Don't worry, let's talk slowly. The biggest problem in ancient wars was the weak transport capacity.
Compared with today's trains, planes, trucks, ancient people can only rely on cattle, horses, donkeys and other animal power, and these things are also very expensive in wartime, so many times, the ancients have to rely on the expropriation of food and grass carried by the wives of the people, and there is no particularly easy way in ancient times, even at the equator of Qin Dynasty.
The side effect of this inefficient transportation is "consumption", which is very consumption! Whether it is human or animal power, a certain proportion of food will be consumed on the road. For example, when Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty attacked the Xiongnu, there were 65,438+10,000 troops at the front line, and hundreds of thousands of civilian workers needed to be mobilized to relay to the front line at one time. A kilo of grain was transported to the hands of the front-line Han army, and 30 kilos were consumed on the road.
So did Napoleon's 600,000-man expedition to Russia. Although time has entered the modern era, the transportation efficiency has not been greatly improved in essence. As a reformer of the military system, Napoleon believed that "marching is war", so his understanding of the importance of logistics was far better than that of contemporary rulers. He left out the military tent that needed to be checked by cart, let the soldiers sleep in the open air, and replaced heavy containers such as wooden boxes with cloth bags, so that the carriage could drag more food and grass. Before attacking Russia, Napoleon hoarded food in Danzig for a long time, which could consume 400,000 soldiers and 50,000 war horses for 50 days, and forcibly requisitioned 30,000 carriages and more than 300,000 war horses from Europe, just to maintain the consumption of the army.
But even with such full preparation, Napoleon finally fell on the logistics problem. With the help of frequent ambushes in winter, the Russians cut off the long supply lines, which eventually led to the complete collapse of the arrogant French army and blew the horn of funeral for Napoleon. According to historical records, Napoleon's logistics motorcade is much better than that in the era of Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty. The carriage reduces the logistics consumption to one third, but even so, the consumption of 600,000 people for 82 days is an amazing figure.
In a long historical stage, people can't solve the transportation problem of grain and grass at all. Therefore, both Central Europe and ancient times set up military grain depots and logistics bases at the front. They are usually responsible for hoarding and transferring materials and food, and become the logistics backbone to support the front line in wartime. Otherwise, everything will have to be transported for a long distance, not to mention the huge cost, like Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty hit Xiongnu and Napoleon hit Russia. Can the long supply line be safe?
Therefore, relying on the "grain city" to resist, the frontline troops moved slowly and steadily, which became the basic routine of ancient wars. After all, the ancients had limited mobility and transportation capacity. However, it should be noted here that the theme says "
It is not true why the military camp and the grain depot are not in the same place. The large-scale "grain market" itself is a fortress. They are usually well defended, with delicate terrain and abundant materials, and it is difficult to do it overnight. Think about it, so many food supplies are not heavily guarded, who will rest assured? There were only a few roads in ancient times, and there was no satellite navigation. Who can easily go deep behind enemy lines and conquer the grain city? The other side has food and people, so the enemy can get more than he bargained for.
Moreover, war has a routine of war. Even in commercial and warehouse supermarkets, it is impossible for all materials to be piled up in the most favorable supermarket for delivery, but to turn around each other through large warehouses. The same is true of war. A large grain market hoards a huge amount of grain, far exceeding the short-term demand of an army. Sometimes it is necessary to supply more than one army and cooperate with the overall strategy. Why give it to an army? It is impossible for a fighting army to fight with a huge granary on its back. Can you walk?
With the progress of the war, the grain and grass in the big grain market will continue to support the front line in accordance with the "grain road", and some grain will be piled up again halfway to form a secondary transfer station to continue to support the front line. In this cycle, theoretically, as long as there is enough food and grass, an army can reach the horizon.
In fact, the troops also have their own logistics reserves, which are generally not very small, which is related to the combat capability of the troops. As early as the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, China people knew how to "settle accounts" for the battlefield, so as to make overall plans on how much food they need to consume, how much food they can carry and how long they can fight, and make plans for the war. But as I said before, in ancient times, transportation capacity was limited. In addition to food, troops must also transport weapons, armor, arrows, tents, medicinal materials, tools and many other things. Like the volunteers of later generations, it is already the limit of many troops to carry grain bombs that can fight mobile warfare for seven days.
In addition, what did the ancient feudal rulers guard against most? It's the army. How to control the army? To control food, of course. The army with grain is in no hurry, and the distribution right of grain is in the hands of the court. It is very simple to achieve the goal of pinching the lifeline of the generals and avoiding the rebellion or rebellion of the other side.
In a word, the big granary is the war preparation made by the ancients based on the backward transportation capacity, and the real granary itself is the barracks; After the frontline troops attack, the grain and grass in the granary will be transported by special logistics forces, and then a new grain depot will be set up according to the war situation. It is precisely because the grain route is easy to break the grain city and difficult to rob the grain city. Every time a hero breaks through the grain city in history, it will bring about a strategic change.