(1) The Red Army's Long March was the result of the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" under the guidance of Wang Ming's "Left" ideology.

(2) The Long March of the Red Army has historical inevitability and necessity. It was not the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" caused by the "Left" error that forced the Long March, but the change of political, economic, military and other objective conditions and subjective reasons in China at that time.

(3) There are three main reasons for the Red Army's Long March:

First, the Soviet area has shrunk. By September 1934, the central base area had been reduced from 35 counties to only a few counties such as Ruijin and Xingguo. The area has been reduced from more than 50,000 square kilometers to about 1 10,000 square kilometers, leaving the Red Army with no room for manoeuvre.

Second, because of the enemy's economic blockade and Wang Ming's "Left" economic policy, the economy of the base area is on the verge of collapse, which makes the Red Army lack the material conditions to continue its struggle in the base area.

Third, due to the shrinking area and population of the Soviet area, the Red Army soldiers could not be replenished, so they had to break through and develop outward.