Since Xiao appointed Shang Yang to carry out the political reform, the State of Qin has formulated the correct strategy of enriching Qin: to enjoy farming, to enrich the army and to enrich Qiang Bing; Lian Heng broke the longitudinal direction, made close friends to attack, and diplomacy succeeded again and again; Flags are flying, fighters are galloping, and military victories are frequently reported. /kloc-for more than 0/00 years, eating slowly and hitting slowly, attacking with heavy punches, breaking the Three Jin Dynasties, defeating the strong Chu and weakening the Eastern Qi have constituted a strategic offensive posture against the six countries in Shandong. In the face of the aggressive soldiers of Qin, Han and Wei condescended to flatter, South Chu was absorbed, East was incompetent, and North Yan was insignificant. Only Zhao, since King Wuling of Zhao carried out the military reform of "Khufu riding and shooting" in 302 BC, has a strong national strength and strong military strength, and has won more than enough battles in foreign wars. There are also a number of generals such as Lian Po, Zhao She and Li Mu who can be good at fighting, and they can still deal with it.
Obviously, if Qin wants to complete the great cause of unifying the six countries, it must pull out the nail of Zhao. Naturally, Ye Zhao is not easy to mess with, so why not give in easily? The strategic decisive battle between the two countries is inevitable.
According to the prime minister's strategic concept of "making friends far away and attacking near", since 268 BC, Wei has successively sent troops to capture Huai (now west of Wuzhi, Henan) and Xingqiu (now near wen county, Henan), forcing Wei to be close to himself. Subsequently, he attacked Korea on a large scale and successively captured Ji (now northwest of Jiyuan, Henan Province), Gaoping (now southwest of Jiyuan, Henan Province), Shaoqu (now west of Jiyuan, Henan Province) and other places. And in 26 1 BC, he conquered the wild king (now Qinyang, Henan Province) and divided Korea into two. When the news came, the South Korean court was in a panic, and quickly sent envoys to the State of Qin to offer peace to the Party County (now Changzhi, Shanxi).
However, Shangdang satrap did not want to give his land to Qin, but chose to give his land to Zhao. His intention is obvious: the advantage of transfer made Zhao and South Korea unite to resist Qin.
Wang Zhao is short-sighted. He accepted the advice of Ping Yuanjun and Zhao Sheng, and used this land to incorporate Shangdang County into his territory. Zhao's move was tantamount to grabbing food from the tiger's mouth, which caused great dissatisfaction in Qin State and intensified the contradiction between Qin and Zhao. Fan Ju suggested that the king of Qin seize the opportunity to send troops to attack Zhao. In 26 1 year BC, the king of Qin ordered Qin Jun to attack Gou's family in South Korea (now southwest of Yanshi, Henan) and take Xingyang to deter South Korea. At the same time, he ordered the commander Wang Bi to lead an army to pounce on Zhao and attack Shangdang. Shangdang Zhao suffered a crushing defeat and retreated to Changping (now northwest of Gaoping, Shanxi).
When the prince of Zhao heard that Qin Jun was marching eastward, the joy of getting the land had disappeared by half. So we had to fight, and sent general Lian Po to lead Zhao's main force to Changping in an attempt to recapture Shangdang. After Lian Po arrived in Changping, he launched an attack on Qin Jun. Unfortunately, both Qiang Qin and Zhao Wei were weak, and Zhao suffered a lot in several wars. Lian Po deserves to be a wise general. In view of the actual situation, he changed his strategic policy in time, turned from defensive to offensive, relied on favorable terrain, built a base and stuck to it. Tired of Qin Jun and Lian Po, this move was very effective, and the momentum of Qin Jun's quick decision was restrained, and the two armies were deadlocked in Changping area.
However, after all, the war directors of Qin were better at playing chess, and they opened the gap with strategy, creating conditions for the subsequent strategic attack. On the one hand, they took advantage of the opportunity of Zheng Zhu, the envoy of Zhao State, to make peace with Qin State, and deliberately entertained Zheng Zhu, creating the illusion of reconciliation between Qin and Zhao for other countries, so that Zhao State lost the opportunity to "unite" with other countries in diplomacy and was passive and isolated. On the other hand, they used a deviant tactic to send people to Handan, the capital of Zhao, to buy off the officials of Zhao Wang and provoke the relationship between Zhao Wang and Lian Po. Rumors are spread everywhere: Lian Po is not afraid. He sticks to the defense in order to surrender to Qin Jun, while Qin Jun is most afraid of Zhao Kuo, the son of Ma Fujun Zhao She. Finally, by the hand of the prince of Zhao, Lian Po was pulled down from the position of the governor of Zhao. The prince of Zhao ignored the opposition of Lin Xiangru and Zhao Kuo's mother and appointed Zhao Kuo as the governor of Zhao.
Zhao Kuo is a mediocre man, lacking practical experience, and will only be an armchair strategist. After he came to power, he rebelled against Lian Po's actions, replaced the general's assistant and changed the military system, alienating Zhao from Germany and demoralizing him. He also changed Lian Po's strategic defense policy and actively planned a strategic offensive in an attempt to win it at one fell swoop and recapture Shangdang.
While confusing Zhao, Qin also adjusted its military deployment in time: immediately sending more troops, and recruiting Wu, a warrior, to command Qin Jun instead of Wang Bi. In order to avoid attracting the attention of the Zhao army, the king of Qin ordered the army to keep this secret strictly: "Anyone who dares to vent his anger will be beheaded." This Tian Lei is not an ordinary person. He was the most outstanding military general in the Warring States period. He fought against yique in many battles, killing 240,000 people in the allied forces of Korea and Wei. The south defeated Chu, entered Yan, entered Ying, burned Yiling and killed Chu people. Zhao Kuo, who can only recite a few words of art of war, is no match for him.
After taking office, in view of Zhao Kuo's weaknesses such as lack of actual combat experience, eagerness to win, recklessness and underestimation, he adopted the correct operational policy of luring the enemy in ambush, dividing troops and then carefully deploying troops, resulting in a powerful situation of "hitting eggs with stones".
Tian Lei's specific operational deployment is to take the original frontline troops as bait troops, wait for the Zhao army to attack, and then retreat to the long wall of the preset main position to lure the enemy deeper; Secondly, skillfully use the long wall to build a bag-shaped position, defend the camp with the main force, resist the attack of the Zhao army, organize the light assault force, and take the initiative to attack after being besieged, consuming the effective strength of the Zhao army; Third, ambush both flanks with 25,000 raiders. After the attack of Zhao, insert it into the rear of Zhao in time, cut off Zhao's retreat, and cooperate with the main force on the long wall of the main position to complete the attack on Zhao's encirclement. Fourth, 5,000 elite cavalry were sent to infiltrate Zhao's camp to contain and monitor the remaining Zhao troops in the camp.
The development of the war situation is indeed in accordance with the direction set by Tian Lei. In August, 260 BC, Zhao Kuo, who knew nothing about the dynamics, led Zhao Zhuli to launch a large-scale attack on Qin Jun. After a brief confrontation between the two armies, the decoy troops pretended to rout. Reckless Zhao Kuo regardless of the actual situation, immediately led the army to pursue. When Zhao advanced to the preset position, he was strongly resisted by the main force, and his offensive was defeated and blocked under the city wall. Zhao Kuo wanted to leave, but it was too late. Qin Jun's 25,000 men, who had been ambushed on the two wings in advance, quickly attacked, inserted behind Zhao's attacking troops in time, seized Xiguan (now the highland of Han Wang Mountain in Gaoping, Shanxi Province), cut off the contact between the attacking Zhao and its camp, and surrounded the attacking Zhao. Another group of 5,000 Qin soldiers quickly inserted into Zhao's camp to contain and monitor part of Zhao's camp and cut off all food passages for Zhao. At the same time, the commandos were ordered to attack the besieged Zhao army continuously. Zhao's army was unfavorable in several wars and the situation was very critical. He was forced to camp on the spot, turn to attack and wait for rescue.
Hearing that the state of Zhao was surrounded, the Qin people came to Hanoi (now Qinyang, Henan Province and its vicinity) to organize all the local men over 65,438+05 years old to form an army to reinforce the Changping battlefield. This army entered Danzhuling, now north of Changping, and its highland to the east, further cutting off Zhao's reinforcements and logistics supply, thus ensuring that the besieged Zhao army was completely annihilated.
By September, Zhao Jun had been deprived of food for 46 days, killing each other internally, shaking the morale of the army, and the shadow of death hung over the whole army. The situation is very critical. Zhao Kuo organized four breakout forces to attack Qin Jun positions in turn, hoping to open a way out, but all failed. In desperation, Zhao Kuo put all your eggs in one basket and led Zhao's elite troops to break through. The result was a fiasco, and even he himself was killed by an arrow. Zhao lost his commanding general, lost his fighting spirit and stopped resisting. More than 400,000 hungry and exhausted troops all surrendered to Qin Jun, and all these 400,000 Zhao soldiers, except 240 young people, were brutally killed by Leitian. Qin Jun finally won the unprecedented fierce and cruel battle of Changping.
In the battle of Changping, Qin Jun annihilated 450,000 Zhao troops before and after, which fundamentally weakened Zhao, the most powerful opponent among the six Kanto countries at that time, and also gave great shock to other Kanto vassal states. Since then, the road of Qin's unification of the six countries has become unimpeded.
The defeat of Qin Sheng and Zhao in the battle of Changping was not accidental. In addition to the overall strength, Qin has a relative advantage over Zhao, and the strategic gains and losses of both sides and the level of specific combat art application are also important factors. Qin Jun won because: first, it divided and disintegrated the strategic alliance of the six countries in Kanto; Secondly, the clever use of deviant behavior induced Wang Zhao to make a serious mistake of improper placement; The third is to choose the right person and use Tian Lei, who is resourceful and brave, as the main general; Fourth, cherish the fighters in vain, use soldiers as gods, lure the enemy to attack, and then divide and surround the Zhao army with tactics of winning by surprise, so as to increase the pain and annihilate it; Fifth, at the critical moment of the battle, Qin mobilized from top to bottom, reinforced in time, coordinated and cooperated, cut off the enemy's assistance, and provided the necessary guarantee for the correct operational command.
The reasons for Zhao Jun's crushing defeat are as follows: first, regardless of the situation that the enemy is strong and we are weak, he rashly went to war and pursued blindly; Second, it's easy to get cold feet, and let Zhao Kuo, who has no actual combat experience, take the place of Zhao Jun, commander-in-chief of Lian Po, who has been alienated by Qin people. Thirdly, in diplomacy, he is not good at taking advantage of the hatred of countries towards Qin, and actively strives for cooperation with countries to help himself; Fourth, Zhao Kuo didn't know the meaning of "odd and positive" changes and flexible use of troops. He doesn't know the correct operational policy, nor does he know the actual situation of the enemy. He didn't even get out of trouble from the mechanism, and he was always passive. Fifth, in the specific operation, repeatedly make big mistakes. At the beginning of the decisive battle, we rushed out and were besieged. After the siege, they only knew how to break through passively and forcibly, and did not cooperate internally and externally, which eventually led to the tragic end of the collapse of the whole army.