcheng Lake and Hucheng Lake: Located in the north and south of Wuxian County, the mobility of the army is limited, and it is easy to distinguish between the enemy and the enemy.
6 the aforementioned fortifications? Obstacles rely on Lingzhou Bay and Taihu Lake, making it difficult for the enemy to detour on a large scale, so they can only attack the front, while the national army can build positions one by one in the rear and resist one by one.
An analysis of the operational concept of Japan and Japanese troops
Strictly speaking, the Japanese army has no planned military action against China. After the war, Shigemitsu Mamoru, the chief representative of Japan's surrender to the allied forces, wrote the book Showa Rebellion, in which it was mentioned that since World War I in Shanghai in the 21st year of the Republic of China, the Japanese navy believed that Shanghai and the Yangtze River valley in Central China should be the operational centers against China, but the army disagreed, thinking that China was not Japan's opponent, and it was more sufficient to solve China with a few troops stationed in North China. Japan's main enemies are the Soviet Union and Russia, so we should focus on the northeast. These two opinions are noisy and can't be solved all the time. In the second year, the business plan has passed the annual deadline and still cannot be decided. The army is in a hurry. In order to perfuse the navy, it added this sentence to its conclusion: If necessary, it may be like sending troops to Shanghai in some cases, but the real intention of the Japanese General Staff is that it is not necessary to send troops to Shanghai. After the July 7th Incident, the Japanese army still did not have a consistent concept of fighting against China. Although there are fragments in its military plan, it is not specific. At the same time, the opinions within its base camp are not consistent with those of the troops fighting in China. At the beginning of the July 7th Incident, the Japanese still regarded it as another local conflict and thought that China would make new concessions in a conciliatory manner. Unexpectedly, China turned tough. The Japanese base camp has different opinions on the handling of this incident, which are divided into cautious faction and radical faction, but their principle is to devote themselves to the specialization of North China. Finally, it was decided to mobilize three divisions and another brigade to March into Peiping and Tianjin, expel the 29th Army of China and seize Peiping and Tianjin.
After the war in North China expanded, Shanghai immediately became excited. The naval forces strongly demanded that the army send troops, but the chiefs of staff resolutely opposed it. As a result, Japanese Prime Minister Wei adopted a minimum plan-a three-point compromise plan. Although the Japanese base camp advocated that the army only sent troops to North China, in order to protect Japanese overseas Chinese, the navy could be used instead of the army to send troops to Shanghai, but in the end, the Japanese army was wiped out. 1960 In April, the Bureau of Historical Affairs sent personnel to visit the War History Room of the Japanese Defense Agency to collect information about the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The visitors met with more than a dozen senior Japanese generals who fought in China.
Interviewer asked: What is the strategic purpose of the Japanese raid on Shanghai?
General Imamoto: At first, the Japanese army had no plans to attack Shanghai. Because captain Dashan was killed in Shanghai, it triggered a conflict between the two sides. At first, the Japanese army fought in Shanghai only to protect overseas Chinese. Unexpectedly, the Japanese army was besieged by China troops in Shanghai, so the Japanese army sent more troops to Shanghai and staged a battle in Shanghai.
As can be seen from the above description, the operational concept of the Japanese army at that time was to protect overseas Chinese in Shanghai at first, and after the expansion of the war, it was to destroy the China army near Shanghai and force China to make peace.
1at the beginning of October, the Japanese reinforcements reached about 6 divisions, but they still could not solve the war and suffered heavy losses. Shintaro Ishihara, the war minister who originally advocated the principle of non-expansion, was forced to resign. After his successor, Major General Shimomura, judged the whole situation, he formulated the following operational guidelines:
1 the army quickly sought the desired results in Shanghai.
2. After the operations in North China and Shanghai reached the expected goals, they turned into long-term operations, focusing on air operations, and continued to attack important locations, which made the enemy lose morale.
After adopting this policy, the base camp actively prepared to send the tenth army to land in Weizhou Bay. 1 1 July 7, the base camp instructed that the task of the Central China Army was to cooperate with the navy to destroy the enemy's fighting will, win the final battle, and sweep the enemy near Shanghai. The Tenth Army received no orders to attack Nanjing. However, after the successful landing in jinshanwei, the Tenth Army realized that the national resistance was weak, which led to its ambition to seize Nanjing, so it crossed the Sujia limit line and attacked Nanjing without authorization. The base camp also had to adjust its actions according to the current battlefield situation.
Third, some problems in the process of ground operations and analysis
I. Analysis of the strategic situation between the two sides before the war
1 Strength and combat power of both sides:
National Army: The total strength is about 50,000.
A army: 87? Eighty-eight thirty-six divisions? Twenty brigades alone? Shanghai Police Corps? Jiangsu guard of a regiment and a battalion of the second artillery corps.
Navy: About forty ships of various types.
C air force: about 250 aircraft can support operations.
Japan: The total ground force is about15,000 people.
An army: an infantry brigade has about 2 100 people, and there are about 3,600 people in rural areas.
B Navy: There are more than 30 ships and about 3,200 marines, and about 3,000 sailors are transferred to join the Marine Corps.
Air Force: There are about one hundred new planes.
In terms of the number of troops, the national army is about twice that of the Japanese army, but what is the combat power of the Japanese army? Powerful firepower.
2 The positions of the forces of both sides:
The Japanese army can land amphibious from the south bank of the Yangtze River estuary and the north bank of Hangzhou Bay, and then insert the two wings of the national army to join forces on the Beijing-Shanghai line, cut off the supply line and retreat of the national army, and completely surround the national army.
The national army faces the rivers and seas, has nowhere to penetrate, and has insufficient strike power. The Japanese army landed on the two wings, was separated and was killed.
3 the relationship between the two forces and their supply lines:
The main base of the National Army is Nanjing, and the supply lines are mainly the Beijing-Shanghai line and the Jiaxing-Xing Wu-Nanjing line. The supply line is perpendicular to the front line, but it is interfered by the Japanese air force.
The Japanese base is located in the northeast of China and its mainland. The supply line is very long, and it is supplied by sea, but it can be covered by its navy and air force, so it is safe.
4. Reinforcements from both sides:
The national army can get reinforcements from five or six divisions and independent 17 1 brigade immediately, and the 18th Army and the 98th Division can arrive five days later. But if the above-mentioned troops arrive, they will have an advantage of five to one or eight to one for the Japanese army.
The Japanese army can get reinforcements from the northeast of North China and Tumen, and it will take three to five days at the earliest to reach the battlefield after preparation and maritime maneuver.
Conclusion: Before the war, the strategic situation of the two sides was roughly the same. The reason for this is the following:
A number of troops: the national army has obvious advantages and rapid growth, but its combat effectiveness is weak.
B supply lines: they are all perpendicular to the battle front, but the national army is fighting in its own territory and has the advantage of local recruitment.
C force position: the Japanese army has the advantage of sea and air.
D reinforcements: the national army can get reinforcements from one division and another brigade immediately, and the Japanese army can get reinforcements in three to five days at the earliest.
Second, the national offensive such as
On August 15, 2006, the National Army launched an attack on the Japanese army in Shanghai with the 87th Division as the left wing and the 88th Division as the right wing. At first, the focus of the attack was Hongkou, and later it turned to the cotton mill of the University of Technology. After several battles, the Japanese Marine Corps in Shanghai was surrounded by our army, but the loss of troops was limited. At the right time, Chen Cheng went to Shanghai to see sincerity. After negotiations between Chen Cheng and Zhang Zhizhong, it was only 36 divisions? The 98th Division launched an attack, and at the same time shifted its focus to Huishan Wharf in an attempt to break through the central government, split the Japanese army in two, and then wiped it out on both sides. Unfortunately, the attack started too early. The 36th Division and the 98th Division approached Huishan Wharf, and the follow-up troops had not yet arrived. The attack was frustrated and changed from active to passive.
As an analysis of the national army attack
1 As can be seen from the analysis of the aforementioned strategic situation, the situation of both sides is roughly equal, and the national army's attack on the Japanese army will only have absolute advantages after the arrival of reinforcements, and only by attacking the Japanese army will it have a chance of winning.
The Japanese army is arrogant and despises the national army. If the national army does not launch an offensive first, the Japanese army will not send troops to reinforce immediately. However, once the national army launches an offensive, the Japanese army is likely to immediately dispatch reinforcements. Therefore, after the national army launched the offensive, it will inevitably reach the prelude after the Japanese reinforcements.
Conclusion: The determination of the national army to attack at dawn on August 15 is insufficient. It is more appropriate to launch an attack around August 20 after the arrival of reinforcements and before the arrival of Japanese reinforcements.
Japanese reinforcements arrived in Wusong on the morning of August 23rd. Baoshan? After landing near Chuanshakou and defeating the defenders, the national army seized the key position along the river, and the national army dispatched troops to attack the Japanese reinforcements. Because Japanese reinforcements arrived on the battlefield one after another, and were equipped with chariots and heavy artillery, the Japanese navy and air force along the coast were all dominant, with fierce firepower and heavy casualties of the national army, so they took the defensive.
Third, the defensive actions of the national army.
From September 14, the Japanese army launched an all-out attack, with the main force pointing directly at Luodian, and fierce fighting broke out between the two sides. By the middle of 10, the Japanese army had increased to six divisions. With the support of a large number of air force heavy artillery vehicles, the main force was directed at the Central Combat Army of the National Army, focusing on Yunzao Beach and implementing infiltration operations. In view of the fact that if the Yunzao beach is penetrated, the Japanese army can go straight to the wild field, which is a great threat to the side and back of the Central Combat Army of the National Army, so it is determined to attack Yunzao. After six days of fighting from1October 2 1 day to 26, they suffered heavy losses, so they turned to the right bank of Suzhou River on the night of1October 26-27, and 1 1 May 5, the two sides were in Liuhe-Luodian West-Suzhou Left Bank-
What's your comment on this bill
1 When the Japanese army goes all out to attack Yunzao Shore, if the newly arrived 2 1 army (4 divisions) is used for recovery or the gap in the northeast of the stadium, it can hit the Japanese flank, which can not only reduce the pressure of the Japanese frontal attack, but even annihilate 1 Japanese army and achieve better results. However, in fact, it failed to stop the Japanese army from infiltrating the Yunzao shore one after another.
/kloc-at the beginning of October, the Japanese army broke through the Yunzao bank, and the Central Combat Army felt that its side was threatened. Surely it should retreat to the west bank of the Jinghe River? Jiading? Nanxiang? The front of the west bank of Suzhou Creek meets the following conditions:
A stay away from the range of Japanese naval guns to avoid losses.
B Existing fortifications can be used, and there is enough time to organize and occupy positions.
C occupying this place can achieve the purpose of refusing to stop the Japanese army and forcing the Japanese army to continue to reinforce.
D have proper space and evacuation route to avoid command and coordination? Difficulties and disorders.
E wing is covered by Liuhe and Huangpu River to avoid being surrounded by Japanese troops.
This can not only reduce the damage, but also make the damage last longer by virtue of the existing position. However, the national army did not turn back until the fall of the field on the 26th, with heavy casualties, and there was no time to occupy and strengthen the existing positions, thus effectively stopping the Japanese army of the Japanese army.
General Zhang Fakui once mentioned the following passage in the article Memories of the Battle of Songhu in August 13:
10 30, the left-wing situation has reached an extremely unfavorable level. The enemy who raided our big field position is already in Zhoujiazhai? When Yaojiazhai crossed Suzhou River, our Shanghai Army felt a great threat from the side and back. Judging from the situation at that time, it seems that the enemy has swept from the west to the left and right. ... from the whole strategy, there is no doubt that the enemy will retreat after crossing the Suzhou River. Although this requires the high command to make a very difficult decision and must be decided immediately, it is the most difficult condition to guide the army soldiers. The article Military in the Anti-Japanese War by Mr. Qi Xisheng was included in The Price of Victory in the Anti-Japanese War.
The responsibility for the final failure of this campaign is not a strategic mistake, but a deviation in implementation. If the national army can withdraw from the battlefield two weeks in advance and calmly retreat to preserve its strength, this battle will be the most brilliant victory in the history of the Anti-Japanese War. Unfortunately, the high command failed to fully grasp the changes in the battlefield, hoping that the enemy's defense line would collapse, and only when a large number of enemy reinforcements landed and directly threatened the national defense line did they retreat hastily, which could not save the end of the whole line.
The Japanese army landed in Wusong-Liujian area, hoping to alleviate the crisis of local Japanese siege and try to eliminate the main force of the national army; However, because the landing area was predicted by the National Army, and it was not far from the main force of the National Army, the National Army could immediately transfer troops to refuse it, making it difficult for the Japanese army to form a siege situation and forcing the National Army to fight a decisive battle. As for its focus on Yunzaobin, if the national army can retreat in time, the Japanese army will not achieve its goal. In a word, this landing of the Japanese army can only solve the crisis of encirclement and suppression of its defenders in Shanghai and oppress the national army to retreat.
The Japanese army landed successfully, and the besieged troops were not afraid of being besieged. The main force of landing near Liuhe Shakou should point to Taicang area, which is the flank of the national army and weak in strength. The Japanese army can go straight to the Beijing-Shanghai line from here, cut off the main supply line of the national army, or achieve the goal of destroying most of the national army.
Fourth, the national army turned into the Republic of China. On October 20th, 2006/KLOC-0, the Japanese base camp decided to start from North China again. North Korea? Japan dispatched three divisions and two wings to form the tenth army to reinforce the fighting in Songhu area. 1 1 On May 5th, the Japanese army landed in jinshanwei, the north shore of Kangzhou Bay, and took the main offensive directed at Songjiang. At the same time, the Japanese army in Shanghai also cooperated with jinshanwei in landing operations and launched an offensive. In view of the critical situation, the third theater decided to turn the left and right combat troops to the national defense positions on the Wufu line and made the following treatments:
1 Make the 67th Army hold Songjiang until the evening of November 11th.
1 1 month 10, the Songhu National Army began to enter.
Comments at this stage are:
1 When the war in Songhu area was deadlocked, the Japanese army formed the 10th Army to land in jinshanwei and immediately launched an attack on Songjiang. If the country does not retreat in time, it may be surrounded, which is quite suitable for the Japanese army.
When the Japanese army landed in jinshanwei, they should immediately turn to the Five Blessingg Line on 1 1 month instead of1month 10, and then they could use the Japanese army to deal a heavy blow to the separation of Taihu Lake, but the war zone turned too late and suffered heavy losses.
General Zeng Zhen once described this retreat in the article "Notes on Shanghai Operations at the Early Stage of the Anti-Japanese War"
As the enemy landed on the two wings of the Shanghai National Army on a large scale, at this time, the National Army did not have a strong reserve, or even a reserve with considerable strength. It cannot hinder the advance of the enemy's wings. If you don't retreat, you are in danger of being surrounded and annihilated. Therefore, our high command decided to retreat all the time. The right-wing national army gradually retreated on 1 1 June 6. On 12, the national troops on the central and left fronts in Shanghai began to retreat rapidly. As the enemy attacked our Jiaxing side first, our army could not retreat to Hangzhou, but only to Nanjing. The traffic from Shanghai to Nanjing, besides railways and highways, even parallel highways, is mainly based on beijing-shanghai railway and Beijing-Shanghai highways. There are countless small rivers on both sides of railways and highways, most of which are too deep to cross. There are few bridges, and the traffic between ordinary people depends on small wooden boats. Therefore, when the country retreated, all troops could only walk along railways and highways, and some bridges were blown up by enemy planes because the roads were not crowded. March in an orderly way, but there are many troops and units retreating behind, and everyone is crowded on railways and highways. At first, the commander of the army hoped that the March would be orderly and the organizational system would not be disordered, so as to maintain the strength of the army; But when they arrived, enemy planes circled in the air day and night, constantly bombing and strafing, and the order was in chaos. The officers and men of the first army mixed into the second army, and the officers and men of the second army squeezed into the third army. The organizational system was chaotic, and the platoon leader of the battalion company controlled his officers and men. There is chaos, and no one can command anyone. The officers and men marched day and night without supplies. The officers and men ate everywhere, but the colonel could not find the battalion commander and company commander. Commander? Commander of the legion? The commander-in-chief received orders from his superiors and moved to the following places. The positions of headquarters at all levels are constantly changing, and orders cannot be delivered. Even if the order is given, it can't be commanded. From the beginning, the chairman ordered the troops to leave Shanghai to defend the national defense fortifications on the Five Blessingg line. If they don't obey, they will engage in military law. But the order went on and no one obeyed. Some troops were ordered to guard, but the key to the iron gate of this reinforced concrete fortress was originally entrusted to the local Garbo commander. Because of the enemy's air raid, the soldiers fell into a panic, and Commander Garbo escaped, and the key could not be found. The iron gate won't open and people can't get in. So it takes a lot of time? The national defense fortifications built with money didn't work, and the troops retreated like a flood. Some commanders had to swim across the river from the water because the railway road was crowded with people. Later, the chairman ordered the troops to defend the national defense fortifications of Xicheng Line, and to act according to military law in violation of mistakes; However, due to the above reasons, the Xicheng line is unguarded. Some of the troops that first withdrew from Shanghai have gone to the periphery of Nanjing to accept orders, arrange for supplementary defense in Nanjing, and are building fortifications; But these troops who arrived after the rout have been retreating to Nanjing Oriental Jurong? In the vicinity of Tangshan and other places, all units set up flags, prepare meals, take care of themselves, then organize and arrange, and then take on the task of defending Nanjing.
Verb (short for verb) There were casualties on both sides.
In this battle, as many as 75 infantry divisions went into battle? Nine infantry brigades? Tax police force? The total number of teaching corps and special forces is more than 600,000, and about 270,000 Japanese troops participated in the war. As for casualties, before the Japanese army landed in jinshanwei, there were 40,672 casualties, including 9 1 15 killed and 3 1357 injured, while the national army suffered heavy losses. However, due to the fact that the casualty data of various military divisions have not been reported, there is still no official casualty statistics, and the estimated casualties are still quite different. It is estimated that the casualties should reach 30.
The Influence and Reflection of Wusong Shanghai Battle on War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.
First, influence the Japanese front.
At present, the Japanese army has a strong fighting capacity, but its resources are insufficient and its war potential is not great. At the same time, we should also prepare for Russia. If we can concentrate our superior forces at the beginning of using force against China, destroy China's force in the shortest time, and force China to make peace before the foreign powers interfere or help, Japan can achieve the effect of a quick victory. Judging from the activities of the Japanese army in Northeast China for many years, it is easy for the Japanese army to point to Ping Jin in the early days, but the capture of Ping Jin will not force China to surrender. If the Japanese army can take advantage of the geographical situation in North China that is conducive to the activities of motorized troops and artillery, it will quickly go south along the Pinghan Railway and point to Hankou, and another army will go north from Guangzhou along the Yuehan Railway and point to Wuchang. Once the northern and southern Japanese troops meet quickly in Wuhan, China will be isolated from the east and the west, and the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River in China will become the richest region. To the east of the Guangdong-Han Railway, the Japanese army can defeat the national army with weak combat power, lost supply lines and no favorable terrain to use.
China's existing combat power is not strong. If we want to make a quick decision on the Japanese army, we can only take advantage of other superior conditions in China, adopt the strategy of continuous consumption, avoid a decisive battle with the Japanese army too early, consume the Japanese army's fighting capacity at the same time, and actively cultivate its fighting capacity. After the Japanese army's offensive is shaken, we will take an offensive to annihilate the Japanese army. Although there is a saying in Sun Tzu's Art of War: One soldier is more expensive than long. Fighting a protracted war of attrition will do great harm to China. However, due to two objective conditions, China has many brave people and vast advantageous terrain. It can not be afraid of being killed by the enemy. It can exchange space for space and use the advantageous terrain to stop the enemy from advancing. From the foregoing analysis of the Japanese quick-fix battle route, we can see that if China wants to wage a protracted war of attrition, it must prevent the Japanese from gaining control of Wuhan too early and being attacked by the north and south, and then it must change the direction of the Japanese battle route.
At the beginning of the Battle of Songhu, the Japanese first sent five divisions from China to fight in Shanghai. After struggle, it transferred two Japanese divisions and a detachment fighting on the Pinghan railway line in North China to Shanghai to fight. 1At the beginning of 0/0, the Japanese army shifted its main battle from North China to Shanghai. At the same time, the Japanese army going south along the Pinghan Railway was threatened by the Shanxi National Army, and the soldiers marched into Shanxi in four ways, which slowed down the speed of the Japanese army going south.
After the Battle of Songhu, the Japanese army formed an army in 2006 1 1 month. Shanghai and Nanjing were captured in1February. Later, the Japanese army was attracted by the main force of the national army near Xuzhou. In the third year of the twenty-seventh year? In April, Xuzhou had a battle with the national army. After that, the Japanese main force went south along the Yangtze River, and1captured Wuhan at the end of October 27th. Although Wuhan fell, Japan lost the chance to win the war. Although the Battle of Songhu caused more than 300,000 casualties in China, it played a key role in the online operations of the Japanese army.
Second, the strong fighting capacity of the Japanese army inspired China's strong determination to fight against China. At the same time, local soldiers from all provinces saw the heroic sacrifice of the Central Army and eliminated the concept of preserving strength, and went to Shanghai to participate in the national jihad.